IMT Nuremberg Archives

H – 1503 A-J

International Court of Justice

374-385

H-1503 (a-j)

H1503-0002

Filed Feb. 21, 1946
[illegible]
Clerk

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503 a

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР № 374.

PS-1099

A 083669

H1503A-0001

EXHIBIT U.S.A. USSR 374 (1099-PS)

EXHIBIT ~~U.S.A.~~ USSR 374

(1099-PS)

A 083670

H1503A-0002

H1503A-0003

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document 1099-PS No. USSR- 374 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the ~~United States~~ Russian Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the National Archives, Washington D.C. .

Nuremberg, 19 July 1948

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military
Tribunal

H1503A-0004

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date: 2.12.47

I certify that Document Number 1099-PS was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-374 in the Trial by the International Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

FRED NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document Control Branch

DCB-36 (102447)

H1503A-0005

Marginal note on left side of the document:

"Dies wohl auf Befehl des Fuehrers.
Warum keine Benachrichtigung ..... gez. R.

gez. R."

Marginal note as seen on the original
R. Manuscript.

H1503A-0006

Der Generalkommissar für
Weißruthenien.

Minsk, den 29.September 194

Herrn
Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete
Reichsleiter Alfred R o s e n b e r g ,

B e r l i n W 35
Rauchstr. 17/18

P e r s ö n l i c h !

Ministerbüro
Eing. am -3. OKT. 1941 Nr.

Sehr verehrter Parteigenosse Reichsleiter Rosenberg!

Heute habe ich endlich nach langem Suchen die Reste der Kunstschätze in Minsk feststellen und sicherstellen können. Minsk besaß eine große - zum Teil sehr wertvolle - Kunst- und Gemäldesammlung, die fast restlos aus Minsk entfernt worden ist. Auf Befehl des Reichsführers SS Reichsleiters Heinrich Himmler ist die Mehrzahl der Gemälde - zum Teil noch unter meiner Amtsführung - von der SS verpackt und ins Reich verschickt worden. Es handelt sich hierbei um Millionenwerte, die dem Generalbezirk Weißruthenien entzogen worden sind. Die Gemälde sollen nach Linz und nach Königsberg in Ostpreußen verschickt worden sein. Ich bitte, diese wertvollen Sammlungen - soweit sie nicht im Reich benötigt werden - für den Generalbezirk Weißruthenien wieder zur Verfügung zu stellen, auf jeden Fall aber den materiellen Wert für das Ministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete sicherzustellen.

Nach Aussage eines Majors der 707. Division, der mir heute die Restbestände übergab, hat die SS die übrigen Bilder und Kunstgegenstände - darunter wertvollste Bilder und Möbel aus dem 18. und 19.Jahrhundert, Vasen, Marmor-Gegenstände, Uhren usw. - der Wehrmacht zur weiteren Ausplünderung überlassen. Der General Stubenrauch hat einen wertvollen Teil aus Minsk mit nach vorn ins Operationsgebiet genommen. Sonderführer, die mir noch nicht gemeldet werden konnten, haben 3 Lastkraftwagen (ohne Quittung) mit Möbeln, Bildern und Kunstgegenständen verschleppt. Ich lasse die Formationen feststellen, um die Bestrafung der Schuldigen, die sich der Plünderung strafbar gemacht haben, durchzusetzen.

1099-PS

EXHIBIT U.S.A. (1099-PS)

Von den Überresten haben hiesige Wehrmachts- und SS-Stellen - ohne meine Genehmigung - weitere Gegenstände und Bilder entnommen, die aber in Minsk noch nachgewiesen werden können.

Ich bitte, zur Restaurierung der zum Teil sinnlos durch Messerstiche beschädigten Gemälde den nationalsozialistischen Kunstmaler Willi S p r i n g e r , Berlin SW 29, Hasenheide 94, herzuschicken, damit unter seiner Aufsicht gerettet werden kann, was noch zu retten ist. Leider sind auch zahlreiche wertvolle Vasen, Porzellan, Schränke und Stilmöbel aus dem 18.Jahrhundert schwer beschädigt oder zerstört worden. Im ganzen handelt es sich um unersetzliche Werte von Millionen von Mark. Für die Zukunft bitte ich um Schritte des Ostministeriums bei den verantwortlichen Wehrmachtsstellen, daß derartige Zerstörungen abgestellt und daß die Schuldigen mit schwersten Strafen bedroht und belegt werden.

Auch das vorgeschichtliche Museum befindet sich in einem völlig verwüsteten Zustand. Die geologische Abteilung ist um wertvolle Edelsteine und Halbedelsteine beraubt worden. In der Universität sind Instrumente von hunderttausenden von Mark sinnlos zerschlagen oder verschleppt worden. Vielleicht wäre eine Meldung an den Führer durch Sie, sehr verehrter Herr Reichsleiter, zu empfehlen. Das schon an sich arme Weißruthenien hat durch diese Handlungen schwersten Schaden erlitten. Hoffentlich werden in Leningrad und in Moskau sowie in den alten Kulturstädten der Ukraine von vorn herein Sachverständige zur Verhütung derartiger Vorgänge eingesetzt, sonst findet die Zivilverwaltung überall dieselben Verheerungen wie hier vor.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 374
Filed Jul 21, 1946

H e i l H i t l e r !

Ihr sehr ergebener

Wilhelm Kube

Generalkommissar für Weißruthenien.

H1503A-0007

H1503A-0008

USSR - 374

(PS - 1099)

Filed Feb. 21, 194

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503b

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

29

СССР № 375

A 083673

PS-076.

375

H1503B-0001

H1503B-0002

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document 046-PS No. USSR - 345 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the ~~United States~~ Russian Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the National Archives, Washington D.C. .

Paul Joosten

Nürnberg, 19 July 1948

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military
Tribunal

H1503B-0003

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date: 2./ 12./47

I certify that Document Number 076-PS was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-375 in the Trial by the International Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

FRED NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document Control Branch

DCB-36 (102447)

CCCP-375 OFFICE OF U.S.CHIEF OF COUNSEL
Doc.No.076-PS FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY
APO 887 Date: 13 August 1945.

Source of Original ROSENBERG files

STAFF EVIDENCE ANALYSIS

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT (Under following headings).

Title and Nature: Draft Letter from ROSENBERG to HITLER re. seizure of art objects in the east.

Date: 16 Oct.1941; Original ( ) Copy (x); Language: German.

If not English, is translation attached: Yes ( ) No ( )

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)as of 15 August 1945:

Unknown. Copy in ROSENBERG files, OCC-Paris.

PERSONS OR ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED: ROSENBERG, Alfred; HITLER, Adolf; OKW; SS; APA; SD; BORMANN, Martin.

REFERENCES TO INDEX HEADING (Key to par.nos.of Summary below):

1. SPOLIATION OF FOREIGN PROPERTY - Direct Seizure

NECESSARY PROCESSING TO PUT IN EVIDENTIARY FORM: LEADS General STUBENRAUCH, Director ROSSE, Gruppenführer SCHAUB, Dr.HEYM, Doc.No.077-PS.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

1. ROSENBERG reports to HITLER theft, plunder and organized seizure of objects from public art collections and libraries. The SS, SD, Wehrmacht and General STUBENRAUCH are implicated or held responsible.

2. The document does not contain any evidence that it has been finally submitted to HITLER.

LT.WILDON Doc.No.076-PS
NOTE:DO NOT MARK,UNDERLINE OR OTHERWISE DEFACE ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 375
Filed Feb 21,1946

H1503B-0005

Translation of Document 076
Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel

Draft of a letter from the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territory to the Führer.

In re: The placing in security of art treasures, cultural goods and research materials in the occupied Eastern Territories.

---

my Führer!

Various reports coming into my office made me decide to ask you, my Führer, to consider a binding and fundamental regulation for all German service bureaux including the Wehrmacht in order to assure the securing of art treasures, cultural goods and research materials in the occupied Eastern Territories. As Reichminister for the occupied Eastern Territories I do not envisage my tasks confined to taking care of the new areas administratively and making them useful to the Great German Reich, but also as your representative in the responsibility before history, I should like to make certain that all art treasures, cultural goods and all the research material of this area be reserved exclusively for the Great German Reich (Grosse Deutschen Reich). By this means unnecessary destruction and private thievery by subjects of the Great German Reich should be avoided. How much these factors are at fault, is demonstrated by two reports, which have been sent to me concerning the proceedings in Minsk. The enclosed report of Corporal Dr. Abel, who was placed in Minsk on my instigation in order to carry out his tasks, proves beyond doubt, that the destructions (which might have been avoided) were perpetrated by German units in the libraries of Minsk. From the reports it further appears that once the Propaganda Ministry, and on another occasion, the Security Police undertook confiscations of which I, as the competent Minister for the occupied areas, should have been informed. Which of the other Reich Authorities have undertaken confiscation on their own account, is not yet known here.

It is known to me, my Führer, that you permitted certain art treasurers to be transported to the museum in Linz for the purpose of placing them in security. General Commissar Kube has reported to me, however, that in this connection great values from the extensive collections of art treasures in Minsk have been taken away by service offices and persons who ostensibly were not authorized to do so. Such proceedings in my opinion can not bring forth any good, and because of the nature of the situation, can only be prevented by a special disposition emanating from you, my Führer.

In this connection I would like to mention the Einsatzstab of my service bureau. In the Eastern occupied territories, materials required for my political and scientific work (this includes a great volume of art treasures in the possession of Jews) have been placed in security by my Einsatzstab. These objects have been sheltered in the castles Neuschwanstein and near Chiemsee according to their individual character. These art treasures are being so catalogued by my deputies, that they can be submitted to you, my Führer, in comprehensive picture catalogues permitting selection for your various plans. I have laid special stress on this point, that the whole work is to be executed correctly to the smallest detail and

H1503B-0006

that the result is to be available in the first place to you, my Fuehrer.

The Reich head of the treasury (Reichsschatzmeister) of the Nazi Party has financed this work on a grand scale and in general made possible its execution. The organs of the State and the Wehrmacht declined to accept the responsibility for this work, which as a consequence I am executing in our fight against Jewry. It has, however, been agreed with the support of Reich Marshal Hermann GOERING, that all these tasks would be executed within the framework of my Einsatzstab. Thus unsupervised separate actions of different service bureaus and personalities are to be prevented. Your adjutant, Gruppenfuehrer SCHAUB, and the adjutant of Reich Director (Reichsleiter) BORMANN, Ministerial Counsellor Dr. HETH, have had the opportunity to learn about my Einsatzstab's mode of working.

I have now indicated to the same Einsatzstab of my service bureaus, which had executed the work in the west in a comprehensive fashion, to execute the same task in the eastern territories. In order to prevent the material from being dispersed to the four winds, I have forbidden first of all that any shipment should be within the province of the civil administration. The whole of the material should be safeguarded and catalogued by my special employment staff. In this manner a perspective is created by which all the justified wishes and demands of the service bureaus of the great German Reich can be considered. On this basis, my Fuehrer, I should be in a position to accept the responsibility of guaranteeing that all art treasures, which are involved with your personal plans respecting Linz and other museums, could be directed effectively to this purpose. The hypothesis for that is, however, that the work of my Einsatzstab begins directly on the operational area, and thus follows hard on the heels of the troops. On the basis of past experience this is only possible, if you, my Fuehrer, publish a command for this purpose, which is binding on all service bureaus which are active in the occupied eastern territories including the operational area.

I am taking the liberty to enclose here an appropriate draft which will make the stated purpose known to the troops via the three divisions of the armed forces, to the individual units of the SS and Security Police through the Reichsfuehrer of the SS. I should also be very appreciative, if Mr Director POSSE as your special representative for the Linz Museum would direct his wishes and proposals to me. By this means, my Fuehrer, I can assure strict compliance with your wishes. It seems to me that it would also be very useful if even more delegates were to be employed with the already existing service bureaus and organisations which are concerned with these tasks. I have been informed by General Administrative Officer (Generalquartiermeister) of the army, that Mr Dr von HOLST has been deputized upon the proposal of Director POSSE to assure the safety of the art treasures in Leningrad. Mr Dr von HOLST as a person well-informed on the country and as an art expert is very well-fitted for this. Thus it seems to me for the above-mentioned reasons his activity would be put to more use within the framework of my Einsatzstab. In that fashion the work of my Reich Commissar would be made easier, and it will fit in with the wishes and conceptions of the Generalquartiermeister of the army.

H1503B-0007

DRAFT

D E C R E E

to all service bureaus and members of the three parts of the Armed Forces, of the Waffen-SS

to the Sonderkommandos of the Security Police and the Security Service.

to all special deputies and commissars of the Great German Reich.

as well as the Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories and his subordinate offices in the occupied eastern territories.

Subject: The placing in safety of art-treasures, cultural goods and research material in the occupied eastern territories.

For the purpose of placing art treasures, cultural goods and research materials of the occupied eastern territories in security, I hereby decree:

1) The transporting away and removal of art treasures, cultural goods, scientific and world political philosophical research materials of all sorts (libraries, archives, museums, galleries, scientific-political and world philosophy institutions) from the occupied eastern territories is hereby forbidden. I delegate the Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories for the task of placing in security and cataloguing of the above-mentioned materials. For the realization of this purpose the Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories is activating an Einsatzstab under the direction of Reichshauptstellenleiter UTIKAL.

2) The Einsatzstab of the Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories, which bears the designation Einsatzstab Rosenberg for the occupied areas, starts its activity in the rear army areas and ends only where the subsequent civil administration takes over. In the operational area the activity of this Einsatzstab will be executed by Sonderkommandos which are to join the individual armies. Further stipulations respecting cooperation with the armies are being decreed by the Generalquartiermeister of the army in accordance with the agreement with the Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories.

3) The Reich Minister for occupied eastern territory is to inform me personally from time to time about the results of this work. He is to provide the Einsatzstab with the requisite directives.

4) The Reich Minister for the eastern occupied territories is to consult with the central authorities with regard to the dismissal of expert personnel for the mission of art, archive and library defense.

5) This regulation does not concern the special missions of the Foreign Office in the Embassies, Legations and Consulates. Likewise, the missions of the Security Police and the Security Service for the pursuit and annihilation of enemies of National Socialists remain in full force.

6) The financing of the Rosenberg Einsatzstab is being undertaken by the Reich treasury head of the Nazi Party as a party mission of importance to the war effort. This is a consistent continuation of its fight against world-bolshevism both in the occupied western territories and in the southeast.

H1503B-0008

A special agreement between the Reichs Minister for occupied eastern territories and the Reich Finance Minister on one side and the Reich Treasury Head of the Nazi Party on the other, will be reached in order that a share of the costs will be assumed by the Reich.

7) Requests for consideration in the allotment of materials placed in security by the Einsatzstab Rosenberg are to be directed to the Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories, Berlin W 35, Tiergartenstrasse 17-18. The decision on these matters emanates from me personally upon a proposal of Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories. On this point, the already drafted directives (of the Reich Marshal of the Great German Reich, GOERING) respecting the occupied western territories are to meet with due consideration.

16 October 1941 - W/Sz

H1503B-0009

COPY

The General Commissar
for West Ruthenia

Minsk, 29 September 1941

To
Reich Minister for the occupied eastern territories,
Reich Director (Reichsleiter) Alfred ROSENBERG

Berlin W-35
Bucherstr. 17/18

Personal!

Dear Party Member Reich Director Rosenberg!

Today after long searches I have finally been able to locate and place in security the remainder of the art treasures in Minsk. Minsk possessed a large - in part very valuable - art and painting collection, but nearly all has been shipped out of Minsk. On the order of Reich Leader (Reichsfuehrer) SS Reich Director (Reichsleiter) Heinrich HIMMLER the majority of the paintings (in part under the jurisdiction of my office) have been packed and sent into the Reich by the SS. In this case it was a question of millions in value which have been removed from the general district of White Ruthenia. The paintings should have been sent to Linz and to Koenigsberg in East Prussia. I request that these valuable collections - insofar as they are not needed in the Reich - should be again made available for the General District (Generalbezirk) of White Ruthenia, or in any case to place the material value in security for the Ministry of the Occupied Eastern territories.

According to the statement of a major of the 707th Division, who today gave over to me the remaining goods, the SS has abandoned the left-over paintings and art objects - including very valuable pictures and furniture of the 18th and 19th centuries, vases, marble objects, timepieces, etc. - to the further plundering of the Armed Forces. General STUBENRAUCH has taken with him a very valuable booty to the forward area in the operational district. Special agents (Sonderfuehrer) whose identity I have not yet been able to learn, have shipped away three freight cars (without receipt) loaded with furniture, pictures and art objects. I will make certain of these conditions in order to enforce the punishment of the persons who have made themselves liable to punishment by their looting. The local armed forces and SS offices have taken away - without my approval - additional pictures and objects from the remainder. These can still be found in Minsk.

I request that the National Socialist artist Willi Springer, Berlin SW 29, Hasenheide 94, be sent here for the restoration of a portion of the paintings which were senselessly damaged by knife-cuts. Thus under his supervision can be rescued what is still possible to rescue. Unfortunately, numerous valuable vases, porcelain, chests, style furniture of the 18th century have been heavily damaged or destroyed. All in all, it is a question of an irreplaceable value of millions of marks. For the future, I request that the Ministry for occupied eastern territory take

H1503B-0010

the matter up with the responsible offices of the Armed Forces so that all destruction is suppressed and that the guilty persons be threatened with the severest punishments.

[illegible], the prehistoric museum is in a fully ruined condition. The geological section has been robbed of valuable jewels and semi-precious stones. In the University instruments worth hundred of thousands of marks have been senselessly broken to pieces or shipped away. Perhaps it is to be recommended that the Fuehrer be informed by you, dear Mr Reichs Director (Reichsleiter). Poor White Ruthenia has already suffered the worst of the damages by these deeds. It is to be hoped that in Leningrad and in Moscow as well as in the old cultural cities of the Ukraine experts will be employed from the beginning to prevent such proceedings, otherwise the civil government will find generally the same destruction as heretofore.

Heil Hitler !
Your very devoted,
signed: Wilhelm Kube
General Commissar for White Ruthenia

H1503B-0011

Report of Corporal ABEL concerning the Libraries in Minsk

On the insistance of the commander of the rear military area, I was ordered to report at the Field Command Post (Feldkommandantur) of the city of Minsk for fourteen days for the purpose of making an inspection of the library materials. This was evidently a reference to material taken from the Library of the Academy of Sciences and placed in security at Field Command Post as well as to the Library of the Academy of Sciences itself. In the course of my work in Minsk it became necessary for me to inform myself with respect to all the libraries there and to examine the condition of their contents. Thus the question came up of guaranteeing the security of the libraries on the spot and to describe what measures have already been taken as well as those which are still necessary in order to protect them from theft, plundering and the weather conditions. The present report naturally goes into the general characteristics of the libraries, which should make possible and lighten the task of a later evaluation by other offices.

I - Lenin Library

Krasno-armeiskaja 9, not far from the Red Army House

The building is a new edifice. The locations of the storage rooms, the reading rooms and the special sections are opportune and well thought out. The building as a whole is nearly intact, though the bombardment wrecked all the window-panes and frames. The destruction in the interior of the building was caused in the greater part by German military units though the Russian military personnel and civil population were responsible for a small part of it. This occurred when the shortage of undestroyed buildings obliged these elements to use the library for shelter and business space. The leader of the German unit presently stationed in the building has brought about the covering of the windows of the ground floor with planks in place of the destroyed window-panes so that no more property will be looted. He complained that before his arrival senseless destruction was perpetrated - obviously by members of the Armed Forces. The contents of the book-stacks had been torn from the shelves, trampled under foot, and in part, disgustingly, soiled. He himself has endeavored since his arrival (and with success) to keep the material found, and to protect it from theft by Russian elements and from further plundering.

The Lenin Library is the central library of White Russia. An estimate of the number of volumes is difficult, but the figure should run close to 1.5 million volumes. It received, it is stated, copies by obligatory deposit from all the Soviet sister republics. About 2/3 of the catalogues are preserved; perhaps, in the future, some boxes of catalogue cards will be found. There are three catalogues: an alphabetical catalogue of the authors, an object catalogue classified under the decimal system and an object catalogue which is arranged according to large areas, and under these areas, according to title in alphabetical order. The whole catalogue is a card-catalogue of the international format. The chief reading room is bright and roomy; nearly all of its furniture and reference library were taken away. The shelves in the book-stacks, are built of wood which is impregnated against fire. The emplacement of the books is set up in accordance with the 9 or 10 large groups of the decimal classification. Accessions are possible within

H1503B-0012

these groups. The contents of the special sections are located in the reading room of relevant special section. There is a surprisingly large number of unbound books; evidently there was not enough money available for binding. This observation is also valid for the other libraries.

* * * * * * * *

(Remainder of the document is given below in synopsis form)

1) Additional description of the Lenin Library.

2) Library of the Academy of Sciences: Lengthy description. Library has strong propaganda character. About 200,000 volumes. Reich Propaganda Ministry had made investigation before writer. Important Radziwill collection (taken from Poland in 1940) partly destroyed, part placed in Field Command Post building.

3) Gorki Library: Detailed description: Destruction of part. Confiscations by Wehrmacht.

4) Pushkin Library: Description. Destruction slight. Confiscation by Security Police.

5) Tolstoy Library: Little destruction.

6) University Library, the Medical Library, Library of People's Economy Institute. Descriptions. First named confiscated by Armed Forces. Estimate of destruction.

7) Other Scientific Libraries: Description of contents and extent of destruction or confiscations.

8) Military Literature: The library in the House of the Red Army. Chaos and confiscations.

States that steps will have to be taken to preserve collections and literature of value to the Reich. Necessary to have command from highest source to restrain German soldier.

H1503B-0013

OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

Reference: Certificate 11 September 1945

dated 11 Sept 1945 for

Document No. 076-PS

Signed by Wm H Baldwin

Maj AC, O-919524

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, FRED NIEBERGALL, 2nd Lt Inf, O-1555567,

hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English, ~~French~~, and German languages; and that the attached is a true and correct translation, made under my supervision by WALTER D BROWN JR, Civilian,

a qualified translator, into the English language from the (German) ~~(French)~~ language, of the document (or excerpts therefrom as indicated)* attached to, and referred to in the Certificate dated 11 September 1945, for Document No. 076-PS, signed by Wm H Baldwin, Maj AC, O-919524.

Fred Niebergall

NAME FRED NIEBERGALL

RANK 2nd Lt Inf

ASN O-1555567

*To be used where excerpts only are translated and to be stricken when entire document is translated.

Entwurf eines Schreibens des Reichsministers für die besetzten Ostgebiete an den Führer

Betr.: Sicherstellung von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und Forschungsmaterial in den besetzten Ostgebieten

Mein Führer!

Verschiedene bei mir eingegangene Berichte veranlassen mich, Sie, mein Führer, zu bitten, für die Sicherstellung von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und Forschungsmaterial in den besetzten Ostgebieten eine für alle deutschen Dienststellen einschliesslich der Wehrmacht und den SS-Formationen bindende grundsätzliche Regelung zu treffen. Als Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete sehe ich meine Aufgaben nicht nur darin, die neuen Gebiete verwaltungsmässig zu betreuen und für das Grossdeutsche Reich nutzbar zu machen, sondern möchte auch als Ihr Treuhänder in Verantwortung vor der Geschichte alle Kunstschätze, Kulturgüter und das gesamte Forschungsmaterial dieses Raumes für das Grossdeutsche Reich umfassend gesichert wissen. Dadurch sollen unnötige Zerstörungen und private Diebstähle durch Angehörige des Grossdeutschen Reiches vermieden werden. Wie sehr diese Dinge teilweise im argen liegen, geht aus zwei Berichten hervor, die mir über die Vorgänge in Minsk zugeleitet wurden. Der beiliegende Bericht des Gefreiten Dr. A b e l , der auf meine Veranlassung in Minsk zur Durchführung seiner Aufgaben angesetzt wurde, lässt eindeutig erkennen, dass Zerstörungen in den Bibliotheken von Minsk durch deutsche Einheiten vorgenommen wurden, die sich ohne weiteres hätten vermeiden lassen. Aus dem Bericht geht ferner hervor, dass einmal das Propagandaministerium und zum anderen die Sicherheitspolizei Beschlagnahmungen durchführten, von denen ich als zuständiger Minister für diese besetzten Gebiete hätte unterrichtet werden müssen. Welche weiteren Reichsbehörden Beschlagnahmungen für sich durchgeführt haben, ist von hier aus im Augenblick noch nicht zu übersehen.

H1503B-0014

H1503B-0015

Mir ist bekannt, dass Sie, mein Führer, bestimmte Kunstschätze zwecks Sicherstellung für das Museum in Linz abtransportieren liessen. Der Generalkommissar K u b e berichtet mir jedoch, dass darüber hinaus aus den umfassenden Sammlungen von Kunstschätzen in Minsk sehr grosse Werte von Dienststellen und Personen entführt wurden, die offensichtlich dazu nicht befugt waren. Solche Vorgänge können meiner Meinung nach in keiner Weise gut geheissen werden und können nach Lage der Dinge nur durch eine gesonderte Verfügung durch Sie, mein Führer, verhindert werden.

Ich darf in diesem Zusammenhang auf den Einsatzstab meiner Dienststelle hinweisen. Durch diesen Einsatzstab wurden in den westlichen besetzten Gebieten neben dem für meine politischen und wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten erforderlichen Material in grossem Umfange Kunstschätze aus jüdischem Besitz sichergestellt, die in den Schlössern Neuschwanstein und am Chiemsee entsprechend Ihrer persönlichen Weisung untergebracht wurden. Diese Kunstschätze werden durch meine Beauftragten so inventarisiert, dass sie anhand von umfassenden Bildkatalogen Ihnen, mein Führer, zur Auswahl für Ihre verschiedenen Pläne vorgelegt werden können. Ich habe Wert darauf gelegt, dass diese ganzen Arbeiten bis ins einzelne korrekt durchgeführt werden und über das Ergebnis in erster Linie durch Sie, mein Führer, verfügt wird.

Der Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP. hat in grosszügiger Weise diese Arbeiten finanziert und mir so überhaupt ihre Durchführung ermöglicht. Die Organe des Staates und der Wehrmacht lehnten es ab, die Verantwortung für diese Arbeit, die ich als Konsequenz in unserem Kampf gegen das Judentum durchführe, zu übernehmen. Es ist jedoch mit Unterstützung des Reichsmarschalls Hermann Göring erreicht worden, dass in den besetzten Westgebieten alle diese Aufgaben im Rahmen meines Einsatzstabes durchgeführt wurden. So wurde verhindert, dass unübersichtliche Sonderaktionen verschiedener Dienststellen und Persönlichkeiten durchgeführt wurden. Die Arbeitsweise meines Einsatzstabes kennenzulernen,

H1503B-0016

hatte Ihr Adjutant, Gruppenführer S c h a u b , und der Adjutant des Reichsleiters Bormann, Ministerialrat Dr. H e y m , Gelegenheit.

Ich habe nunmehr den gleichen Einsatzstab meiner Dienststelle angewiesen, die im Westen durchgeführten Arbeiten in umfassenderer Weise in den besetzten Ostgebieten ebenfalls durchzuführen. Um ein Zerflattern des Materials zu verhindern, habe ich im Bereich der Zivilverwaltung zunächst jeglichen Abtransport von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und Forschungsmaterial verboten. Das gesamte Material soll durch meinen Einsatzstab gesichert und inventarisiert werden. Anhand der so entstehenden Übersicht können alle berechtigten Wünsche und Forderungen der Dienststellen des Grossdeutschen Reiches berücksichtigt werden. Auf dieser Grundlage würde ich auch die Garantie dafür übernehmen können, dass alle Kunstschätze, die für Ihre persönlichen Pläne, mein Führer, mit Linz und anderen Museen in Frage kommen, tatsächlich auch diesem Zweck zugeführt werden können. Voraussetzung dafür ist jedoch, dass die Arbeit meines Einsatzstabes bereits im Operationsgebiet beginnt und damit der Truppe auf dem Fusse folgt. Das ist aber auf Grund der gemachten Erfahrungen nur möglich, wenn Sie, mein Führer, für diesen Zweck einen Befehl erlassen, der für alle Dienststellen, die in den besetzten Ostgebieten einschliesslich des Operationsgebietes tätig sind, bindend ist.

Ich erlaube mir, einen entsprechenden Entwurf beizufügen, der zweckmässiger Weise über alle drei Wehrmachtsteile den Truppen und über den Reichsführer SS den einzelnen Einheiten der SS und des SD bekannt gegeben wird. Ich wäre auch dankbar, wenn Herr Direktor P o s s e als Ihr besonderer Beauftragter für das Museum in Linz seine Vorschläge und Wünsche mir zuleiten würde, damit ich für strikte Berücksichtigung Ihrer Wünsche, mein Führer, sorgen kann. Das erscheint mir auch zweckmässiger zu sein, als wenn neben den bereits bestehenden Dienststellen und Einrichtungen, die sich mit diesen Aufgaben befassen, noch weitere Beauftragte eingesetzt würden. Ich habe durch den Generalquartier-

H1503B-0017

meister des Heeres erfahren, dass auf Vorschlag von Direktor Posse zur Sicherung von Kunstschätzen in Leningrad Herr Dr. von H o l s t beauftragt wurde. So sehr Herr Dr. von Holst als Kenner des Landes und Kunstsachverständiger dazu geeignet ist, so erscheint mir seine Tätigkeit aus den geschilderten Gründen innerhalb meines Einsatzstabes weit zweckmässiger, da damit die Arbeit meines dortigen Reichskommissariates erleichtert und den Wünschen und Auffassungen des Generalquartiermeisters des Heeres entsprechen wird.

den 16. Oktober 1941 - U/Sz

H1503B-0018

Entwurf

A n o r d n u n g

an alle Dienststellen und Angehörigen der drei Wehrmachtsteile
d
der Waffen-SS
der Sonderkommandos der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD
an alle Sonderbeauftragten und Kommissare des Grossdeutschen Reiches
sowie den Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete und seine nachgeordneten Organe in den besetzten Ostgebieten

- -

Betr.: Sicherstellung von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und Forschungsmaterial in den besetzten Ostgebieten

Zur Sicherstellung von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und Forschungsmaterial in den besetzten Ostgebieten ordne ich an:

1.) Der Abtransport und die Entfernung von Kunstschätzen, Kulturgütern und wissenschaftlichem und politisch-weltanschaulichem Forschungsmaterial aller Art (Bibliotheken, Archive, Museen, Galerien, wissenschaftliche, politische und weltanschauliche Institutionen) aus den besetzten Ostgebieten ist verboten. Mit der Sicherstellung und Inventarisierung des obengekennzeichneten Materials beauftrage ich den Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, der zu diesem Zweck einen besonderen Einsatzstab unter Leitung des Reichshauptstellenleiters U t i k a l in Tätigkeit setzt.

2.) Der Einsatzstab des Reichsministers für die besetzten Ostgebiete, der die Bezeichnung "Einsatzstab Rosenberg für die besetzten Gebiete" trägt, nimmt seine Tätigkeit im rückwärtigen Heeresgebiet auf und beendet sie im Rahmen der

H1503B-0019

nachfolgenden Zivilverwaltung. Im Operationsgebiet wird die Tätigkeit dieses Einsatzstabes in Form von Sonderkommandos, die den einzelnen Armeen angeschlossen werden, durchgeführt. Nähere Bestimmungen über die Zusammenarbeit mit den Armeen erlässt nach Übereinkunft mit dem Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete der Generalquartiermeister des Heeres.

3.) Der Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete unterrichtet mich über das Ergebnis dieser Arbeiten laufend persönlich. Er versieht den Einsatzstab mit den erforderlichen Arbeitsrichtlinien.

4.) Der Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete nimmt mit den zentralen Behörden des Deutschen Reiches wegen Abstellung von Fachkräften für die Aufgaben des Kunst-, Archiv- und Bibliotheksschutzes Fühlung.

5.) Diese Regelung betrifft nicht die Sonderaufträge des Auswärtigen Amtes in den Botschaften, Gesandtschaften und Konsulaten. Desgleichen bleiben die Aufträge der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD zur Verfolgung und Vernichtung des Gegners des Nationalsozialismus in vollem Umfange bestehen.

6.) Die Finanzierung des Einsatzstabes Rosenberg übernimmt als kriegswichtige Aufgabe der NSDAP. in konsequenter Fortsetzung ihres Kampfes gegen den Weltbolschewismus wie in den besetzten Gebieten des Westens und Südostens der Reichsschatzmeister der NSDAP. Über eine Beteiligung an diesen Kosten durch das Reich werden Sonderregelungen zwischen dem Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete und dem Reichsfinanzminister einerseits und dem Reichsschatzmeister andererseits getroffen.

7.) Wünsche um Berücksichtigung bei der Verteilung des durch den Einsatzstab Rosenberg sichergestellten Materials sind an den Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, Berlin W 35, Rauchstr. 17-18, zu richten. Die Entscheidung hierüber

- 3 -

H1503B-0020

erfolgt nach Vorschlag des Reichsministers für die besetzten Ostgebiete durch mich persönlich. Dabei finden die bereits für die besetzten Westgebiete vom Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches, Göring, getroffenen Richtlinien Berücksichtigung.

den 16. Oktober 1941 - U/Sz

H1503B-0021

Abschrift

P.

Der Generalkommissar für
Weißruthenien

Minsk, den 29. September 1941.

Herrn
Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete
Reichsleiter Alfred R o s e n b e r g

B e r l i n W 35
Rauchstr. 17/18

P e r s ö n l i c h !

Sehr verehrter Parteigenosse Reichsleiter Rosenberg!

Heute habe ich endlich nach langem Suchen die Reste der Kunstschätze in Minsk feststellen und sicherstellen können. Minsk besaß eine große - zum Teil sehr wertvolle - Kunst- und Gemäldesammlung, die fast restlos aus Minsk entfernt worden ist. Auf Befehl des Reichsführers SS Reichsleiter Heinrich Himmler ist die Mehrzahl der Gemälde - zum Teil noch unter meiner Amtsführung - von der SS verpackt und ins Reich verschickt worden. Es handelt sich hierbei um Millionenwerte, die dem Generalbezirk Weißruthenien entzogen worden sind. Die Gemälde sollen nach Linz und nach Königsberg in Ostpreussen verschickt worden sein. Ich bitte, diese wertvollen Sammlungen - soweit sie nicht im Reich benötigt werden - für den Generalbezirk Weißruthenien wieder zur Verfügung zu stellen, auf jeden Fall aber den materiellen Wert für das Ministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete sicherzustellen.

Nach Aussage eines Majors der 707. Division, der mir heute die Restbestände übergab, hat die SS die übrigen Bilder und Kunstgegenstände - darunter wertvollste Bilder und Möbel aus dem 15. und 16. Jahrhundert, Vasen, Marmorgegenstände, Ohren usw. - der Wehrmacht zur weiteren Ausplünderung überlassen. Der General Stubenrauch hat einen wertvollen Teil aus Minsk mit nach vorn ins Operationsgebiet genommen. Sonderführer, die mir noch nicht gemeldet werden konnten, haben 3 Lastkraftwagen (ohne Quittung) mit Möbeln, Bildern und Kunstgegenständen verschleppt. Ich lasse die Formationen feststellen, um die Bestrafung der

- -

H1503B-0022

Schuldigen, die sich der Plünderung strafbar gemacht haben, durchzusetzen. Von den Überresten haben hiesige Wehrmachts- und SS-Stellen - ohne meine Genehmigung - weitere Gegenstände und Bilder entnommen, die aber in Minsk noch nachgewiesen werden können.

Ich bitte, zur Restaurierung der zum Teil sinnlos durch Messerstiche beschädigten Gemälde den antionalsozialistischen Kunstmaler Willi S p r i n g e r, Berlin SW 29, Hasenheide 94, herzuschicken, damit unter seiner Aufsicht gerettet werden kann, was noch zu retten ist. Ledier sind auch zahlreiche wertvolle Vasen, Porzellan, Schränke und Stilmöbel aus dem 18. Jahrhundert schwer beschädigt oder zerstört worden. Im ganzen handelt es sich um unersetzliche Werte von Millionen von Mark. Für die Zukunft bitte ich um Schritte des Ostministeriums bei den verantwortlichen Wehrmachtsstellen, daß derartige Zerstörungen abgestellt und daß die Schuldigen mit schwersten Strafen bedroht und belegt werden.

Auch das vorgeschichtliche Museum befindet sich in einem völlig verwüsteten Zustand. Die geologische Abteilung ist um wertvolle Edelsteine und Halbedelsteine beraubt worden. In der Universität sind Instrumente von hunderttausenden von Mark sinnlos zerschlagen oder verschleppt worden. Vielleicht wäre eine Meldung an den Führer durch Sie, sehr verehrter Herr Reichsleiter, zu empfehlen. Das schon an sich arme Weißruthenien hat durch diese Handlungen schwersten Schaden erlitten. Hoffentlich werden in Leningrad und in Moskau sowie in den alten Kulturstädten der Ukraine von vornherein Sachverständige zur Verhütung derartiger Vorgänge eingesetzt, sonst findet die Zivilverwaltung überall dieselben Verheerungen wie hier vor.

Heil Hitler!

Ihr sehr ergebener
gez. Wilhelm Kube,
Generalkommissar für Weißruthenien

H1503B-0023

Anlage 3.

Bericht des Gefr. Abel über die Bibliotheken in Minsk.

Auf Veranlassung des Befehlshabers des rückwärtigen Heeresgebietes Mitte wurde ich für 14 Tage zur Feldkommandantur Minsk-Stadt kommandiert "zur Sichtung des Materials der Bibliothek". Damit war offenbar das aus der Bibliothek der Akademie der Wissenschaften in der Feldkommandantur sichergestellte Material sowie die Bibliothek der Akademie der Wissenschaften gemeint. Im Verlauf meiner Arbeiten in Minsk ergab sich jedoch die Notwendigkeit, sämtliche Bibliotheken in Minsk zu erkunden und auf ihren Erhaltungszustand zu prüfen. Dabei kam es darauf an, die Bibliotheken an Ort und Stelle sicher zu stellen und zu schildern, welche Maßhahmen bereits ergriffen bezw. noch notwendig waren, um sie gegen Diebstahl, Plünderung oder Witterungseinflüsse zu schützen. Der vorliegende Bericht enthält naturgemäß darüber hinaus allgemeine Charakteristiken der Bibliotheken, die ihre spätere Auswertung durch andere Stellen ermöglichen und erleichtern sollen.

I. Leninbibliothek.

Krasno-armeiskaja 9, unweit des Hauses der Roten Armee.

Das Gebäude ist ein Neubau; die Lage der Magazine, des Lesesaals und der Spezialabteilungen ist zweckmäßig und durchdacht. Das Gebäude als Ganzes ist fast unversehrt, jedoch gingen durch Bombenabwurf sämtliche Fensterscheiben und ein Teil der Fensterkreuze in Trümmer. Die Zerstörungen im Innern sind zum kleinen Teil durch das russische Militär und die Zivilbevölkerung, zum größeren Teil durch deutsche Einheiten verursacht worden, die bei dem Mangel an unzerstörten Gebäuden in die Bibliothek Unterkunfts- und Geschäftsraäume legen mußten. Der Führer der gegenwärtig im Gebäude liegenden Einheit hat bereits durch Anbringen von Bretterverschlägen an Stelle der zerstörten Fensterscheiben im Erdgeschoß Vorsorge getroffen, daß die Bestände nicht noch mehr gelichtet werden. Er klagte darüber, daß - offensichtlich durch deutsche Wehrmachtsangehörige - vor seinem Eintreffen in sinnloser Weise Zerstörungen vorgenommen, die Bestände in den Magazinen aus den Regalen gerissen, zertrampelt und teilweise ekelhaft beschmutzt worden seien. Er selbst sei seit seinem Eintreffen mit Erfolg bemüht gewesen, das Vorgefundene zu erhalten und vor Diebstählen durch russische Elemente und vor weiteren Plünderungen zu schützen.

H1503B-0024

Die Leninbibliothek ist die Zentralbibliothek von Weißrußland. Eine Schätzung der Bandzahl ist schwierig, doch dürfte sich der Bestand auf 1,5 Millionen Bände belaufen. Angeblich erhielt sie Pflichtexemplare aus sämtlichen sowjetischen Schwesterrepubliken. Die Kataloge sind ungefähr zu zwei Dritteln erhalten, doch finden sich vielleicht in der Folgezeit noch einige Zettelkästen an. Es gibt drei: einen alphabetischen Verfasserkatalog, einen Sachkatalog nach der Dezimalklassifikation und einen Sachkatalog, der nach größeren Gebieten und innerhalb dieser Gebiete nach Schlagworten in alphabetischer Reihenfolge geordnet ist. Sämtliche Kataloge sind Zettelkataloge internationalen Formats. Der Hauptlesesaal ist hell und geräumig; fast seine gesamte Inneneinrichtung und die Handbibliothek waren entfernt. Die Gestelle in den Magazinen bestehen aus Holz, das gegen Feuer imprägniert ist. Die Aufstellung der Bücher geschieht nach den 9 oder 10 großen Gruppen der Dezimalklassifikation und ist innerhalb dieser Gruppen akzessorisch. Die Bestände der Spezialabteilungen befinden sich jeweils im Leseraum der betr. Spezialabteilung. Auffallend groß ist die Anzahl der ungebundenen Bücher; offenbar war zum Einbinden nicht genügend Geld vorhanden. Diese Beobachtung trifft auch für die anderen Bibliotheken zu.

Die Magazine bieten zum Teil ein trostloses Bild. Wieviel von den Beständen wirklich fehlt, kann nur durch eine Revision an Hand der Eingangsjournale festgestellt werden. Häufig liegen die Bücher in den Magazingängen oder sind in das ein Stockwerk tiefer liegende Magazin geworfen worden.

Von den Spezialabteilungen ist wichtig die für Weißrusland, in der alles, was über Weißrußland erschienen ist (z.B. Fauna, Flora, Volkswirtschaft, Folklore, Literatur, Geographie usw.), fast lückenlos vorhanden sein soll. Die Bestände auch in dieser Abteilung sind durch Belegung des Raumes versehrt. Es ist ferner vorhanden eine Spezialabteilung für Technik, für politische Literatur (propagandistischen Charakters, mit Ausstellungsraum und kommunistischer Literatur für Kinder) sowie für hebräische Literatur. Bemerkenswert ist, daß die Bestände der Spezialabteilungen im allgemeinen nur in den dort befindlichen Spezialkatalogen, nicht in dem allgemeinen Katalog verzeichnet sind. Ein Raum mit älteren Büchern - meist 1939/40 aus dem besetzten Teil Polens gestohlen - steht jetzt leer; der

H1503B-0025

der Inhalt ist im Museum neben der Feldkommandantur sichergestellt worden. In einem Schrank im Direktorzimmer befinden sich u.a. moderne ausländische Nachschlagewerke (auch zur Bibliothekskunde) und ältere Bücher. Handschriften und Inkunabeln wurden nicht gefunden.

In der Zeit meines Aufenthalts in Minsk war eine Bibliothekarin der Leninbibliothek, Frl. Iwanowa, beschäftigt, mit einigen Gehilfen Aufräumungsarbeiten in der Bibliothek zu leisten. Eine Sichtung und Neuaufstellung erfordert einen Stab von Bibliothekaren und vor allem Arbeitern und muß der Initiative der Stadtverwaltung überlassen bleiben.

2. Bibliothek der Akademie der Wissenschaften.

Puschkinstr.56, von der Stadt aus unmittelbar hinter den städtischen Kliniken.

Die Bibliothek befindet sich im Keller und im 1. und 2. Stockwerk des an der Straße gelegenen Gebäudeteils. Das Akademiegebäude ist noch im Bau; die Gerüste sind an vielen Stellen noch nicht entfernt. Außer den Fensterscheiben ist am Gebäude nichts zerstört.

Die Bibliothek enthält in der Hauptsache - neben der unvermeidlichen marxistisch-kommunistischen Literatur- wissenschaftliches Schrifttum. Bemerkenswert ist ein Raum mit verbotener Literatur, der wissenschaftliche Werke enthält, deren Ergebnisse der bolschewistischen Wissenschaft offenbar unbequem und unerwünscht sind. Der propagandistische Charakter des Instituts ist außerordentlich stark. Eine Reihe von Räumen im ersten Stock sind mit Schaubildern, Zitaten aus Lenins und Stalins Werken und Reden sowie Gemälde dekoriert, doch ist jetzt nur noch ein einziger Raum in dem ursprünglichen Zustand belassen worden. Der Wandbehang der übrigen ist im Zimmer des Direktors der Bibliothek zusammengetragen und dort mit einer größeren Anzahl von marxistischen Büchern auf Veranlassung des Propagandaministeriums beschlagnahmt worden. Die Durchsuchung der Bibliothek für das Propagandaministerium erfolgte vor meinem Eintreffen.

Der Umfang der Bibliothek dürfte ungefähr 200 000 Bände betragen. Teile des systematischen Katalogs sind sichergestellt,

H1503B-0026

der alphabetische Katalog ist verloren. Die Bibliothek enthält auch auslandisc e Literatur, da sie nach Aussa e der Bibliothekarin, Frl. Schukis, im Tauschverkehr mit aus ertigen Akademien und wissenschaftlichen Instituten stand. Die Zerstörung besonders in den Räumlichkeiten im 1. Stockwerk ist so gross, daß die Papiermassen wohl nur noch als Makulatur brauchbar sind.

Der wertvollste Teil der Bibliothek bestent zweifellos in der 1940 von den Russen aus dem von ihnen besetzten Teil Polens nach Minsk überführten Radziwillschen Bibliothek. Sie ist in ihren ursprünglichen braunen und schwarzen Holzschränken teilweise im Keller, teilweise in einem Gang des 1. Stockwerks untergebracht. Nach Ausweis der Exlibris, von denen drei in der Anlage beigefügt werden, handelt es sich um die Bibliothek von Fürst Georg Radziwill, um die Ordinations- und um die Schloßbibliothek von Nieswiez (Neswish) - südwestlich von Minsk auf dem Wege nach Baranowitschi. Eine Durchsicht der ca. 10 000 Bände zeigt, daß es sich zunächst in der Hauptsache um theologische Literatur des 17. und 18. Jahrhdts. und um Geschichte, Staatsrecht, alte (klassische) und schöne Literatur des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts handelt. Die Bücherei ist dann in neuerer und jüngster Zeit mit wechselnder Geschmacksrichtung fortgeführt worden; fehlen doch sogar Autoren wie Pitigrilli in polnischer und Pola Negri in französischer Übersetzung nicht. Naturgemäß ist der Anteil von Büchern in polnischer Sprache, und zwar gerade von älteren Krakauer und Warschauer Drucken groß, weswegen für Arbeiten auch an dieser Bibliothek unbedingt ein Bibliothekar mit Kenntnis der slawischen Sprachen erforderlich ist. Einiges ragt über das Niveau von Schloßbibliotheken ähnlicher Art heraus; es seien als Beispiel angeführt:

Statur regni Poloniae, gedruckt in Krakau in der 2. Hälfte des 16. Jahrhdts. von der Witwe des Hieronymus Vietor, mit wertvollem Einband der Zeit,

ein Sallust und Forus, gedruckt 1773 bei Baskerville in Birmingham,

ein zwölfsprachiges Neues Testament, 1599 in Nürnberg gedruckt,

eine polnische Bibel, 1599 in Warschau gedr.,

der von Schlegel und Tieck herausgegebene Musenalmanach von 1802

H1503B-0027

Ein Teil der Radziwillschen Bücher war bereits vor meinem Eintreffen in das Gebäude der Feldkommandantur überführt worden; sie sind jetzt gesichtet und in einem verschließbaren Raum des Museums neben der Feldkommandantur sichergestellt. Die Teile der Bibliothek, die in 10 schwarzen Holzschränken - den Originalschränken aus Nieswiez - im Ganges des 1. Stockwerks in der Akademie stehen, sind ebenso wie der Bestand in den braunen Nieswiezer Schränken im Keller vor Zugriffen Unbefugter gesichert. Der Ortskommandant von Minsk, Herr Major Dr.Mittasch, hat am 22. August in Gegenwart des Unterzeichneten von Offizieren der in der Akademie liegenden Einheit die Versicherung erlangt, speziell die Radzivillschränke unangetastet zu lassen und dafür Sorge zu tragen, daß die Mannschaften, soweit sie überhaupt Zutritt haben, nichts entnehmen.

Ein alphabetischer Katalog auf Zetteln ist so lückenhaft erhalten, daß eine Sicherstellung sich nicht lohnte. Dagegen wurde ein nach fortlaufenden Nummern geordnetes Titelverzeichnis in Bandform (die Zahlen entsprechen den hinten in die Bücher geklebten Standnummern), bestehend aus drei Teilen, am 19. August sichergestellt. Die drei Bände wurden Herrn Generalmajor Stubenrauch, dem Kommandanten der Feldkommandantur, am 24. August übergeben. Nach Ausweis eines im ersten Katalogband befindlichen Protokolls in polnischer Sprache haben Kasimir Hol nski und Marian Kolosowski am 7. Juni 1939 mit der Aufnahme der Titel der Bücher im Schloß - in die Schloßbibliothek waren offenbar schon vorher die Bestände der Ordinationsbibliothek übernommen - begonnen. Diese nicht sehr sach- und sprachkundig durchgeführte Arbeit war am 21. November 1939 beendet. Ein Vermerk in russischer Sprache vom 9. Januar 1941 am Schluß des dritten Katalogbandes besa t, daß - nach Eintreffen der Radziwillbibliothek in der Minsker Akademie - alle im Katalog verzeichneten Bücher ordnungsgemäß vorhanden waren. Ältere Handschriften sowie Inkunabeln enthielt die Radziwillbibliothek offenbar nicht.

Die Radziwillbibliothek muß von der Staatsbibliothek in Krakau oder von Warschau aus betreut werden; dort arbeiten deutsche Bibliothekare, die Sprachspezialisten für Polnisch sind. Sodann ist zu entscheiden, ob sie in Minsk verbleiben - wozu kein Grund besteht oder nach Krakau in die Staatsbibliothek

- 6 -

H1503B-0028

oder nach Warschau überführt werden soll. Eine Rückfrage nach Nieswiez ist nicht ratsam, da sich dort wohl niemand einer Neuaufstellung und Revision der Bestände annehmen kann.

3. Gorkibibliothek

im 5. Stockwerk des linken Seitenflügels des Leninhauses.

Die Gorkibibliothek war die offizielle Regierungsbibliothek. Die Erwerbung erfolgte nur durch Kauf, und die Auswahl des Materials war offensichtlich durchdacht und verständig, wie man überhaupt dieser Bibliothek trotz der bei der Besetzung des Leninhauses verübten Zerstörungen noch jetzt eine gewisse Gepflegtheit anmerkt. Aus allen Wissenschaftsgebieten wurde hier das Wertvollste zusammengetragen, so daß gleichsam eine Handbibliothek sämtlicher Wissensgebiete entstanden ist, die schätzungsweise 25 000 Bände enthielt. Der Hauptteil ist in Glasschränken im Lesesaal untergebracht, ein kleinerer Teil im Vorraum. Die Kataloge sind fast ganz zerstört, was bei dieser Bibliothek, die den letzten Stand der Sowjetwissenschaft darstellt, besonders bedauerlich ist.

Als die Bibliothek bereits erheblich zerstört und in Unordnung gebracht worden war, wurde - schon vor meinem Eintreffen - an der Eingangstür ein Schild angebracht, daß die Räume als "beschlagnahmt für die Wehrmacht" bezeichnet und die Sätze enthält: "Entfernung von Gegenständen wird als Plünderung bestraft" und "Das Zimmer enthält wertvolles Schriftgut und steht dem Wirtschaftskommando Minsk zwecks Sichtung zur Verfügung."

Der Lesesaal diente bei meinem ersten Besuch der Frontsammelstelle Minsk, die sich im Leninhaus befindet, als Unterkunftsraum, war aber bei einem späteren Besuch geräumt und notdürftig gesäubert.

Im Keller des Leninhauses befinden sich größere Teile der Gorkibibliothek, die unverarbeitet sind, vielleicht auch aus Platzmangel in der eigentlichen Bibliothek nicht mehr untergebracht werden konnten. Die Zerstörung ist hier derartig fortgeschritten, daß davon kaum noch etwas brauchbar sein dürfte.

4. Puschkinbibliothek.

Oktoberstr. 11, nahe dem Freiheitsplatz.

Die in einem älteren Gebäude untergebrachte Puschkinbiblio -

H1503B-0029

thek ist die Minsker Volksbibliothek. Sie ist so gut wie unbeschädigt; bei der Flucht der Russen wurde allerdings - wohl mit Wissen des Wächters - Mobiliar, Teppiche, Vorhänge usw. von der Bevölkerung gestohlen. Nach Aussage der dort beschäftigten Bibliothekarin soll sie 50 000 Bände enthalten. Die Kataloge sind unbeschädigt, aber unordentlich geführt. Bemerkenswert sind kleine Abteilungen mit deutscher (z.B. Goethe, Lessing, Heine) französischer und englischer (z.B. Dickens) Literatur. Der Etat betrug ungefähr 65 000 Rubel (= 6500 RM).

Im 2. Stockwerk befindet sich eine Kinderbibliothek und ein Leseraum für Kinder. Eine besondere Ausleihabteilung stellte kleinere Wanderbilder zusammen und versorgte Fabriken und Betriebe im Minsker Bezirk.

An den Eingängen im 1. und 2. Stockwerk befinden sich Anschläge des Einsatzkommandos 8 der Sicherheitspolizei und des Sicherheitsdienstes folgenden Inhalts: "Das hier liegende Material ist vom Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und SD beschlagnahmt. Jede Entnahme wird als Plünderung geahndet!"

5. Tolstoibibliothek, Sowjetskaja 1-3, unweit des Leninhauses

Diese Volksbibliothek kann nur als Kuriosum erwähnt werden. Sie befindet sich in einem baufälligen grünen Holzpavillon zusammen mit den Räumen einer Taubstummenvereinigung und enthielt nur wenige Tausend ältere Bände. Sie wurde offenbar sehr vernachlässigt; ihre Zerstörung ist daher nicht als großer Verlust zu buchen.

6. Die Universitätsbibliothek und die Bibliotheken des medizinischen und des volkswirtschaftlichen Instituts in der sogen. "Universitätsstadt" gegenüber dem Leninhaus.

Die Universitätsbibliothek befindet sich im Erdgeschoß des Gebäudes der "Biologischen Fakultät". Sie soll 100 000 Bände umfassen, doch erscheint der Bestand geringer. Im Leseraum lag eine deutsche Einheit; die zahlreichen allenthalben verstreuten Sekt- und Likörflaschen lassen den Grad der offensichtlichen mutwilligen Zerstörungen verständlich erscheinen.

Ein gesonderter Leseraum für Dozenten, mit Hand und Nachschlagebüchern ausgestattet, ist ebenfalls stark in Mitleiden-

H1503B-0030

schaft gezogen. Vor den eigentliche, nun verwaisten Bücherma gazinen befindet sich jetzt ein Schild: "Beschlagnahmt für die deutsche Wehrmacht."

Die Bibliothek des medizinischen Instituts ist aufs stärkste verwüstet. Ein Teil des Buchbestandes ist zerstört bezw. sinnlos durcheinander geworfen, ein Magazinraum völlig ausgeräumt, da er als Lagerraum für erbeutetes russisches Verbandsmaterial benötigt wurde.

Die Bibliothek des Volkswirtschaftlichen Instituts nebst ihren Katalogen ist ebenfalls in Unordnung gebracht, wenn auch die Zerstörung hier nicht so stark ist. Im Lesesaal enthielt u.a. Enzyklopädien und politisch-statistische Literatur, ein Zimmer für den politischen Kommissar marxistische Literatur.

7. Andere wissenschaftliche Bibliotheken.

Die Bibliothek des Polytechnischen Instituts (schräg gegenüber der Akademie, Puschkinst. 49) - im Kellergeschoß des linken Flügels ist ebenso wie eine große Anzahl von Laboratorien hoffnungslos zerstört und in Unordnung gebracht worden.

Die Bibliothek des Juristischen Instituts ist nach Aussage der Bibliothekarin Iwanowa in die Leninbibliothek überführt worden.

Die Bibliothek des Instituts für Körperkultur (Logoiskijtrakt 6, an der Gabelung mit der Puschkinstr.) ist unrettbar verloren. Sie wurde mit größter Wahrscheinlichkeit durch eine deutsche Einheit - da das Institut ein fast unzerstörter Neubau ist und die Räume für ein Kriegslazarett benötigt wurden, kurzerhand auf das freie Feld geworfen und liegt dort zusammen mit Schränken, Turn- und Sportutensilien, Eierhandgranaten usw. Ein längerer Regen hat das Material so durchweicht, daß eine Rettung aussichtslos ist.

Die Bibliothek des Pädagogischen Instituts (Sowjetskaja, von der Stadt aus hinter dem historischen Museum auf der linken Seite, unweit des Hauses der Roten Armee) befindet sich im im 2. Stockwerk und bildet ein Chaos, bei dessen Herstellung auch Russen mitgewirkt haben. Sie enthält allgemeinbildende, politische und ältere und neue, teilweise recht gute pädagogische Literatur. Zur Zeit meines Aufenthaltes war ein Professor der Pädagogik, wohl der frühere Leiter des Instituts, mit Aufräu-

H1503B-0031

mungsarbeiten beschäftigt.

Die Bibliothek des Konservatoriums, Kirowstr. 47 (im Gebäude befindet sich die Feldkommandantur Minsk-Land) ist nur wenig in Unordnung gebracht worden. Sie enthält nach Aussage der dortigen Bibliothekarin ca. 30 000 Notenbände und 10 000 Werke der Musikliteratur. Im Jahre 1941 wurde von der Regierung viel für die Bibliothek getan: zu dem festen Etat von 20 000 Rbl. (= 2000 RM) kam eine Sonderbewilligung von 15 000 Rubel. Mit Partituren und Klavierauszügen ist die Bibliothek genügend versehen, auch waren 60 - 80 wertvolle Schallplatten vorhanden, die aber von Russen gestohlen wurden.

Der Katalog ist nicht zerstört. Als Maßstab für den Inhalt sei weiterhin mitgeteilt, daß zwar die Bach-Busoni-Ausgabe - nach Aussage einer Baltin, die in Musikgeschichte promovieren wollte, eine Seltenheit für Rußland - vorhanden ist, daß aber neuere Brahmsliteratur fehlt. Mit Studienmaterial war die Bibliothek gut ausgerüstet: so sind z.B. die bekannten Czerny-Etüden in 60 Exemplaren vertreten. Zur Zeit arbeitet eine Bibliothekarin an der Revision der Bibliothek.

Die Bibliothek der Journalistenhochschule in der Karl-Marx-Str. im 1. und im Kellergeschoß des linken Seitenflügels unter dem Theatersaal - (im Gebäude befindet sich die Feldkommandantur Minsk-Stadt) - enthält in der Hauptsache propagandistische Parteiliteratur zu Schulungszwecken. Sie ist in Unordnung gebracht, doch würde eine Durchsicht auf wertvolles Schrifttum durch einen sachverständigen russisch sprechenden Bibliothekar des Propagandaministeriums sich lohnen.

8. Büchereien mit wehrwissenschaftlichem Schrifttum.

Die Bibliothek im Hause der Roten Armee (Straße der Roten Armee) enthält in einem modern und geschmackvoll eingerichteten Leseraum Werke allgemein bildenden Charakters, daneben natürlich besonders Werke der Wehrwissenschaft. In den chaotisch zugerichteten Büchermagazinen, vor denen sich ein Beschlagnahmeschild befindet, sah ich technische und wehrwissenschaftliche Literatur, darunter viele Zeitschriften. Die Bibliothek muß in nicht allzu ferner Zeit von einem russisch sprechenden Bibliothekar für die Heeresbücherei durchgesehen werden.

- 10 -

H1503B-0032

Eine Bücherei mit zahlreichen modernen russischen Instruktionsschriften befindet sich in einem gelben Gebäude in der Mitte des Geländes der sogen. Bibliothek. Sie war völlig durcheinandergebracht, ist aber von einer Einheit mit Hilfe von Juden wieder soweit gesäubert, daß die Bücher sämtlich auf den richtigen Stellen bezw. sauber gestapelt sind. Es handelt sich offensichtlich um eine Mannschafts- bezw. Offiziersbücherei in Verbindung mit einer Sammlung von Dienstvorschriften. Der Inhalt befindet sich unter Verschluß; zwei Schlüssel wurden von mir dem Herrn Ortskommandanten von Minsk übergeben. Eine Durchsicht dieser Bücher auf neue russische Dienstvorschriften durch einen russisch sprechenden Sachverständigen des O.K.H. muß unbedingt vorgenommen werden, obwohl sich Geheimsachen offenbar nicht unter den Vorschriften befanden.

Die Wiederherstellung der Ordnung in den Bibliotheken von Minsk muß - soweit nicht ein wehr- oder staatspolitisches Interesse eine Öffnung zunächst verbietet - in weitestem Maße der Stadtverwaltung überlassen bleiben. In welchem Sinne und unter welchen Voraussetzungen das zu geschehen hat, zeigt ein von mir am 19. August gegebenes kurzes Gutachten, das in Durchschrift beigefügt ist. Das Hauptaugenmerk ist darauf zu richten, daß im kommenden Winter nicht wertvolle Buchbestände von der russischen Bevölkerung oder von deutschen Wehrmachtsstellen zu Heizzwecken verwendet werden.

Der Bericht zeigt, daß nicht nur von bolschewistischer sondern auch von deutscher Seite wertvolles Schrifttum - ich meine damit n i c h t die in jeder Bibliothek in größerem oder kleinerem Umfange vorhandene parteipolitische und Propagandaliteratur - zerstört wurde. Selbstverständlich werden die Belange der deutschen Wehrmacht in jedem Falle vor, besonders, wenn Räume für Lazarette benötigt werden. Aber es läßt sich auch dann vermeiden, daß in Bibliotheken, die für uns zum Teil recht wertvolles Material enthalten, sinnlose Zerstörungen hervorgerufen werden. Schon jetzt haben zahlreiche deutsche Beauftragte, die Literatur für ein bestimmtes Wissenschaftsgebiet in Minsk suchten, zu ihrem Leidwesen feststellen müssen, daß ein Auffinden des gewünschten infolge der Verwüstungen erschwert oder gar unmöglich war.

H1503B-0033

Der Zweck des Berichtes ist erst dann erreicht, wenn er der allerhöchsten Führung vorgelegt wird und wenn von dort aus die nötigen Befehle gegeben werden, die einmütig verhindern, daß in Zukunft ein deutscher Soldat als Barbar auftritt.

H1503B-0034

USSR-375

Filed Feb. 21, 1946

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503C

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

376

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР № 376

PS-161.

A 083695

H1503C-0001

H1503C-0002

C E R T I F I C A T E

I hereby certify that the annexed document 161-PS No. USSR-376 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the ~~United States~~ Russian Prosecution under this number. The original document has been withdrawn in accordance with Rule 10 of the International Military Tribunal, and to the best of my knowledge and belief is to be held at the National Archives, Washington D.C. .

Paul Joosten

PAUL A. JOOSTEN

General Secretary
International Military
Tribunal

Nuremberg, 19 July 1948

H1503C-0003

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

EVIDENCE DIVISION

Date: 2.12.47

I certify that Document Number 161-PS was introduced into evidence as Exhibit Number USSR-376 in the Trial by the International Tribunal of Hermann GOERING, et al, which commenced on 20 November 1945, and that the attached photostat is a true and correct copy of the original.

Fred Niebergall

FRED NIEBERGALL
Chief, Document Control Branch

DCB-36 (102447)

23. August 1944.

U/Roe. PS-161

Auftrag

Am 21. 8. 44 hat Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg den

Haupteinsatzführer Friedrich S c h ü l l e r

vom Einsatzstab RR zur Berichterstattung über die zur Zeit noch bestehenden Evakuierungsmöglichkeiten von Kulturgütern aus dem Bereich des Ostlandes aufgefordert. Auf Grund dieses Berichtes hat der Reichsleiter bestimmt, daß die wertvollsten Kulturgüter des Ostlandes durch seinen Einsatzstab noch abtransportiert werden sollen, soweit dies ohne Beeinträchtigung der Belange der kämpfenden Truppe möglich ist. Als besonders wertvoll bezeichnete der Reichsleiter folgende Kulturgüter:

aus Riga:	Stadtarchiv Staatsarchiv (Hauptbestand in Edwahlen)
aus Reval:	Stadtarchiv Estn. literar. Gesellschaft kleine Bestände im Schwarzhäupterhaus, Rathaus, ev.-luth. Konsistorium und Nikolaikirche
aus Dorpat:	Universitätsbibliothek
auf estnischen	Landgütern untergebrachte Bestände: Jerlep, Wodja, Weißenstein, Lachmes.

Mit der Durchführung des Abtransportes wird Haupteinsatzführer Schüller in seiner Eigenschaft als komm. Leiter der Hauptarbeitsgruppe Osten des Einsatzstabes RR beauftragt. Er hat insbesondere mit der Heeresgruppe Nord in Verbindung zu treten, um die Durchführung des Auftrages des Reichsleiters mit den Bedürfnissen der kämpfenden Truppe an Transportraum in Einklang zu bringen.

(Utikal)

Chef des Einsatzstabes

H1503C-0004

H1503C-0005

161 - PS
(USSR - 376)

CCCP- 379.

UK 82

H-1503d

UK 82.

~~G. B. EXHIBIT~~

U.S.S.R. 379

Exhibit USSR 379
Filed Feb. 18, 1946
[illegible]
Recy.

A083706

33

H1503D-0001

nicht dieses

USSR-356

EC-338

H1503D-0003

REPORT OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC GOVERNMENT

to the

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

This report consists of the following three main heads:

I. Germany's preparation of the war of aggression against Greece.

II. The violations of the laws and customs of war perpetrated by the German Armed Forces during the war operations.

III. The violations of the universally accepted rules concerning occupation perpetrated by Germany in Greece during the occupation, by the enforcement of a policy of financial and economic exploitation, (confiscation, requisition, inflation, misuse of clearing) and of terrorism (starvation, wholesale massacre, killing of hostages etc.)

PART I. (PRELIMINARIES OF WAR) will deal with the first head.

PART II. (WAR) will deal with the second head.

PART III. (OCCUPATION) will deal with the third head.

The report is not concerned with acts of individual brutality. It is concerned only with such acts as, by their character, denote the existence of a general plan aiming at the domination of Europe by Germany, and a plan which included organised financial and economic pillage of the occupied countries and forced collaboration of their populations by means of terrorism.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 379
Filed Feb 18 1946

H1503D-0004

PART I. PRELIMINARIES OF WAR.

At 5. 30 a.m. on Sunday, 6th April 1941, Prince Erbach-Schönberg, German Minister to Athens, presented a communication by which the Greek Government was informed that Germany was at war with Greece. At the same time German troops which had been concentrated in Bulgaria in March 1941 crossed the Bulgarian frontier and entered Greek territory. In six weeks the resistance of the Greco-British forces was overcome and the whole of the Greek state came under the German yoke.

Germany's attack on Greece was absolutely unprovoked and unjustifiable. It was obviously part of Germany's wider plan for world conquest. It was preceded by no warning or threat, nor by any serious diplomatic démarche for the removal of any existing doubts; nor was there any demand for arbitration or judicial procedure for the solution of any difference that may have existed.

The persons in Germany responsible for the diplomatic and strategic handling of this aggressive action desired to avail themselves of all the advantages of surprise and of the natural reluctance of a small country like Greece to take in time against a powerful aggressor defensive measures which he could regard as provocative. According to the plans of those who directed the policy of the Reich, Greece had to be isolated diplomatically, to be paralysed internally, and to be tricked by the threat of an immediate attack or by false assurances of good intentions into not taking in good time the indispensable defensive measures, so that her subjugation would be easier.

2. Germany's attack on Greece was made, of course, within the framework of the wider politico-strategic effort of the Axis to ensure its domination throughout Europe. The responsibility of each individual person responsible for the attack is therefore

A 083708

H1503D-0005

inter-connected with the responsibility of their other Allies, and the crime committed against Greece took place in full mutual collaboration in the execution of their design of conquest. In view of this fact, the individual responsibility of each one of those who directed German policy cannot be examined separately but constitutes one single whole, as an organ of the collective political and military activity of the Reich and even more generally of the Axis. In its aggressive policy, however, it is known that it was Germany that directed its rapacious effort, and consequently it is Germany that bears the greater part of the responsibility.

3. Germany's aggression against Greece, which was thus involved in the wider plan of action of the Axis, followed various phases according to the development of events. Thus a) it supported the aggressive designs of Greece's neighbours against her, b) it tried to subjugate her economically so as to overcome all tendencies of political resistance, c) it endeavoured to terrorise Greece into stopping her from taking the necessary defensive measures against the impending Italian threat, d) when the Italian attack was launched, it aimed at and succeeded in keeping a substantial part of the Greek army tied up on Greece's North-Eastern frontiers, e) it forced Greece to decline all assistance from her Allies, and isolated her diplomatically so that she could succomb more easily to Germany's will.

4. Until 1939 Germany worked for the gradual subjugation of the European states by means of her well-known economic and political plan of advancing her positions towards the South-East. During this period Greece is not immediately within the sphere of Germany's aggressive activities. The threat against her is manifested mainly from Italy and Bulgaria, each of which for special reasons looks to the seizure of Greek territories. Germany nevertheless supports and exploits these efforts which serve the immediate interests of her collaborators and at the same time her own. This is not the appropriate place to relate Italy's

A 083709

H1503D-0006

aggressive efforts against Greece from the beginning of the present century and particularly since the establishment of the Fascist regime. These things are in any case known to all. Without taking a definite attitude against Greece, Germany supported the Italian aims, thus helping and preparing the final attack in 1940. In October 1932 Hitler said in an interview with the Italian newspaper "TEVERE": "Italy and Germany have the same enemies and their mission consists in working together in the task of civilisation". In 1937, on the morrow of the events in Vienna, Hitler himself said at the Party Rally on the 7th September at Nuremberg:".... Germany is now no longer isolated but united in close friendship with powerful nations . The natural community of interests between National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has been shown in recent months to be a factor seeking to safeguard Europe from the threat of a chaotic lunacy". The whole German press, directed in the well-known manner by the supreme Government circles, encouraged Italy in her designs of conquest. When Italy seized Albania in March 1939, thus establishing a bridgehead for further aggressive action against Greece, Hitler said inter alia in his speech on the 28th April before the Reichstag:

"The German Government with full understanding appreciates the justification for the action taken in Albania by its Italian friend, and therefore greets it with pleasure. Yes, it is not only the right, but the duty of Fascism to ensure within the living space indisputably recognised to Italy by nature and history, the maintenance of a state of things on which alone truly prospering human civilisation seems to be able to depend and make itself firm."

In the recently published extracts from Ciano's diaries, it is mentioned in this connection that after the occupation of Albania, all the roads "were planned to lead to the Greek frontiers. This was ordered by the Duce, who thinks more and more of attacking Greece on the first opportunity." At another point in these diaries, the following is said about Germany: "Ribbentrop has sent a message that Berlin looks with sympathy on our action in Tirana as victory for Italy means strengthening

A083710

H1503D-0007

of the power of the Axis".

5. Not content with the moral support of Italy, Germany tried to prevent Greece from taking elementary measures for the defense of her threatened independence. When the occupation of Albania rendered the threat to Greece more imminent, Germany hastened to denounce the guarantees of Greek Independence given by France and Gt. Britain as being directed against the Axis, and made every effort to bully or cajole Greece into declining these guarantees. From that moment the opposition to the British and French guarantee was destined to constitute the main weapon of attack against Greece in order to weaken her resistance. Greece had to be forced at all costs to deprive herself of any friendly assistance so that she could more easily suffer the fate prepared for her by the Axis. All available diplomatic means were mobilised: "friendly recommendations" among diplomats, public statements by political personalities, a press and radio campaign. Similar efforts were simultaneously made in the direction of Greece's friends in the Balkans in order that the Balkan pact and the alliance with Turkey should be weakened or torpedoed at any sacrifice. On the 27th August 1940 Ribbentrop went even further, and asking the Greek Minister in Berlin to call on him, told him clearly that Germany regarded Greece as a country that had placed itself by the side of Gt. Britain "because the Greeks accepted the British guarantee" and for various other reasons; that "in coming centuries Europe would be controlled by the Axis powers and the attitude of the Axis towards the European states would be regulated by the attitude of these states towards Britain during Germany's and Italy's life and death struggle". Ribbentrop concluded by saying: "(he) could only urgently advise the Greek Minister, both on account of the immediate and also of the more distant future, to remedy the Italian grievances as quickly as possible and comply with the eventual wishes of the Italians." On the 30th January

A 083711

H1503D-0008

1940 Hitler had declared: "There also (in the Balkans) I do not see many hopes(for Gt. Britain) because one thing is true, that wherever Britain appears we shall attack her, and we are strong enough to do it."

6. In the meantime Germany continued to apply towards Greece the programme of economic domination of the Balkans which had been put into action as soon as the Hitlerite regime came into power. By securing an absolute control over Greece's economic life she thus hoped to subjugate the country politically and to paralyse all power to resist.

More specifically, Germany's economic effort from 1933 assumed to wards Greece the following essential characteristics:

a). Efforts to supplant the other purchasing countries, particularly Anglo-American, in the Greek market and especially the tobacco market. This was achieved mainly by the offer of substantially higher prices, which was made possible by the fact that Germany did not pay in free exchange but simply made a credit entry in the Greco-German clearing.

b). Offers of high prices by Germany to the Greek tobacco growers. This created the impression among Greek growers that Germany was really interested in Greek economy and that the other countries merely sought the exploitation of the tobacco growers.

c). Thus an increase of exports to Germany was achieved, which increased the credit balance in favour of Greece in the clearing which could not be used except for imports from Germany, which tended to Greece's economic dependence on Germany.

d). The apparent advantage of the offer of high prices to the Greek growers was false, as when the time came to use the balance available in the clearing to buy German goods, the prices demanded by Germany were sufficiently high to offset completely the high prices given to the Greek growers.

e). This effort on the part of Germany is illustrated by the following figures:

In 1933 Greece's exports to Germany amounted to 31 million

A083712

H1503D-0009

marks and her imports to 19 million; in 1938 Greece's exports rose to 97 million and her imports to 100 million.

f). According to official statements by the competent German authorities, it was sought by this policy to create a large economic unit within a wide area under the hegemony of Germany, inside which the other nations would be dependant on, and would be obliged to adjust there economy to, the needs of German economy and not the international market.

7. When in October 1940 the one member of the Axis, Italy, launched her actual attack on Greece, Germany's blackmailing activities assumed a more immediate and substantial character. It was no longer simply a case of terrorising Greece into submitting to Italy's political pressure, but a question of an immediate effort to break the morale of the Greek people defending itself and of weakening her political ability at all costs.

German propaganda employed the most diabolical methods to this end. It did not directly demand of Greece that she should surrender to force, because it knew that the only effect would be to invigorate the resistance of the Greek people even more. Holding over her head the threat of German intervention, it tried to force Greece to repel any assistance from her Allies or at least to restrict it to a minimum in the hope that she would thus avert a German attack. In this way, without any cost to Germany, Greece would be exhausted without any help from outside, and the Italian armies would finally be able to bring to a conclusion the Axis operation South-East of the Balkans. On the 28th November 1940 the representative of the German Foreign Office declared on the radio: "Germany's attitude towards the Greco-Italian conflict is the attitude of a very interested spectator, and it is stated that she will not intervene in this conflict unless Britain's help becomes very much greater." Throughout November and December the German information centres all over Europe circulated reports about impending

A 083713

H1503D-0010

German action to clear up the situation in the Balkans either through Bulgaria or through Yugoslavia. From early January 1941, responsible German circles in Sofia began to say that despite Germany's original intention not to disturb the situation in the Balkans, events now compelled the clearing up of the festering source of resistance to the policy of the Axis. In Belgrade and Bucharest during the same period officials of the press bureau of the German Embassy were circulating similar reports. The Reich's economic representative in the Balkans, Neubacher, who visited Sofia in the beginning of February, was saying there that the purpose of the concentration of German troops in Roumania was to strike towards the Aegean. On the 25th February 1941 the whole German press - as well as the Italian press - announced in big headlines the impending commencement of decisive operations. During the same period the German Military Attaché in Sofia was saying to a colleague that though he had no reason to expect any extension of the war to the Balkans, he did not completely preclude this owing to the attitude of certain circles in Athens who wanted to invite British troops to come in. The German military attaché in Ankara, speaking on the same lines, even went so far as to specify the 2nd March as the date of the Germans' entry into Bulgaria! Similar things were being said to members of the Greek Legation in Berlin and in Athens through the German Commercial Counsellor. Thus the essence of all the above narrowed down to this threat: Greece had nothing to fear from Germany, but on one condition: she should not permit any British troops to come to her aid, thus remaining isolated!

8. It was only natural that all this artfully-applied effort by the inspired German press should produce grave anxiety in Greece, where the army fighting in Albania had its flanks continuously exposed to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia because of geographical reasons. The Greek General Staff was obliged to ~~keep constant~~

A 083714

H1503D-0011

keep constant vigil in this direction, and this at a time when the unequal struggle made imperative the concentration of every effort against Italy. At the same time although its war material was insufficient and was speedily being expended as operations proceeded, and the need for allied help was becoming more and more imperative, the Greek Government hesitated to accept all the help offered by Britain for fear that this would provoke the German flood. Thus the plan to terrorise Greece on the part of Germany was giving substantial results to the benefit of the aggressor Italy.

The presence of the German-Bulgarian threat from the North-East compelled the Greek General Staff to make provision in the mobilisation plan for the concentration on the Bulgarian frontier of the following forces: 6 infantry divisions and one infantry brigade (out of a total of 17 divisions and 3 brigades). But the encouraging attitude shown by Turkey and Yugoslavia from the very first days of the war permitted the Staff to withdraw part of the forces concentrated against Bulgaria, which were thus reduced to 4 divisions and one brigade and later (February 1941) to 3 divisions and one brigade. But when later ~~when~~ on the German-Bulgarian threat began to be clearer, the Staff transferred another two infantry divisions to the sector Kaimaktsalan (N.W.Edessa)-Vermion-Aliakmon, so that the total forces of which the Albanian front was deprived amounted to 5 divisions and one brigade. These forces would have obviously been sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the Greek army in the winter of 1940 had they been used in Albania.

On the other hand the constantly-proclaimed threat that the acceptance of substantial British help would lead to Germany's intervention in aid of Italy compelled the Greek Government to decline any effective help on the part of the British forces. With the exception of the forces which took over Crete and a small air force of which use was made on the Albanian front,

A083715

H1503D-0012

no other more substantial assistance was accepted by Greece. For the same reason, as soon as the first British air reinforcements arrived, General Metaxas requested that all their operations should be directed towards Albania and refused to give his approval to the establishment of British air forces at the Larissa aerodrome which could, in view of its situation, be used for other operations also.

Later, on the 13th January 1941, General Wavell went to Athens and proposed to the Greek Government the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Salonika to organise a military base to meet the German threat from Roumania and Bulgaria. Still not wishing to give any grounds for a German attack, General Metaxas rejected this proposal, emphasizing that this would be of benefit to Greece only if the expeditionary force could number 10 divisions at once, which was not possible under the conditions then prevailing. Thus the diabolical way in which German blackmail was being applied produced the desired results!

9. When it was proved that all these blackmailing efforts were of no avail in bending the resistance of Greece, Germany decided to take a more active part in her destruction, putting into motion at the same time the wider strategic plan in the direction of the South-East and the East. "From this moment the German army will play its part in this struggle" (Italy's struggle), said Hitler in his speech of 16th March. His armies were concentrated in Bulgaria and Roumania, making preparations for their advance to the Aegean. In order to facilitate this operation within the time limit provided by the military command, however, it was necessary to secure: (a) the co-operation of Bulgaria (b) neutralisation of Yugoslavia, and (c) the immobilisation of Greece's ally, Turkey. German diplomacy was therefore set into motion to facilitate the German army's task.

With regard to Bulgaria, we have already seen from the published diary of the then Prime Minister of Bulgaria the full

A 083716

H1503D-0013

record of Germany's activities.

On the 1st January 1941 the Bulgarian Premier is summoned before Hitler and Ribbentrop at Salzburg, where participation to the Tripartite Pact is proposed as a prelude to Bulgaria's further co-operation. To ensure her acceptance, she is offered Greek territories and specifically "Aegean Thrace" as a reward. On the 7th January the Bulgarian King accepts this proposal in principle, and in consultation with his Prime Minister it is decided to ask Germany for further clarification with regard to the annexation of "Aegean Thrace" from Greece and as regards the Bulgarian army's co-operation. It is decided to hold Staff talks to this end, and the German Minister in Sofia, Herr von Richtofen, announces on the 16th January that the German Government proposes that the talks should commence in Roumania with Field-Marshall List. On the 18th January the Bulgarian Minister to Berlin, Draganof, arrives at Sofia and reports that Herr Weizäcker informed him on behalf of Ribbentrop that the Germans agreed to cede Greek Thrace from the Maritza to the Nestos to Bulgaria in exchange for her collaboration. On the 23rd January the Bulgarian representative at Field-Marshal List's Headquarters announces that the Germans agree to guarantee Bulgaria from attack from Turkey and that they will concentrate the greater part of their army on the Turkish frontier on condition that the Bulgarians agree that during the first four days of the attack, they will hold the Turks with at least four divisions. By By the 29th January all the details of the military co-operation have been worked out, and at a Cabinet Meeting held in Sofia the protocol agreed upon by the German and Bulgarian military representatives is finally approved, together with the announcement to be made in Berlin by the Bulgarian representative in connection with Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. On the same day the military protocol was approved by the German General Staff also. On the 1st March Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact takes place in Vienna. "Ribbentrop and Ciano", relates Filov in his diary, "handed me the documents by virtue of which, at the moment of the

A 083717

H1503D-0014

settlement of the Balkan frontiers, we would receive an outlet to the Aegean between the rivers Strymon and Maritsa. This fact was to be kept a close secret, and was ~~only~~ to be announced only with the consent of the two Governments." Thus in order to facilitate the use of Bulgaria against their victim Greece, the responsible Germans distributed Greece's lands to their partners in crime. As is revealed by the above, the original promise of the Nestos-Maritsa area was extended during the negotiations as far as the Strymon, including, that is, Greek Eastern Macedonia.

The Bulgarians naturally were not slow to make use of this payment for their treachery, and invaded Greek territory in the wake of the German armies. On the 15th May, in the Bulgarian Parliament, the Prime Minister, Filov, expressed his gratitude towards his great Allies. "The Bulgarian people", he said, "will always feel the deepest gratitude and the most profound obligation towards the Axis Powers and their great leaders, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, who have made the union of Bulgaria a reality". And Hitler, magnanimous even before the event, said in his speech of the 4th May: "I was able to make this decision at the present moment with greater calm as I knew I was acting in agreement with Bulgaria, whose sentiments and whose stand by the side of the German Reich have remained unbroken...."

10. But even this was not sufficient to complete Germany's blackmailing efforts against Greece. Yugoslavia also had to be utterly neutralised so as to avoid complications from that direction and so that Greece, isolated from that side, could be morally cowed and crushed without giving any fight. To this end, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was persistantly sought through all the usual methods of German policy. In his speech of the 4th May 1941, Hitler stated unequivocally: "It was our sincere desire, by following a path of closer co-operation with Yugoslavia, to succeed perhaps in averting a clash with Greece, satisfying in a suitable manner Italy's just

A 083718

H1503D-0015

demands."

Thus on the 25th March, after insistent pressure from Germany, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was signed in Vienna. And as in the case of Bulgaria, so in Yugoslavia's case also, Greek territories were offered to her as bait to facilitate her adherence. "Furthermore", said Hitler in the same speech on the 4th May, "Yugoslavia received the assurance, at the specific demand of her Government, that if territorial changes took place in the Balkans, she would be ceded an outlet to the Aegean under Yugoslav sovereignty specifically including Salonika."

11. A little earlier, on the 17th February 1941, German diplomacy also managed by simultaneous pressure in Sofia and Ankara to achieve the neutralisation of Turkey through the signature of a Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria. At that time Turkey was negotiating with Bulgaria a friendly statement which sought to oblige Bulgaria to try to defend her independance in the event of a German invasion. For this reason, in the Turkish draft of the statement, specific reference was made to the Menemenjoglou-Kiosseivanof negotiations of January 1940 which were precisely aimed to this end. At this stage Germany intervened and demanded that this provision should be expunged. "At 6 o'clock on the 27th January 1941", writes Filov in his memoirs, "von Ribbtofen came to tell me that he had received a telegram from Ribbentrop approving the signature of the proposed statement on the non-aggression agreement with Turkey, but that we should expunge the section in which it was stated that its signature was in the spirit of the Kiosseivanof-Menemenjoglou meeting of the previous year. He recommended that the agreement should be signed in secret, so that its signature could be expedited. I gladly agreed to this suggestion." Simultaneous pressure on Turkey thus made it possible to alter completely ~~that~~ the meaning of that statement which, by simply asserting the avoidance of any

A 083719

H1503D-0016

aggression - without any further provision - could only mean that Turkey would not move against Bulgaria and that Greece was now absolutely isolated and at Germany's mercy. And this is exactly the impression its signature made throughout Europe. "Britain and her Greek appendage", wrote the well-known Fascist writer Gayda on the 20th February, "now appears to be isolated, indeed expelled, from the Balkans".

13. While all these things were being perpetrated at the expense of Greece, German diplomacy was persistently trying by means of all kinds of false assurances to lull the responsible Greek Government by distracting its attention from the threatening danger. The German Legation in Athens and most of the German representatives abroad did not tire of proclaiming that they fully disapproved of the Italian attack against Greece and that Germany was animated by the best intentions towards her. As late as the 1st March 1941, the day of Bulgaria's adherence to the Axis, the spokesman of the German Foreign Office stated to American correspondents that "Germany's relations with Greece have undergone no change and continue to be friendly". On the 3rd March the same German spokesman stated that relations with Greece remained unchanged. And assisting from its own angle this work of misleading, Rome Radio was asserting as late as the 3rd April that well-informed circles looked with less pessimism than hitherto on the Yugoslav situation and noted as good symptoms of the easing of the tension in Belgrade the lack of contact between the Greek and the new Yugoslav government and the agreement being reached for the participation in the government of the Croat leader Matchek.

A083720

H1503D-0017

PART II. W A R.

The invasion of Greece started on the 6th April 1941. By the 28th of that month the Germans had entered Athens and had overrun the mainland of Greece. By the end of May, Crete having been captured, the whole of Greece was under German occupation.

In these few weeks of war, besides many cases of individual savagery on the part of members of the German army towards the population, the German armed forces committed the following acts against the Laws of War in applying the German principle "Kriegräson geht vez Kriegsmanier."

1. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.

The German Air Force bombed and very heavily damaged the following twenty-three undefended Greek towns: Jannina, Preveza, Arta, Corfu, Kozani, Servia, Klasson, Larissa, Tukkala, Volos, Lamia, Chalkis, Thebes, Piraeus, Corinth, Patras, Nauplia, Argos, Sparta, Kalamata, Canea, Rethymno and Heraklion. Of these the towns of Jannina, Arta, Preveza, Trikkala, Larissa and Canea were almost completely destroyed.

In most cases the inhabitants, mainly old men, women and children, were deliberately mowed down by machine-gun fire. The victims of bombing and machine-gunning amounted to over 3,000.

2. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.

In Jannina Red Cross Hospitals, though conspicuously marked, were deliberately bombed in daylight and completely destroyed. 600 wounded, together with 50 nurses and a number of doctors, were buried under the ruins.

3. Destruction of Hospital Ships.

The five Greek hospital ships, "HESPEROS", "POLICOS", "ATTIKI", "HELLENIS", and "SOCRATES", attached to the Greek forces, though bearing clear Red Cross markings by day and fully illuminated

A 083721

H1503D-0018

by night, were deliberately sunk by German aircraft, flying at a low altitude; and the survivors were machine-gunned as they strove to keep afloat.

4. Pillage.

As the German armies advanced southwards in the wake of their armoured divisions, they plundered and pillaged everything in their path. Cattle, crops of every kind, clothing and movables were stolen from the inhabitants. Shops were stripped of their goods and all stocks commandeered.

5. Destruction of Ships without warning. Murder of survivors.

After the occupation of Greece, the Greek Mercantile Marine continued the struggle, till the defeat of Germany. Over 200 Greek cargo vessels were destroyed without warning and many Greek sailors fell victims of the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. There are many instances where entire crews disappeared. One instance is recorded where three members of a crew miraculously survived to tell the story. On the 13th March 1944, the Greek s.s. "PELEUS" was torpedoed and sunk without warning. After the "PELEUS" sank, U. 852 surfaced and attempted to kill all survivors. The rafts and wreckage were rammed, and the men on them were machine-gunned, and hand grenades thrown among the rafts. Thirty-four seamen out of thirty-seven were killed.

A 083722

H1503D-0019

PART III. O C C U P A T I O N.

From the very start of the occupation, the Germans decided on a policy of territorial dismember ment and divided the country among themselves the Italians and the Bulgarians.

Germany occupied Central and Western Macedonia, Crete, the Aegean Islands and a zone in the Evros district of Thrace.

Epirus, the Ionian Islands and the Cyclades were placed under Italian occupation and completely isolated from the rest of Greece.

Two of the most fertile Greek provinces, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, were ceded to Bulgaria, who unofficially "annexed" them, so that they ceased to form part of Greek territory. Later, following on the Italian surrender, Central and Western Macedonia were also handed over by the Germans to the Bulgarians.

The rest of Greece was left under Greek civil administration but with Germans and Italians, and more particularly the former, retaining control over all the more important economic and strategic factors.

As in other occupied countries, the German occupation policy in Greece was governed by two determining factors: the exploitation of the country to the maximum of its resources for the benefit of Germany's war economy, and the subjugation of the population by means of methodical terrorism and indiscriminate oppression.

The Germans pursued their two-fold policy in a spirit of plunder and revenge, in complete defiance of the universally recognised rules of occupation.

A. EXPLOITATION.

In order to understand the special policy of mass exploitation enforced by Germany in Greece and how the acute conditions of starvation and want came about throughout Greece during the years 1941 - 1944, it would be necessary to explain in some detail: (1) the economic situation of the country at the time of the beginning of the

A 083723

H1503D-0020

occupation, and (2) the method of pillage employed i.e. the predatory financial and economic measures enforced by the Germans during the occupation.

1. When the Germans entered Greece they found themselves in an already exhausted country. Even under the best conditions Greece possesses very slender resources in relation to the size of its population. Over half its area is mountainous and arid, and of the remainder only 20% is suitable for cultivation. Natural conditions are unfavourable to the growth of food crops and stock-raising. In addition, the country lacks fuel and many raw materials. Thus, Greece is almost entirely dependent on imports for its requirements in food stuffs, fuel and many essential raw materials.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 had an adverse effect—even when Greece was still neutral—on the Greek economy, which by reason of its structure had always been extremely sensitive to world economic conditions. Total imports, which exceeded 2,700,000 tons during the pre-war period, fell to 1,450,000 tons in 1940. The situation deteriorated still further after Italy's attack in October 1940, and Germany's attack in April 1941, when the country had to face a hard and unequal struggle against first one and later two, mighty powers. The country had to devote its resources to the prosecution of the war, and to make every sacrifice in meeting the needs of the fighting forces. The general mobilisation, the need of maintaining large forces on inadequate local supplies, the requisitioning of practically all means of transport for military purposes, meant a drastic curtailment of civilian consumption. At the same time, agriculture suffered considerably from the mobilisation of the peasant population, the requisitioning of draught animals and the slaughtering of livestock for the needs of the army. As a result, severe restriction of consumption and strict rationing had been introduced at an early date, and the civilian population placed on a minimum diet.

In short, at the moment when the German occupation began it was

A 083724

H1503D-0021

evident that the losses in productive capacity suffered during the war as well as the considerable reduction in the stocks of imported goods had by themselves sufficed to cause acute distress in the country.

Nevertheless, so far from recognising that they were occupying a country from which no material contribution could possibly be exacted without imperilling the very existence of the population, the Germans pursued a policy of pillage which was bound to bring about, which did in fact bring about, famine, chaos and disintegration.

The treatment of Greece was more rigorous than that meted out to other occupied countries. The explanation is that Germany's policy in every case was closely related to the economic structure of each particular country. In other occupied countries the Germans organised production for the maximum benefit of their war effort. In these countries it was in their interest to maintain the worker's productive capacity; they did not condemn the whole population. In the case of Greece, however, as the country lacked self-contained industries and manufactures, transport systems and electric power, they considered it more advantageous to drain it of everything it could provide, in complete disregard of the most elementary needs of the population, and to enforce general terroristic measures, thereby threatening a whole people with extinction.

2. In pursuance of their policy, the Germans enforced the following administrative, financial and economic measures, which served the economic needs of the German nation and not the needs of an army of occupation, as provided by the rules concerning occupation. In violation of Articles 46, 47, 48, 51 and 52 of the Hague Regulations the Germans maintained in Greece much larger forces than were necessary for the purposes of a mere occupation:

they carried out extensive fortification works compulsorily financed by the country;

they levied immense sums as "costs of occupation" far in excess

A083725

H1503D-0022

of the needs of an army of occupation;

they confiscated and requisitioned the existing stocks and supplies out of all proportion to the resources of the country;

they extorted a vast contribution in a disguised from by means of inflation and of forced borrowing by clearing.

(a) Maintenance of Large Forces.

Owing to her geographical position, Greece was used by the Germans as a base of operations for the war in North Africa. They also used Greece as a place of rest for thousands of their troops from the North African and Eastern fronts. Thus, they concentrated in Greece muchlarger forces than were actually required for purposes of occupation. Large amounts of local supplies of fruit, vegetables, potatoes, olive oil, meat and dairy products were taken for the needs of these forces. As current production was not sufficient for those needs, requisitioning of live-stock was extensively resorted to, with the result that the country's live-stock was seriously depleted in numbers.

(b) Execution of extensive fortifications.

In order to prepare against attack from the south, as Greece formed the southern sector of the so-called "Fortress of Europe", the Germans exhausted her already greatly diminished resources in the construction of vast works of fortification and defence. Neither the materials nor the food supplies for the labour employed were imported. The cost of the works was borne by Greece and amounted to 2½ million gold pounds.

(c) Costs of Occupation.

Enormous sums were exacted as costs of occupation. Between August 1941 and December 1941 the Germans were paid the sum of drs. 26,206,085,000 i.e. 60% above the estimated national income during the same period. In fact, according to the estimates of two Axis experts, Dr. Barberino (German) and Dr. Bertoni (Italian), the national income of that year amounted to only 23,000 million

A 083726

H1503D-0023

drs. In the following year, as the national income decreased, they extracted sums at the expense of the national capital.

(d) Confiscations and Requisitions.

One of the enemy's first measures on occupying Greece was to lay hands on all the stocks existing in the country by requisition or direct confiscation. Among other things, they requisitioned from the wholesale and retail trade 71,000 tons of currants and 10,000 tons of olive oil: they confiscated 1,435 tons of coffee, 1,143 tons of sugar, 2,520 tons of rice, and a whole shipload of wheat at the Piraeus of a value of $ 530,000 etc.

In the case of local supplies, since requisition was not always easy to carry out in the rural districts, one of the most effective devices for laying hands on them was the placing of an embargo on local products in the centres of production.

As already stated, the country had been divided between three occupants. This dismemberment did not merely serve administrative expediency. It also, among other things, served the German economic policy by enabling the "blocking" of local produce. All economic relations between the three zones of occupation were prohibited. Moreover, within the several zones, prohibitions and restrictions were such as to isolate whole regions and to deprive them of contact with the rest of the country. Thus, owing to these artificial boundaries, the inhabitants of one region were unable to buy the products of another, and while there might be a famine in one area, local supplies were available in the next. Even inside each region the transport and sale of commodities was made subject to special licence from the occupying authorities. This policy had the further advantage of enabling these authorities to obtain local produce at stable and unreasonably low prices which took no account of the large-scale inflation.

As a complement to the "blocking" of supplies and disregarding the fact that transport facilities had always been inadequate in Greece, and that heavy losses had already been sustained during the period

A 083727

H1503D-0024

of military operations, the occupying forces took over practically all the means of transport left in the country and used them almost exclusively for their own needs. The result was that even when supplies available in one region were desperately needed in another region, their dispatch could not be effected owing to lack of means of transport. The Relief Commission of the International Red Cross itself was faced with great difficulties in transporting the limited quantities of relief supplies (200,000 tons per annum) which it distributed to the population.

No small country could have survived the splitting up of its territory into so large a number of closed economic areas. In the case of Greece, the Germans deliberately disregarded the greatly diversified forms of agricultural production prevailing in different parts of the country, and the fact that the various regions were complementary to each other. The effects of the extensive requisitioning of local produce during the first years of occupation were so disastrous for the Greek population that the enemy himself had to admit that he had gone too far. At the end of 1942 an undertaking was given to the International Red Cross Commission in Greece that local foodstuffs consumed by the occupying authorities or exported would be replaced by imported foodstuffs providing the same amount of calories. Even this undertaking was not kept in actual fact.

(e) Inflation.

In Greece more than in any other occupied country the issue of unlimited quantities of currency was deliberately used by the Germans as a means of obtaining command over local resources. Faced with an already exhausted economy, with the refusal of the population to submit to any form of compulsory labour, and, in addition, with the fact that not every article could be confiscated or requisitioned, the Germans adopted a policy of large-scale inflation as the easiest means of exploiting the country.

From the very start, they put into circulation 10,000,000,000 occupation Marks, a sum equal to half the money in circulation at that

A083723

H1503D-0025

date. By April 1944, the monetary circulation had reached 14,000,000 (million) drs. i.e. had increased 700 times since the date of occupation.

The extent of the inflation is shown by the following figures: In April 1941 the price of a gold sovereign was 1,000 drs. In October 1944 it had reached 200,000,000,000,000, drs. Taking January 1941 as basis (100) the cost of living index stood at 3,268 in April of the same year, while towards the end of the occupation it had soared to 1,536,000,000,000, a 2,252,000,000-fold increase. Thanks to the inflation, when the Germans paid for goods they enriched themselves by the difference between the real prices and the artificial prices established through it. Thus not only food stuffs, but every article of value, jewels, gold objects, furniture, etc., even all the coins in circulation nickel and nickel alloys found their way to Germany at a very conveniently low price.

(f) Misuse of Clearing.

The clearing system which had been applied before the war by Germany as a means of economic penetration, was evolved by them during the war as the most efficient device for spoliation, equivalent in fact to mass-looting. The Germans exercised their controlling power in such a way that the most important and essential products of the country were excluded from trade inside the country and kept at the disposal of the occupying Power.

Commodities destined for export were first of all confiscated or placed under an embargo by the Military Authorities and were subsequently bought by the interested parties at arbitrarily fixed prices, usually at pre-war prices which took no account of the devaluation of the drachma and the tremendous rise in prices in the open market. The value of the commodities, as fixed by this arbitrary reckoning, was then entered to the credit of Greece's account. Conversely, goods imported from Germany, in spite of the steady prices prevailing at the place of origin, were charged at 200 -500 per cent over their normal price. In addition, Greece's

A 083729

H1503D-0026

account was debited with the value of the goods imported from Germany for the use of the forces of occupation.

Some of the latter goods were: coal, of which 80% was used for the railway transport needs of the troops and for the provision of power for the factories working for the Germans, and petroleum products of which 70% was taken by the Military Authorities. As often as not, the bulk of the goods thus imported were confiscated by the Occupation Authorities on arrival and it was not unusual for them to demand that the settlement for these goods, although destined exclusively for the use of the occupation authorities, should be effected through this same clearing account. In consequence, notwithstanding the fact that Greece exported the whole of her available resources to Germany, the clearing account showed a credit balance in favour of Germany of 264,157,574,03 marks when the Germans left, while the credit balance in favour of Greece, at the moment of their arrival stood at 4,353,428,82 marks.

A083730

H1503D-0027

B. T E R R O R I S M.

During the first few weeks of the occupation the Germans presented themselves in Greece as "liberators" seeking the friendly collaboration of the population.

While reviewing the Balkan campaign in a speech at the Kroll Opera House of Berlin on May 4th 1941 Hitler made an attempt to propitiate Greece and to justify his unprovoked attack. He said: "Even today I feel that I must, as I believe in the interest of historical accuracy, distinguish between the Greek people and that thin toplayer of corrupt leaders who, inspired by a King who had no idea of the duties of true leadership, preferred instead to further the aims of British war-mongers. I must categorically stress that this action was not directed against Greece..... Nothing is impossible for the ~~Greek~~ German soldiers. Historical accuracy, however, obliges me to say that, of the opponents who have taken arms against us, the Greek soldiers are those who have fought with the greatest courage and contempt for death."

However, this conciliatory manner did not last long. On the night of May 30 1941 patriots pulled down the swastika from the Acropolis, and the following day May 31, the German Commander in Athens issued an order threatening heavy penalties;

"(a) Because on the night of the 30th - 31st May the German war flag flying on the Acroplis was taken away by unknown persons, those guilty of this act as well as their accomplices will be punished by death.

(b) Because the Press and public opinion of all classes still express themselves with evident sympathy in favour of the English, now expelled from Continental Europe.

(c) Because events in Crete (he was referring to the lawful resistance of the inhabitants) and the ill-treatment of German prisoners not only were not condemned, but in wide circles were even commented on with satisfaction.

(d) Because, although this was specifically forbidden, repeated

A 083731

H1503D-0028

gestures of sympathy towards British prisoners were observed(Offers of gifts, flowers, fruit, cigarettes etc.,) and these demonstrations were tolerated by the Greek police who did not intervene with the means at their disposal.

(c) Because the behavior of large numbers of the people of Athens towards the German armed forces has again become less friendly".

The German Command went on to point out that until then it had been doing all it could to show its goodwill towards the people of Greece; but now with deep regret it must take whatever steps it considered necessary to end the situation.

From that early date, and at those slight signs of moral opposition, the Germans started applying their terroristic policy. In violation of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations they systematically punished the innocent enforcing the expressly condemned principle of joint responsibility of the community for acts of individuals. They used starvation as an instrument of pressure and for weakening the spirit of resistance of the Greek population. They seldom respected the laws of justice. Very few people were tried by court martial, and, when held, such trials were something of a judicial mockery. They instituted a policy of reprisals consisting in taking hostages, in killing hostages, in mass-murders and in destruction and devastation of villages for acts committed in their vicinity by unknown individuals. Thus, the great majority of those executed were picked at random from prisons and camps, without any possible relation to the act in reprisal for which they were executed. The life of every citizen depended on the arbitrary decision of the local commander.

1. STARVATION.

Starvation was not a necessary incident of the war; it was the logical consequence of the policy of exploitation adopted by the Germans in Greece. They provoked hunger and they used hunger as a means of cowing the Greek population. From the following extracts

A 083732

H1503D-028A

of speeches etc., of high Nazi Officials it would appear that starvation was deliberate and was part of a plan which included or intended starvation, or was reasonably calculated to result in starvation.

That Hitler felt no hesitation about reducing or exterminating inconvenient populations is evident from his words to Rauschning (Who would presumably be in a position to confirm them)

"We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. I mean the removal of entire racial units, and that is what I intend to carry our - that, roughly, is my task -. Nature is cruel, therefore, we too may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin."

Dr. Ley wrote in ~~the~~ Goebbel's organ "Der Angriff" of January 31st 1940 that:

"A lower race needs less room, less clothing, less food and less culture than a higher race...."

Goering who "in accordance with the orders of the Führer" was "directing the economy of newly-occupied Eastern countries" stated his principle bluntly, in a speech in October 1942 at the Sportpalast, by which time in Greece starvation had already claimed many thousands of victims.

"I have formed an unshakable resolve, a rock-firm principle which will be inflexibly maintained. The German people come first and foremost as regards the satisfaction of hunger and the question of nutrition. If, as a result of the enemy's measures, difficulties of food supply should arise, then I want everyone to know that <u>if anybody goes hungry, it will not be Germany!</u>

But while it may not be easy to establish how far starvation was deliberately premeditated, it is beyond any doubt that when

A 083733

famine broke out and people died in the streets as a result of the

H1503D-0029

German policy of exploitation, not only the Government of the Reich did not send any help to ease the situation, but they continued to remove agricultural and other supplies for the use of the German forces in Greece, for exportation to the Africa Corps, and for consumption in Germany. Thus, they introduced a new method of "white massacre".

The results of such treatment were bound to be catastrophic. The Greek population was reduced during the occupation to a state of complete physical exhaustion. A few months after the beginning of the occupation the food situation became acute in the urban centres and other non-food-producing regions. During the period from August 1941 to April 1942 famine was rampant in the capital as well as in the Aegean and Cyclades Islands. It is a fact that Greece was only saved thanks to the partial raising of the blockade which was decided upon in the spring of 1942, at which date relief shipments began to arrive in Greece from Allied and neutral countries. These shipments enabled the International Red Cross Commission to provide the bread ration of part of the population and to supply a minimum of food stuffs to the various canteens.

It is an incontestable fact that the great majority of the Greek population lived on the verge of starvation for nearly three years. Many thousands experienced real famine for several months before relief shipments could reach them.

As a result the death rate increased by 500% (600% in the capital and 800 to 1,000% in the Islands during the period August 1941 - April 1942). New-born children died at a rate of 25% and the health of the survivors was greatly undermined.

The following extracts from reports of the Neutral Missions in Greece give an idea of the state to which the population was reduced at the very moment when its scanty resources were used for feeding the Germans:

"During the winter of 1941 - 1942 when famine reigned in the

A083734

H1503D-0030

capital, conditions in the provinces were still tolerable. During the following winter, however, when relief from Canada for the larger towns had been exhausted by the free market, the situation was very different.... During our first tours of inspection (March 1943) we made the acquaintance of a population literally screaming for bread. Many villages had only a substitute baked of flour, wild pears and acorns - ordinary pig's food, and in many districts the population had received no other bread since December. We were taken inside the houses and shown empty shelves and larders and we saw people cooking weeds without oil and salt in order to fill their stomachs. The inhabitants of the poorer villages were all extremely thin, and the children in particular were often in a pitiful condition, with skinny extremities and swollen stomachs without any natural vitality and cheerfulness. It was quite usual for half the children to be unable to go to school." (Report of the Swedish delegates to the Peloponese January 1944).

"Tuberculosis is making havoc among an undernourished population, lacking almost completely animal protein foods. It is the greatest danger which is at present threatening the Greek people.... Skin infections, staphylococcias is and particularly scabies are widespread. Often the entire population of towns and villages is affected." (Report of ~~Swedish~~ Swiss Mission in Greece, 5th April 1944.)

"The population of Salonika, which is daily increasing with the influx of refugees and victims of reprisals, suffers acutely from the lack of foodstuffs which are obtainable on the market at prohibitive prices. Diseases due to the exhaustion caused by undernourishment and by other privations endured since the beginning of the war are spreading. Thus, tuberculosis, malaria and children's diseases (rickets, adenitis, enteritis &c.) have again increased the number already considerable of patients." (Report of the Swedish Delegates in Macedonia, January 31st 1944

A083735

H1503D-0031

II. Massacres, wanton devastation and destruction of villages.

As soon as the Germans occupied Crete, their High Command proclaimed that "places near which attacks took place against German soldiers ~~xxxxxxxx~~ will be burned to the ground and the population will be held responsible." Following this proclamation, the first act of reprisal was committed; a number of people were shot, most of them completely innocent, and the villages of Skini, Prassi and Kandanos burnt to the ground in retaliation for the killing, during the attack on Crete, of some German parachutists by members of the Cretan Militia. On the sites of these villages they erected posters bearing the following inscription in German and Greek "Zur Vergeltung der bestialischen Ermordung eines Fallschirmjägerzuges und eines Pionierhalbzuges durch bewaffnte Männer und Frauen aus dem Hinterhalte zerstört."

The policy of reprisals which at first was of an intermittent character, gradually became intensified, especially after the opposition put up in early 1943 by organised guerrillas all over the country.

The technique employed was a standard one. On the day following any acts of sabotage or guerilla activities near a village, German troops appeared in the village. The inhabitants were summoned into the main square or other suitable place, supposedly in order to listen to a proclamation, and they were then mowed down by machine-gun fire. The German then proceeded to burn down, or in some cases shell, the village, after having pillaged it. They shot people in the streets, in the houses, in the fields, regardless of sex or age. In some cases only males from the age of sixteen and upwards were executed. In other cases, the men having fled to the mountains, they executed the women, the children and old men who had remained behind in the village, in the belief that their sex or age was a protection. Typical examples were Aracheva, Kalavryta, Distomon, Klissoura, Kommeno, Mesevouni. Some villages were destroyed for the sole reason that they happened to be situated within the mountainous

A 083736

H1503D-0032

guerilla area. Thus, 1,600 villages were totally or partially destroyed out of a total of 6,500 and over 1,200,000 people left destitute. The number of villagers killed amounts to some 30,000. The fate of the survivors is described in the following extract from a report of the Relief Commission (May 1944) :

"Whenever the occupation troops burn a village in retaliation for attacks on German lives or property by partisans, the villagers very often have no time - or are not allowed - to save their personal belongings. Half-naked and shoeless they gather together in caves and rock shelters if they are not able to take refuge in neighbouring villages." Many of these destitute people died of starvation and want.

III. HOSTAGES - CONCENTRATION CAMPS .

Hostages were taken indiscriminately and from every class. Politicians, professors, scientists, lawyers, doctors, officers, civl servants, clergymen, workers, women, anybody was labelled as a "suspect" or a "communist" and thrown into the local prisons, or concentration camps. Prisoners under interrogation were subjected to various ingenious forms of torture. Most notorious among the concentration camps were those at Haidari (nr. Athens), Larissa and Agia (Crete), faithfully modelled on the German prototype. In these systematic and deliberate cruelty was practised. The inmates were starved, beaten and tortured, living under the most inhuman conditions without medical help or sanitation, subjected to the refined sadism of the S.S. guards. Many were shot or hanged, others died from maltreatment or starvation, and only a few were released or survived up to the date of the liberation of the country. Hostages were also deported to concentration camps in Germany. Thus, Buchenwald, Belsen, Dachau, etc., had their contingent of Greeks. The number of hostages shot amounts to some ~~91~~ 21,000.

IV. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

Many churches all over Greece were profaned and members of the clergy deported or shot.

The ancient privileges of the Monasteries of Mount Athos, which

A 083737

H1503D-0033

enjoyed autonomy under the Greek constitution and an international treaty, were abolished by the Germans on the ground that the place was a centre of anti-German propaganda.

By their orders and regulations the Germans gradually introduced into Greece the Nuremburg laws relegating Jews to the state of pariahs. At first, both regulations and treatment were, by comparisdn with later events, mild. They introduced discrimination between Jews and Christians. In July 1942, all the male members of the Jewish community of Salonika from 16 to 45 years of age were compelled to do forced labour, such as road-building ~~etc.~~, work on farms etc. Three months later they were released, after having been compelled to pay an exorbitant monetary contribution.

Later, in 1943, the Germans, following the example set by the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace in 1942, started applying the policy announced by Dr. Ley in December 1942, of "waging this war until the Jews have been wiped off the face of the earth". They applied this policy in Greece with the utmost thoroughness. Jews were rounded up and subjected to mass deportation, their property being confiscated. Thus, out of a population of nearly 80,000 ~~thousand~~ Jews in Greece in 1941, 60,000 had been deported to Poland by 1944. According to the evidence given by the few repatriated Jews, most of the above-mentioned number perished under the most appalling conditions. It has been estimated that in the death camp of Birkenau alone, 45,000 Greek Jews were gassed. Only 9 - 10,000 Jews survived in Greece by joining the Guerilla bands in the mountains or by going into hiding in Athens under false names, thanks to the assistance of their Christian fellow-citizens.

V. RECRUITMENT OF LABOUR.

One of the many problems confronting the German administration was that of recruiting labour.

All males between sixteen and fifty years of age were liable to labour conscription. Strikes were declared illegal, and severe penalties enforced for resort thereto. Persons who organised and directed a

A083738

strike were liable to the death penalty. Strikers were tried by military courts.

At first, the Germans by propaganda and various forms of indirect pressure, tried to recruit Greek labour to work within Germany. They promised high wages and better conditions of life. As this kind of "voluntary" recruitment failed to produce the expected results they abandoned it and confronted the workers with the dilemma either of being taken as hostages or else of being sent to Germany to work. Nevertheless, the number of workers deported to Germany did not exceed 16,659.

II. RAPE-PILLAGE.

Though this report is not concerned with criminal acts of individual brutality, it should be mentioned that crimes such as rape and pillage by members of the German forces were daily occurrences.

London, 13th October 1945.

By order and on behalf of
The Royal Hellenic Government.

Th. Aghnides
Ambassador to the
Court of St. James's

AMBASSADE ROYALE DE GRÈCE A LONDRES

CERTIFIED AT THE FOREIGN OFFICE
FOR LEGALIZATION
OF THE FOREGOING
SIGNATURE
"Th. Aghnides"

FOREIGN OFFICE
LONDON

3rd Nov, 1945.

Alexander Cadogan.
FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

A 083730
H1503D-0034

H1503D-0035

U.K.82

AMBASSADE ROYALE DE GRECE,
51, Upper Brook Street,
London, W.1.

No. 8168/ST/30/45.

19th October 1945.

Sir,

With further reference to your Note No. U 6271/29/73 of August 8th., I have the honour to forward herewith, on behalf of my Government, for presentation before the International Military Tribunal, a statement on the crimes, within the definition laid down in Article 6 of the Charter, which have been committed against the Greek nationals or property.

I should be grateful if you could arrange to have this statement presented before the International Military Tribunal.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,

The Right Honourable
Ernest Bevin, M.P.
H.M. Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc.,

HK.

H1503D-0036

U.K. 82.

REPORT OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC GOVERNMENT

to the

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

This report consists of the following three main heads:

1. Germany's preparation of the war of agression against Greece.

II. The violations of the laws and customs of war perpetrated by the German Armed Forces during the war operations.

III. The violations of the universally accepted rules concerning occupation perpetrated by Germany in Greece during the occupation, by the enforcement of a policy of financial and economic exploitation, (confiscation, requisition, inflation, misuse of clearing) and of terrorism (starvation, wholesale massacre, killing of hostages etc.)

PART I. (PRELIMINARIES OF WAR) will deal with the first head.

PART II. (WAR) will deal with the second head.

PART III. (OCCUPATION) will deal with the third head.

The report is not concerned with acts of individual brutality. It is concerned only with such acts as, by their character, denote the existence of a general plan aiming at the domination of Europe by Germany, and a plan which included organised financial and economic pillage of the occupied countries and forced collaboration of their populations by means of terrorism.

H1503D-0037

PART I. PRELIMINARIES OF WAR.

At 5.30 a.m. on Sunday, 6th April 1941, Prince Erbach-Schönberg, German Minister to Athens, presented a communication by which the Greek Government was informed that Germany was at war with Greece. At the same time German troops which had been concentrated in Bulgaria in March 1941 crossed the Bulgarian frontier and entered Greek territory. In six weeks the resistance of the Greco-British forces was overcome and the whole of the Greek state came under the German yoke.

Germany's attack on Greece was absolutely unprovoked and unjust--ifiable. It was obviously part of Germany's wider plan for world conquest. It was preceded by no warning or threat, nor by any serious diplomatic démarche for the removal of any existing doubts; nor was there any demand for arbitration or judicial procedure for the solution of any difference that may have existed.

The persons in Germany responsible for the diplomatic and strategic handling of this aggressive action desired to avail themselves of all the advantages of surprise and of the natural reluctance of a small country like Greece to take in time against a powerful aggressor defensive measures which he could regard as provocative. According to the plans of those who directed the policy of the Reich, Greece had to be isolated diplomatically, to be paralysed internally, and to be tricked by the threat of an immediate attack or by false assurances of good intentions into not taking in good time the indispensable defensive measures, so that her subjugation would be easier.

2. Germany's attack on Greece was made, of course, within the framework of the wider politico-strategic effort of the Axis to ensure its domination throughout Europe. The responsibility of each individual person responsible for the attack is therefore inter-connected with the responsibility of their other Allies, and the crime committed against Greece took place in full mutual collaboration in the execution of their design of conquest. In view of this fact, the individual responsibility of each one of those who directed German policy cannot be examined separately but constitutes one single whole, as an organ of the collective political and military activity of the Reich and even more generally of the Axis. In its aggressive policy, however, it is known that it was Germany that directed its rapacious effort, and consequently it is Germany that bears the greater part of the responsibility.

3. Germany's aggression against Greece, which was thus involved in the wider plan of action of the Axis, followed various phases according to the development of events. Thus a) it supported the aggressive designs of Greece's neighbours against her, b) it tried to subjugate her economic--ally so as to overcome all tendencies of political resistance, c) it endeavoured to terrorise Greece into stopping her from taking the necessary defensive measures against the impending Italian threat, d) when the Italian attack was launched, it aimed at and succeeded in keeping a substantial part of the Greek army tied up on Greece's North-Eastern frontiers, e) it forced Greece to decline all assistance from her Allies, and isolated her diplomatically so that she could succomb more easily to Germany's will.

4. Until 1939 Germany worked for the gradual subjugation of the European states by means of her well-known economic and political plan of advancing her positions towards the South-East. During this period Greece is not immediately within the sphere of Germany's aggressive activities. The threat against her is manifested mainly from Italy and Bulgaria, each of which for special reasons looks to the seizure of Greek territories. Germany nevertheless supports and exploits these efforts which serve the immediate interests of her collaborators and at the same time her own. This is not the appropriate place to relate Italy's

H1503D-0038

aggressive efforts against Greece from the beginning of the present century and particularly since the establishment of the Fascist regime. These things are in any case known to all. Without taking a definite attitude against Greece, Germany supported the Italian aims, thus helping and preparing the final attack in 1940. In October 1932 Hitler said in an interview with the Italian newspaper "TEVERE": "Italy and Germany have the same enemies and their mission consists in working together in the task of civilisation". In 1937, on the morrow of the events in Vienna, Hitler himself said at the Party Rally on the 7th September at Nuremberg: ".....Germany is now no longer isolated but united in close friendship with powerful nations. The natural community of interests between National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has been shown in recent months to be a factor seeking to safeguard Europe from the threat of a chaotic lunacy". The whole German press, directed in the well-known manner by the supreme Government circles, encouraged Italy in her designs of conquest. When Italy seized Albania in March 1939, thus establishing a bridgehead for further aggressive action against Greece, Hitler said inter alia in his speech on the 28th April before the Reichstag:

> "The German Government with full understanding appreciates the justification for the action taken in Albania by its Italian friend, and therefore greets it with pleasure. Yes, it is not only the right, but the duty of Fascism to ensure within the living space indisputably recognised to Italy by nature and history, the maintenance of a state of things on which alone a truly prospering human civilisation seems to be able to depend and make itself firm".

In the recently published extracts from Ciano's diaries, it is mentioned in this connection that after the occupation of Albania, all the roads "were planned to lead to the Greek frontiers. This was ordered by the Duce, who thinks more and more of attacking Greece on the first opportunity." At another point in these diaries, the following is said about Germany: "Ribbentrop has sent a message that Berlin looks with sympathy on our action in Tirana as victory for Italy means strengthening of the power of the Axis".

5. Not content with the moral support of Italy, Germany tried to prevent Greece from taking elementary measures for the defense of her threatened independence. When the occupation of Albania rendered the threat to Greece more imminent, Germany hastened to denounce the guarantees of Greek Independence given by France and Gt. Britain as being directed against the Axis, and made every effort to bully or cajole Greece into declining these guarantees. From that moment the opposition to the British and French guarantee was destined to constitute the main weapon of attack against Greece in order to weaken her resistance. Greece had to be forced at all costs to deprive herself of any friendly assistance so that she could more easily suffer the fate prepared for her by the Axis. All available diplomatic means were mobilised: "friendly recommendations" among diplomats, public statements by political personalities, a press and radio campaign. Similar efforts were simultaneously made in the direction of Greece's friends in the Balkans in order that the Balkan pact and the alliance with Turkey should be weakened or torpedoed at any sacrifice. On the 27th August 1940 Ribbentrop went even further, and asking the Greek Minister in Berlin to call on him, told him clearly that Germany regarded Greece as a country that had placed itself by the side of Gt. Britain "because the Greeks accepted the British guarantee" and for various other reasons; that "in coming centuries Europe would be controlled by the Axis powers and the attitude of the Axis towards the European states would be regulated by the attitude of those states towards Britain during Germany's and Italy's life and death struggle". Ribbentrop concluded by saying: "(he) could only urgently advise the Greek Minister, both on account of the immediate and more distant future, to remedy the Italian grievances as quickly as possible and comply with the eventual wishes of the Italians." On the 30th January 1940 Hitler had

H1503D-0039

declared: "There also (in the Balkans) I do not see many hopes (for Gt. Britain) because one thing is true, that wherever Britain appears we shall attack her, and we are strong enough to do it."

6. In the meantime Germany continued to apply towards Greece the programme of economic domination of the Balkans which had been put into action as soon as the Hitlerite regime came into power. By securing an absolute control over Greece's economic life she thus hoped to subjugate the country politically and to paralyse all power to resist.

More specifically, Germany's economic effort from 1933 assumed towards Greece the following essential characteristics:

a). Efforts to supplant the other purchasing countries, particularly Anglo-American, in the Greek market and especially the tobacco market. This was achieved mainly by the offer of substantially higher prices, which was made possible by the fact that Germany did not pay in free exchange but simply made a credit entry in the Greco-German clearing.

b). Offers of high prices by Germany to the Greek tobacco growers. This created the impression among Greek growers that Germany was really interested in Greek economy and that the other countries merely sought the exploitation of the tobacco growers.

c). Thus an increase of exports to Germany was achieved, which increased the credit balance in favour of Greece in the clearing which could not be used except for imports from Germany, which tended to Greece's economic dependance on Germany.

d). The apparant advantage of the offer of high prices to the Greek growers was false, as when the time came to use the balance available in the clearing to buy German goods, the prices demanded by Germany were sufficiently high to offset completely the high prices given to the Greek growers.

e). This effort on the part of Germany is illustrated by the following figures:

In 1933 Greece's exports to Germany amounted to 31 million marks and her imports to 19 million; in 1938 Greece's exports rose to 97 million and her imports to 100 million.

f). According to official statements by the competent German authorities, it was sought by this policy to create a large economic unit within a wide area under the hegemony of Germany, inside which the other nations would be dependent on, and would be obliged to adjust their economy to, the needs of German economy and not the international market.

7. When in October 1940 the one member of the Axis, Italy, launched her actual attack on Greece, Germany's blackmailing activities assumed a more immediate and substantial character. It was no longer simply a case of terrorising Greece into submitting to Italy's political pressure, but a question of an immediate effort to break the morale of the Greek people defending itself and of weakening her political [illegible] at all costs.

German propaganda employed the most diabolical methods to this end. It did not directly demand of Greece that she should surrender to force, because it knew that the only effect would be to invigorate the resistance of the Greek people even more. Holding over her head the threat of German intervention, it tried to force Greece to repel any

H1503D-0040

assistance from her Allies or at least to restrict it to a minimum in the hope that she would thus avert a German attack. In this way, without any cost to Germany, Greece would be exhausted without any help from outside, and the Italian armies would finally be able to bring to a conclusion the Axis operation South-East of the Balkans. On the 28th November 1940 the representative of the German Foreign Office declared on the radio: "Germany's attitude towards the Greco-Italian conflict is the attitude of a very interested spectator, and it is stated that she will not intervene in this conflict unless Britain's help becomes very much greater". Throughout November and December the German inform--ation centres all over Europe circulated reports about impending German action to clear up the situation in the Balkans either through Bulgaria or through Yugoslavia. From early January 1941, responsible German circles in Sofia began to say that despite Germany's original intention not to disturb the situation in the Balkans, events now compelled the clearing up of the festering source of resistance to the policy of the Axis. In Belgrade and Bucharest during the same period officials of the press bureau of the German Embassy were circulating similar reports. The Reichs economic representative in the Balkans, Neubacher, who visited Sofia in the beginning of February, was saying there that the purpose of the concentration of German troops in Roumania was to strike towards the Aegean. On the 25th February 1941 the whole German press - as well as the Italian press - announced in big headlines the impending commence--ment of decisive operations. During the same period the German Military Attaché in Sofia was saying to a colleague that though he had no reason to expect any extension of the war to the Balkans, he did not completely preclude this owing to the attitude of certain circles in Athens who wanted to invite British troops to come in. The German military attaché in Ankara, speaking on the same lines, even went so far as to specify the 2nd March as the date of the Germans' entry into Bulgaria! Similar things were being said to members of the Greek Legation in Berlin and in Athens through the German Commercial Counsellor. Thus the essence of all the above narrowed down to this threat: Greece had nothing to fear from Germany, but on one condition: she should not permit any British troops to come to her aid, thus remaining isolated!

8. It was only natural that all this artfully-applied effort by the inspired German press should produce grave anxiety in Greece, where the army fighting in Albania had its flanks continuously exposed to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia because of geographical reasons. The Greek General Staff was obliged to keep constant vigil in this direction, and this at a time when the unequal struggle made imperative the concentration of every effort against Italy. At the same time although its war material was insufficient and was speedily being expended as operations proceeded, and the need for allied help was becoming more and more imperative, the Greek Government hesitated to accept all the help offered by Britain for fear that this would provoke the German flood. Thus the plan to terrorise Greece on the part of Germany was giving substantial results to the benefit of the aggressor Italy.

The presence of the German-Bulgarian threat from the North-East compelled the Greek General Staff to make provision in the mobilisation plan for the concentration on the Bulgarian frontier of the following forces: 6 infantry divisions and one infantry brigade (out of a total of 17 divisions and 3 brigades). But the encouraging attitude shown by Turkey and Yugoslavia from the very first days of the war permitted the Staff to withdraw part of the forces concentrated against Bulgaria, which were thus reduced to 4 divisions and one brigade and later (February 1941) to 3 divisions and one brigade. But when later on the German-Bulgarian threat began to be clearer, the Staff transferred another two infantry divisions to the sector Kaimaktsalan (N.W. Edessa)-Vermion-Aliakmon, so that the total forces of which the Albanian front was deprived amounted to 5 divisions and one brigade. These forces would have obviously been sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the Greek army in the winter of

H1503D-0041

1940 had they been used in Albania.

On the other hand the constantly proclaimed threat that the acceptance of substantial British help would lead to Germany's intervention in aid of Italy compelled the Greek Government to decline any effective help on the part of the British forces. With the exception of the forces which took over Crete and a small air force of which use was made on the Albanian front, no other more substantial assistance was accepted by Greece. For the same reason, as soon as the first British air reinforcements arrived, General Metaxas requested that all their operations should be directed towards Albania and refused to give his approval to the establishment of British air forces at the Larissa aerodrome which could, in view of its situation, be used for other operations also.

Later, on the 13th January 1941, General Wavell went to Athens and proposed to the Greek Government the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Salonika to organise a military base to meet the German threat from Roumania and Bulgaria. Still not wishing to give any grounds for a German attack, General Metaxas rejected this proposal, emphasizing that this would be of benefit to Greece only if the expeditionary force could number 10 divisions at once, which was not possible under the conditions then prevailing. Thus the diabolical way in which German blackmail was being applied produced the desired results!

9. When it was proved that all these blackmailing efforts were of no avail in bending the resistance of Greece, Germany decided to take a more active part in her destruction, putting into motion at the same time the wider strategic plan in the direction of the South-East and the East. "From this moment the Germany army will play its part in this struggle" (Italy's struggle), said Hitler in his speech of 16th March. His armies were concentrated in Bulgaria and Roumania, making preparations for their advance to the Aegean. In order to facilitate this operation within the time limit provided by the military command, however, it was necessary to secure: (a) the co-operation of Bulgaria (b) neutralisation of Yugoslavia, and (c) the immobilisation of Greece's ally, Turkey. German diplomacy was therefore set into motion to facilitate the German army's task.

With regard to Bulgaria, we have already seen from the published diary of the then Prime Minister of Bulgaria the full record of Germany's activities.

On the 1st January 1941 the Bulgarian Premier is summoned before Hitler and Ribbentrop at Salzburg, where participation to the Tripartite Pact is proposed as a prelude to Bulgaria's further co-operation. To ensure her acceptance, she is offered Greek territories and specifically "Aegean Thrace" as a reward. On the 7th January the Bulgarian King accepts this proposal in principle, and in consultation with his Prime Minister it is decided to ask Germany for further clarification with regard to the annexation of "Aegean Thrace" from Greece as regards the Bulgarian army's co-operation. It is decided to hold Staff talks to this end, and the German Minister in Sofia, Herr von Richtofen, announces on the 16th January that the German Government proposes that the talks should commence in Roumania with Field Marshal List. On the 18th January the Bulgarian Minister to Berlin, Draganof, arrives at Sofia and reports that Herr Weizäcker informed him on behalf of Ribbentrop that the Germans agreed to cede Greek Thrace from the Maritza to the Nestos to Bulgaria in exchange for her collaboration. On the 23rd January the Bulgarian representative at Field-Marshal List's Headquarters announces that the Germans agree to guarantee Bulgaria from attack from Turkey and that they will concentrate the greater part of their army on the Turkish frontier on condition that the Bulgarians agree

H1503D-0042

that during the first four days of the attack, they will hold the Turks with at least four divisions. By the 29th January all the details of the military co-operation have been worked out, and at a Cabinet Meeting held in Sofia the protocol agreed upon by the German and Bulgarian Military representatives is finally approved, together with the announcement to be made in Berlin by the Bulgarian representative in connection with Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. On the same day the military protocol was approved by the German General Staff also. On the 1st March Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact takes place in Vienna. "Ribbentrop and Ciano", relates Filov in his diary, "handed me the documents by virtue of which, at the moment of the settlement of the Balkan frontiers, we would receive an outlet to the Aegean between the rivers Strymon and Maritsa. This fact was to be kept a close secret, and was to be announced only with the consent of the two Governments". Thus in order to facilitate the use of Bulgaria against their victim Greece, the responsible Germans distributed Greece's lands to their partners in crime. As is revealed by the above, the original promise of the Nestos-Maritsa area was extended during the negotiations as far as the Strymon, including, that is, Greek Eastern Macedonia.

The Bulgarians naturally were not slow to make use of this payment for their treachery, and invaded Greek territory in the wake of the German armies. On the 15th May, in the Bulgarian Parliament, the Prime Minister Filov expressed his gratitude towards his great Allies. "The Bulgarian people", he said, "will always feel the deepest gratitude and the most profound obligation towards the Axis Powers and their great leaders, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, who have made the union of Bulgaria a reality". And Hitler, magnanimous even before the event, said in his speech of the 4th May: "I was able to make this decision at the present moment with greater calm as I knew I was acting in agreement with Bulgaria, whose sentiments and whose stand by the side of the German Reich have remained unbroken....."

10. But even this was not sufficient to complete Germany's black-mailing efforts against Greece. Yugoslavia also had to be utterly neutralised so as to avoid complications from that direction and so that Greece, isolated from that side, could be morally cowed and crushed without giving any fight. To this end, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was persistantly sought through all the usual methods of German policy. In his speech of the 4th May 1941, Hitler stated unequivocally: "It was our sincere desire, by following a path of closer co-operation with Yugoslavia, to succeed perhaps in averting a clash with Greece, satisfying in a suitable manner Italy's just demands".

Thus on the 25th March, after insistent pressure from Germany, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was signed in Vienna. And as in the case of Bulgaria, so in Yugoslavia's case also, Greek territories were offered to her as bait to facilitate her adherence. "Furthermore", said Hitler in the same speech on the 4th May, "Yugoslavia received the assurance, at the specific demand of her Government, that if territorial changes took place in the Balkans, she would be ceded an outlet to the Aegean under Yugoslav sovereignty specifically including Salonika".

11. A little earlier, on the 17th February 1941, German diplomacy, also managed by simultaneous pressure in Sofia and Ankara to achieve the neutralisation of Turkey through the signature of a Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria. At that time Turkey was negotiating with Bulgaria a friendly statement which sought to oblige Bulgaria to try to defend her independence in the event of a German invasion. For this reason, in the Turkish draft of the statement, specific reference was made to the Menemenjoglou-Kiosseivanof negotiations of January 1940 which were precisely aimed to this end. At this stage Germany intervened and demanded that this provision should be expunged. "At 6 o'clock on the 27th January 1941", writes Filov in his memoirs, "von Richthofen

H1503D-0043

came to tell me that he had received a telegram from Ribbentrop approving the signature of the proposed statement on the non-aggression agreement with Turkey, but that we should expunge the section in which it was stated that its signature was in the spirit of the Kiosseivanof-Menemenjoglou meeting of the previous year. He recommended that the agreement should be signed in secret, so that its signature could be expedited. I gladly agreed to this suggestion." Simultaneous pressure on Turkey thus made it possible to alter completely the meaning of that statement which, by simply asserting the avoidance of any aggression - without any further provision - could only mean that Turkey would not move against Bulgaria and that Greece was now absolutely isolated and at Germany's mercy. And this is exactly the impression its signature made throughout Europe. "Britain and her Greek appendage", wrote the well-known Fascist writer Gayda on the 20th February, "now appears to be isolated, indeed expelled, from the Balkans".

13. While all these things were being perpetrated at the expense of Greece, German diplomacy was persistently trying by means of all kinds of false assurances to lull the responsible Greek Government by distracting its attention from the threatening danger. The German Legation in Athens and most of the German representatives abroad did not tire of proclaiming that they fully disapproved of the Italian attack against Greece and that Germany was animated by the best intentions towards her. As late as the 1st March 1941, the day of Bulgaria's adherence to the Axis, the spokesman of the German Foreign Office stated to American correspondents that "Germany's relations with Greece have undergone no change and continue to be friendly!!" On the 3rd March the same German spokesman stated that relations with Greece remained unchanged. And assisting from its own angle this work of misleading, Rome Radio was asserting as late as the 3rd April that well-informed circles looked with less pessimism than hitherto on the Yugoslav situation and noted as good symptoms of the easing of the tension in Belgrade the lack of contact between the Greek and the new Yugoslav government and the agreement being reached for the participation in the government of the Croat leader Matchek.

H1503D-0044

PART II. W A R.

The invasion of Greece started on the 6th April 1941. By the 28th of that month the Germans had entered Athens and had overrun the mainland of Greece. By the end of May, Crete having been captured, the whole of Greece was under German occupation.

In those few weeks of war, besides many cases of individual savagery on the part of members of the German army towards the population, the German armed forces committed the following acts against Laws of War in applying the German principle "Kriegsräson geht voz Kriegsmanier."

1. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.

The German Air Force bombed and very heavily damaged the following twenty-three undefended Greek towns: Jannina, Preveza, Arta, Corfu, Kozani, Servia, Elasson, Larissa, Tukkala, Volos, Lamia, Chalkis, Thebes, Piraeus, Corinth, Patras, Nauplia, Argos, Sparta, Kalamata, Canea, Rethymno and Heraklion. Of these the towns of Jannina, Arta, Preveza, Trikkala, Larissa, and Canea were almost completely destroyed.

In most cases the inhabitants, mainly old men, women and children, were deliberately mowed down by machine-gun fire. The victims of bombing and machine-gunning amounted to over 3,000.

2. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.

In Jannina Red Cross Hospitals, though conspicuously marked, were deliberately bombed in daylight and completely destroyed. 600 wounded, together with 50 nurses and a number of doctors, were buried under the ruins.

3. Destruction of Hospital Ships.

The five Greek hospital ships, "HESPEROS", "POLICOS","ATTIKI", "HELLENIS," and "SOCRATES", attached to the Greek forces, though bearing clear Red Cross markings by day and fully illuminated by night, were deliberately sunk by German aircraft, flying at a low altitude; the survivors were machine-gunned as they strove to keep afloat.

4. Pillage.

As the German armies advanced southwards in the wake of their armoured divisions, they plundered and pillaged everything in their path. Cattle, crops of every kind, clothing and movables were stolen from the inhabitants. Shops were stripped of goods and all stocks commandeered.

5. Destruction of Ships without warning. Murder of survivors.

After the occupation of Greece, the Greek Mercantile Marine continued the struggle, till the defeat of Germany. Over 200 Greek cargo vessels were destroyed without warning and many Greek sailors fell victims of the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. There are many instances where entire crews disappeared. One instance is recorded where three members of a crew miraculously survived to tell the story. On the 13th March 1944, the Greek s.s. "PELEUS" was torpedoed and sunk without warning. After the "PELEUS" sank, U. 852surfaced and attempted to kill all survivors. The rafts and wreckage were rammed, and the men on them were machine-gunned, and hand grenades thrown among the rafts. Thirty-four seamen out of thirty-seven were killed.

H1503D-0045

PART III. OCCUPATION.

From the very start of the occupation, the Germans decided on a policy of territorial dismemberment and divided the country among themselves, the Italians and the Bulgarians.

Germany occupied Central and Western Macedonia, Crete, the Aegean Islands and a zone in the Evros district of Thrace.

Epirus, the Ionian Islands and the Cyclades were placed under Italian occupation and completely isolated from the rest of Greece.

Two of the most fertile Greek provinces, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, were ceded to Bulgaria, who unofficially "annexed" them, so that they ceased to form a part of Greek territory. Later, following on the Italian surrender, Central and Western Macedonia were also handed over by the Germans to the Bulgarians.

The rest of Greece was left under Greek civil administration but with Germans and Italians, and more particularly the former, retaining control over all the more important economic and strategic factors.

As in other occupied countries, the German occupation policy in Greece was governed by two determining factors; the exploitation of the country to the maximum of its resources for the benefit of Germany's war economy, and the subjugation of the population by means of methodical terrorism and indiscriminate oppression.

The Germans pursued their two-fold policy in a spirit of plunder and revenge, in complete defiance of the universally recognised rules of occupation.

A. EXPLOITATION.

In order to understand the special policy of mass exploitation enforced by Germany in Greece and how the acute conditions of starvation and want came about throughout Greece during the years 1941-1944, it would be necessary to explain in some detail: (1) the economic situation of the country at the time of the beginning of the occupation, and (2) the method of pillage employed i.e. the predatory financial and economic measures enforced by the Germans during the occupation.

1. When the Germans entered Greece they found themselves in an already exhausted country. Even under the best conditions Greece possesses very slender resources in relation to the size of its population. Over half its area is mountainous and arid, and of the remainder only 20% is suitable for cultivation. Natural conditions are unfavourable to the growth of food crops and stockraising. In addition, the country lacks fuel and many raw materials. Thus, Greece is almost entirely dependent on imports for its requirements in foodstuffs, fuel and many essential raw materials.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 had an adverse effect - even when Greece was still neutral - on the Greek economy, which by reason of its structure had always been extremely sensitive to world economic conditions. Total imports, which exceeded 2,700,000 tons during the pre-war period, fell to 1,450,000 tons in 1940. The situation deteriorated still further after Italy's attack in October 1940, and Germany's attack in April 1941, when the country had to face a hard and unequal struggle against first one and later two, mighty powers. The country had to devote its resources to the prosecution of the war, and to make every sacrifice in meeting the needs of the fighting forces. The general mobilisation, the need of maintaining large forces on inadequate local supplies, the

H1503D-0046

requisitioning of practically all means of transport for military purposes, meant a drastic curtailment of civilian consumption. At the same time, agriculture suffered considerably from the mobilisation of the peasant population, the requisitioning of draught animals and the slaughtering of livestock for the needs of the army. As a result, severe restriction of consumption and strict rationing had been introduced at an early date, and the civilian population placed on a minimum diet.

In short, at the moment when the German occupation began it was evident that the losses in productive capacity suffered during the war as well as the considerable reduction in the stocks of imported goods had by themselves sufficed to cause acute distress in the country.

Nevertheless, so far from recognising that they were occupying a country from which no material contribution could possibly be exacted without imperilling the very existence of the population, the Germans pursued a policy of pillage which was bound to bring about, which did in fact bring about, famine, chaos and disintegration.

The treatment of Greece was more rigerous than that meted out to other occupied countries. The explanation is that Germany's policy in every case was closely related to the economic structure of each particular country. In other occupied countries the Germans organised production for the maximum benefit of their war effort. In these countries it was in their interest to maintain the worker's productive capacity; they did not condemn the whole population. In the case of Greece, however, as the country lacked self-contained industries and manufactures, transport systems and electric power, they considered it more advantageous to drain it of everything it could provide, in complete disregard of the most elementary needs of the population, and to enforce general terroristic measures, thereby threatening a whole people with extinction.

2. In pursuance of their policy, the Germans enforced the following administrative, financial and economic measures, which served the economic needs of the German nation and not the needs of an army of occupation, as provided by the rules concerning occupation, In violation of Articles 46,47,48,51 and 52 of the Hague Regulations the Germans maintained in Greece much larger forces than were necessary for the purposes of a mere occupation:

they carried out extensive fortification works compulsorily financed by the country;
they levied immense sums as "costs of occupation" far in excess of the needs of an army of occupation; and supplies
they confiscated and requisitioned the existing stocks/out of all proportion to the resources of the country;
they extorted a vast contribution in a disguised form by means of inflation and of forced borrowing by clearing:

(a) Maintenance of Large Forces.

Owing to her geographical position, Greece was used by the Germans as a base of operations for the war in North Africa. They also used Greece as a place of rest for thousands of their troops from the North African and Eastern fronts.Thus, they concentrated in Greece much larger forces than were actually required for purposes of occupation. Large amounts of local supplies of fruit, vegetables, potatoes, olive oil, meat and dairy products were taken for the needs of these forces. As current production was not sufficient for these needs, requisitioning of live-stock was extensively resorted to, with the result that the country's live-stock was seriously depleted in numbers.

H1503D-0047

(b) Execution of extensive fortifications.

In order to prepare against attack from the south, as Greece formed the southern sector of the so-called "Fortress of Europe", the Germans exhausted her already greatly diminished resources in the construction of vast works of fortification and defence. Neither the materials nor the food supplies for the labour employed were imported. The cost of the works was borne by Greece and amounted to 2½ million gold pounds.

(c) Costs of Occupation.

Enormous sums were exacted as costs of occupation. Between August 1941 and December 1941 the Germans were paid the sum of drs. 26,206,085,000 i.e. 60% above the estimated national income during the same period. In fact, according to the estimates of two Axis experts, Dr. Barberine (German) and Dr. Bertoni (Italian), the national income of that year amounted to only 23,000 million drs. In the following year, as the national income decreased, they extracted sums at the expense of the national capital.

(d) Confiscations and Requisitions.

One of the enemy's first measures on occupying Greece was to lay hands on all the stocks existing in the country by requisition or direct confiscation. Among other things, they requisitioned from the wholesale and retail trade 71,000 tons of currants and 10,000 tons of olice oil: they confiscated 1,435 tons of coffee, 1,143 tons of sugar, 2,520 tons of rice, and a whole shipload of wheat at the Piraeus of a value of £ 530,000 etc.

In the case of local supplies, since requisition was not always easy to carry out in the rural districts, one of the most effective ways for devices laying hands on them was the placing of an embargo on local products in the centres of production.

As already stated, the country had been divided between three occupants. This dismemberment did not merely serve administrative expediency. It also, among other things, served the German economic policy by enabling the "blocking" of local produce. All economic relations between the three zones of occupation were prohibited. Moreover, within the several zones, prohibitions and restrictions were such as to isolate whole regions and to deprive them of contact with the rest of the country. Thus, owing to these artificial boundaries, the inhabitants of one region were unable to buy the products of another, and while there might be a famine in one area, local supplies were available in the next. Even inside each region the transport and sale of commodities was made subject to special licence from the occupying authorities. This policy had the further advantage of enabling these authorities to obtain local produce at stable and unreasonably low prices which took no account of the large-scale inflation.

As a complement to the "blocking" of supplies and disregarding the fact that transport facilities had always been inadequate in Greece, and that heavy losses had already been sustained during the period of military operations, the occupying forces took over practically all the means of transport left in the country and used them almost exclusively for their own needs. The result was that even when supplies available in one region were desperately needed in another region, their dispatch could not be effected owing to lack of means of transport. The Relief Commission of the International Red Cross itself was faced with great difficulties in transporting the limited quantities of relief supplies (200,000 tons per annum) which it distributed to the population.

No small country could have survived the splitting up of its territory into so large a number of closed economic areas. In the case of Greece,

H1503D-0048

the Germans deliberately disregarded the greatly deversified forms of agricultural production prevailing in different parts of the country, and the fact that the various regions were complementary to each other. The effects of the extensive requisitioning of local produce during the first years of occupation were so disastrous for the Greek population that the enemy himself had to admit that he had gone too far. At the end of 1942 an undertaking was given to the International Red Cross Commission in Greece that local foodstuffs consumed by the occupying authorities or exported would be replaced by imported foodstuffs providing the same amount of calories. Even this undertaking was not kept in actual fact.

(e) Inflation.

In Greece more than in any other occupied country the issue of unlimited quantities of currency was deliberately used by the Germans as a means of obtaining command over local resources. Faced with an already exhausted economy, with the refusal of the population to submit to any form of compulsory labour, and, in addition, with the fact that not every article could be confiscated or requisitioned, the Germans adopted a policy of large-scale inflation as the easiest means of exploiting the country.

'From the very start, they put into circulation 10,000,000,000 occupation Marks, a sum equal to half the money in circulation at that date. By April 1944, the monetary circulation had reached 14,000,000 million drs. i.e. had increased 700 times since the date of occupation.

The extent of the inflation is shown by the following figures : In April 1941 the price of a gold sovereign was 1,000 drs. In October 1944 it had reached 200,000,000,000,000, drms. Taking January 1941 as basis (100) the cost of living index stood at 3,268 in April of the same year, while towards the end of the occupation it had soared to 1,536,000,000,000, a 2,252,000,000-fold increase. Thanks to the inflation, when the Germans paid for goods they enriched themselves by the difference between the real prices and the artificial prices established through it. Thus not only foodstuffs, but every article of value, jewels, gold objects, furniture, etc., even all the coins in circulation(nickel and nickel alloys) found their way to Germany at a very conveniently low price.

(f) Misuse of Clearing.

The clearing system which had been applied before the war by Germany as a means of economic penetration, was evolved by them during the war as the most efficient device for spoliation, equivalent in fact to mass-looting. The Germans exercised their controlling power in such a way that the most important and essential products of the country were excluded from trade inside the country and kept at the disposal of the occupying Power.

Commodities destined for export were first of all confiscated or placed under an embargo by the Military Authorities and were subsequently bought by the interested parties at arbitrarily fixed prices, usually at pre-war prices which took no account of the devaluation of the drachma and the tremendrous rise in prices in the open market. The value of the commodities, as fixed by this arbitrary reckoning, was then entered to the credit of Greece's account. Conversely, goods imported from Germany, in spite of the steady prices prevailing at the place of origin, were charged at 200-500 percent over their normal price. In addition, Greece's account was debited with the value of the goods imported from Germany for the use of the forces of occupation.

Some of the latter goods were: coal, of which 80% was used for the railway transport needs of the troops and for the provision of power for the factories working for the +Germans, and petroleum products of which

H1503D-0049

70% was taken by the Military Authorities. As often as not, the bulk of the goods thus imported were confiscated by the Occupation Authorities on arrival and it was not unusual for them to demand that the settlement for these goods, although destined exclusively for the use of the occupation authorities, should be effected through this same clearing account. In consequence, notwithstanding the fact that Greece exported the whole of her available resources to Germany, the clearing account showed a credit balance in favour of Germany of 264,157,574,03 marks when the Germans left, while the credit balance in favour of Greece, at the moment of their arrival stood at 4,353,428,82 marks.

H1503D-0050

B. TERRORISM

During the first few weeks of the occupation the Germans presented themselves in Greece as "liberators" seeking the friendly collaboration of the population.

While reviewing the Balkan campaign in a speech at the Kroll Opera House of Berlin on May 4th 1941 Hitler made an attempt to propitiate Greece and to justify his unprovoked attack. He said: "Even today I feel that I must, as I believe in the interest of historical accuracy, distinguish between the Greek people and that thin top layer of corrupt leaders who, inspired by a King who had no idea of the duties of true leadership, preferred instead to further the aims of British war-mongers. I must categorically stress that this action was not directed against Greece.....Nothing is impossible for the German soldiers. Historical accuracy, however, obliges me to say that, of the opponents who have taken arms against us, the Greek soldiers are those who have fought with the greatest courage and contempt for death."

However, this conciliatory manner did not last long. On the night of May 30 1941 patriots pulled down the swastika from the Acropolis, and the following day May 31, the German Commander in Athens issued an order threatening heavy penalties;
"(a) Because on the night of the 30th - 31st May the German war flag flying on the Acroplis was taken away by unknown persons, those guilty of this act as well as their accomplices will be punished by death.

(b) Because the Press and public opinion of all classes still express themselves with evident sympathy in favour of the English, now expelled from Continental Europe.

(c) Because events in Crete (he was referring to the lawful resistance of the inhabitants) and the ill-treatment of German prisoners not only were not condemned, but in wide circles were even commented on with satisfaction.

(d) Because, although this was specifically forbidden, repeated gestures of sympathy towards British prisoners were observed (Offers of gifts, flowers, fruit, cigarettes etc.,) and these demonstrations were tolerated by the Greek police who did not intervene with the means at their disposal.

(e) Because the behaviour of large numbers of the people of Athens towards the German armed forces has again become less friendly".

The German Command went on to point out that until then it had been doing all it could to show its goodwill towards the people of Greece; but now with deep regret it must take whatever steps it considered necessary to end the situation.

From that early date, and at those slight signs of moral opposition, the Germans started applying their terroristic policy. In violation of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations they systematically punished the innocent enforcing the expressly condemned principle of joint responsibility of the community for acts of individuals. They used starvation as an instrument of pressure and for weakening the spirit of resistance of the Greek population. They seldom respected the laws of justice. Very few people were tried by court martial, and, when held, such trials were something of a judicial mockery. They instituted a policy of reprisals consisting in taking hostages, in killing hostages, in mass-murders and in destruction and devastation of villages for acts committed in their vicinity by unknown individuals. Thus, the great majority of those executed were picked at random from prisons and camps, without

any possible relation to the act in reprisal for which they were executed. The life of every citizen depended on the arbitrary decision of the local commander.

1. STARVATION.

Starvation was not a necessary incident of the war; it was the logical consequence of the policy of exploitation adopted by the Germans in Greece. They provoked hunger and they used hunger as a means of cowing the Greek population. From the following extracts of speeches etc., of high Nazi Officials it would appear that starvation was deliberate and was part of a plan which included or intended starvation, or was reasonably calculated to result in starvation.

That Hitler felt no hesitation about reducing or exterminating inconvenient populations is evident from his words to Rauschning (who would presumably be in a position to confirm them).

"We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. I mean the removal of entire racial units. And that is what I intend to carry out - that, roughly, is my task. Nature is cruel, therefore, we too may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin?"

Dr. Ley wrote in Goebbel's organ "Der Angriff" of January 31st 1940 that:

"A lower race needs less room, less clothing, less food, and less culture than a higher race....."

Goering who "in accordance with the orders of the Führer" was "directing the economy of newly-occupied Eastern countries" stated his principle bluntly, in a speech in October 1942, at the Sportpalast, by which time in Greece starvation had already claimed many thousand victims.

"I have formed an unshakable resolve, a rock-firm principle which will be inflexibly maintained. The German people come first and foremost as regards the satisfaction of hunger and in questions of nutrition. If, as a result of the enemy's measures, difficulties of food supply should arise, then I want everyone to know that <u>if anybody goes hungary, it will not be Germany.</u>"

But while it may not be easy to establish how far starvation was deliberately premeditated, it is beyong any doubt that when famine broke out and people died in the streets as a result of the German policy of exploitation, not only the Government of the Reich did not send any help to ease the situation, but they continued to remove agricultural and other supplies for the use of the German forces in Greece, for exportation to the Africa Corps, and for consumption in Germany. Thus, they introduced a new method of "white massacre".

The results of such treatment were bound to be catastrophic. The Greek population was reduced during the occupation to a state of complete physical exhaustion. A few months after the beginning of the occupation the food situation became acute in the urban centres and other non food-producing regions. During the period from August 1941 to April 1942 famine was rampant in the capital as well as in the Aegean and Cyclades Islands. It is a fact that Greece was only saved thanks to the partial raising of the blockade which was decided upon in the spring of 1942, at which date relief shipments began to arrive in Greece from Allied and

H1503D-0052

neutral countries. These shipments enabled the International Red Cross Commission to provide the bread ration of part of the population and to supply a minimum of foodstuffs to the various canteens.

It is an incontestable fact that the great majority of the Greek population lived on the verge of starvation for nearly three years. Many thousands experienced real famine for several months before relief shipments could reach them.

As a result the death rate increased by 500% (600% in the capital and 800 to 1,000% in the Islands during the period August 1941 - April 1942). New-born children died at a rate of 25% and the health of the survivors was greatly undermined.

The following extracts from reports of Neutral Missions in Greece give an idea of the state to which the population was reduced at the very moment when its scanty resources were used for feeding the Germans:

"During the winter of 1941 - 1942 when famine reigned in the capital, conditions in the provinces were still tolerable. During the following winter, however, when relief from Canada for the larger towns had been exhausted by the free market, the situation was very different... During our first tours of inspection (March 1943) we made the acquaintance of a population literally screaming for bread. Many villages had only a substitute baked of flour, wild pears and acorns - ordinary pig's food, and in many districts the population had received no other bread since December. We were taken inside the houses and shown empty shelves and larders and we saw people cooking weeds without oil and salt in order to fill their stomachs. The inhabitants of the poorer villages were all extremely thin, and the children in particular were often in a pitiful condition, with skinny extremities and swollen stomachs without any natural vitality or cheerfulness. It was quite usual for half the children to be unable to go to school." (Report of the Swedish delegates to the Peloponnese January 1944).

"Tuberculosis is making havoc among an undernourished population, lacking almost completely animal protein foods. It is the greatest danger which is at present threatening the Greek people.....Skin infections, staphylococciasis and particularly scabies are widespread. Often the entire population of towns and villages is affected." (Report of Swiss Mission in Greece, 5th April 1944).

"The population of Salonika, which is daily increasing with the influx of refugees and victims of reprisals, suffers acutely from lack of foodstuffs which are unobtainable on the market at prohibitive prices. Diseases due to the exhaustion caused by undernourishment and by other privations endured since the beginning of the war are spreading. Thus, tuberculosis, malaria, and children's diseases (rickets,adenitis, enteritis etc.) have again increased the number already considerable of patients." (Report of the Swedish Delegates in Macedonia, January 31st 1944.)

II. Massacres, wanton devastation and destruction of villages.

As soon as the Germans occupied Crete, their High Command proclaimed that "places near which attacks took place against German soldiers will be burned to the ground and the population will be held responsible." Following this proclamation, the first act of reprisal was committed; a number of people were shot, most of them completely innocent, and the villages of Skini, Prassi and Kandanos burnt to the ground in retaliation

H1503D-0053

for the killing, during the attack on Crete, of some German parachutists by members of the Cretan Militia. On the sites of these villages they erected posters bearing the following inscription in German and Greek "Zur Vergeltung der bestialischen Ermordung eines Fall-schirmjägerzug es und eines Pioniernalbzuges durch bewaffnte Männer und Frauen aus dem Hinterhalte zerstört."

The policy of reprisals which at first was of an intermittent character, gradually became intensified, especially after the opposition put up early in 1943 by organised guerrillas all over the country.

The technique employed was a standard one. On the day following any acts of sabotage or guerilla activities near a village, German troops appeared in the village. The inhabitants were summoned into the main square or other suitable place, supposedly in order to listen to a proclamation, and they were then mowed down by machine-gun fire. The German then proceeded to burn down, or in some cases shell, the village, after having pillaged it. They shot people in the streets, in the houses, in the fields, regardless of sex or age. In some cases only males from the age of sixteen and upwards were executed. In other cases, the men having fled to the mountains, they executed the women, the children and old men who had remained behind in the village, in the belief that their sex or age was a protection. Typical examples were Arachova, Kalavryta, Distomon, Klisoura, Kommeno, Mesovouni. Some villages were destroyed for the sole reason that they happened to be situated within the mountainous guerilla area. Thus, 1,600 villages were totally or partially destroyed out of a total of 6,500 and over 1,200,000 people left destitute. The number of villagers killed amounts to some 30,000. The fate of the survivors is described in the following extract from a report of the Relief Commission (May 1944):

"Whenever the occupation troops burn a village in retaliation for attacks on German lives or property by partisans, the villagers very often have no time - or are not allowed - to save their personal belongings. Half-naked and shoeless they gather together in caves and rock shelters if they are not able to take refuge in neighbouring villages." Many of these destitute people died of starvation and want.

III. HOSTAGES - CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

Hostages were taken indiscriminately and from every class. Politicians, professors, scientists, lawyers, doctors, officers, civil servants, clergymen, workers, women, anybody was labelled as a "suspect" or a "communist" and thrown into the local prisons or concentration camps. Prisoners under interrogation were subjected to various ingenious forms of torture. Most notorious among the concentration camps were those at Haidari (nr. Athens), Larissa and Agia (Crete), faithfully modelled on the German prototype. In these systematic and deliberate cruelty was practised. The inmates were starved, beaten and tortured, living under the most inhuman conditions without medical help or sanitation, subjected to the refined sadism of the S.S. guards. Many were shot or hanged, others died from maltreatment or starvation, and only a few were released or survived up to the date of the liberation of the country. Hostages were also deported to concentration camps in Germany. Thus, Buchenwald, Belsen, Dachau, etc., had their contingent of Greeks, The number of hostages shot amounts to some 91,000.

IV. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

Many churches all over Greece were profaned and members of the clergy deported or shot.

The ancient privileges of the Monasteries of Mount Athos, which

enjoyed autonomy under the Greek constitution and an international treaty, were abolished by the Germans on the ground that the place was a centre of anti-German propaganda.

By their orders and regulations the Germans gradually introduced into Greece the Nuremburg laws relegating Jews to the state of pariahs. At first, both regulations and treatment were, by comparison with later events, mild. They introduced discrimination between Jews and Christians. In July 1942, all the male members of the Jewish community of Salonika from 16 to 45 years of age were compelled to do forced labour, such as road-building work on farms etc. Three months later they were released, after having been compelled to pay an exorbitant monetary contribution.

Later, in 1943, the Germans, following the example set by the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace in 1942, started applying the policy announced by Dr. Ley in December 1942, of "waging this war until the Jews have been wiped off the face of the earth". They applied this policy in Greece with the utmost thoroughness. Jews were rounded up and subjected to mass deportation, their property being confiscated. Thus, out of a population of nearly 80,000 Jews in Greece in 1941, 60,000 had been deported to Poland by 1944. According to the evidence given by the few repatriated Jews, most of the above mentioned number perished under the most appalling conditions. It has been estimated that in the death camp of Birkenau alone, 45,000 Greek Jews were gassed. Only 9 - 10,000 Jews survived in Greece by joining the Guerilla bands in the mountains or by going into hiding in Athens under false names, thanks to the assistance of their Christian fellow-citizens.

V. RECRUITMENT OF LABOUR.

One of the many problems confronting the German administration was that of recruiting labour.

All males between sixteen and fifty years of age were liable to labour conscription. Strikes were declared illegal, and severe penalties enforced for resort thereto. Persons who organised and directed a strike were liable to the death penalty. Strikers were tried by military courts.

At first, the Germans by propaganda and various forms of indirect pressure, tried to recruit Greek labour to work within Germany. They promised high wages and better conditions of life. As this kind of "voluntary" recruitment failed to produce the expected results they abandoned it and confronted the workers with the dilemma either of being taken as hostages or else of being sent to Germany to work. Nevertheless, the number of workers deported to Germany did not exceed 16,659.

II. RAPE-PILLAGE.

Though this report is not concerned with criminal acts of individual brutality, it should be mentioned that crimes such as rape and pillage by members of the German forces were daily occurrences.

London, 13th October 1945.

By order and on behalf of
The Royal Hellenic Government.

(sgd) ?????

Ambassador to the
Court of St. James's.

H1503D-0054

H1503D-0055

File copy
for document book
USSR 379

U.K.82

AMBASSADE ROYALE DE GRECE,
51, Upper Brook Street,
London, W.1.

19th October 1945.

No. 8168/ST/30/45.

Sir,

With further reference to your Note No. U 6271/29/73 of August 8th., I have the honour to forward herewith, on behalf of my Government, for presentation before the International Military Tribunal, a statement on the crimes, wi t hi n the definition laid down in Article 6 of th e Charter, which have been committed against the Greek nationals or property.

I should be grateful if you could arrange to have this statement presented before the International Military Tribunal.

I have the honour to be,
With the highest consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble Servant,

The Right Honourable
Ernest Bevin, M.P.
H.M. Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs,
etc., etc., etc.,

HK.

600.

H1503D-0056

U.K. 82.

REPORT OF THE ROYAL HELLENIC GOVERNMENT

to the

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL.

This report consists of the following three main heads:

1. Germany's preparation of the war of agression against Greece.

II. The violations of the laws and customs of war perpetrated by the German Armed Forces during the war operations.

III. The violations of the universally accepted rules concerning occupation perpetrated by Germany in Greece during the occupation, by the enforcement of a policy of financial and economic exploitation, (confiscation, requisition, inflation, misuse of clearing) and of terrorism (starvation, wholesale massacre, killing of hostages etc.)

PART I. (PRELIMINARIES OF WAR) will deal with the first head.

PART II. (WAR) will deal with the second head.

PART III. (OCCUPATION) will deal with the third head.

The report is not concerned with acts of individual brutality. It is concerned only with such acts as, by their character, denote the existence of a general plan aiming at the domination of Europe by Germany, and a plan which included organised financial and economic pillage of the occupied countries and forced collaboration of their populations by means of terrorism.

H1503D-0057

PART I. PRELIMINARIES OF WAR.

At 5.30 a.m. on Sunday, 6th April 1941, Prince Erbach-Schönberg, German Minister to Athens, presented a communication by which the Greek Government was informed that Germany was at war with Greece. At the same time German troops which had been concentrated in Bulgaria in March 1941 crossed the Bulgarian frontier and entered Greek territory. In six weeks the resistance of the Greco-British forces was overcome and the whole of the Greek state came under the German yoke.

Germany's attack on Greece was absolutely unprovoked and unjust--ifiable. It was obviously part of Germany's wider plan for world conquest. It was preceded by no warning or threat, nor by any serious diplomatic démarche for the removal of any existing doubts; nor was there any demand for arbitration or judicial procedure for the solution of any difference that may have existed.

The persons in Germany responsible for the diplomatic and strategic handling of this aggressive action desired to avail themselves of all the advantages of surprise and of the natural reluctance of a small country like Greece to take in time against a powerful aggressor defensive measures which he could regard as provocative. According to the plans of those who directed the policy of the Reich, Greece had to be isolated diplomatically, to be paralysed internally, and to be tricked by the threat of an immediate attack or by false assurances of good intentions into not taking in good time the indispensable defensive measures, so that her subjugation would be easier.

2. Germany's attack on Greece was made, of course, within the framework of the wider politico-strategic effort of the Axis to ensure its domination throughout Europe. The responsibility of each individual person responsible for the attack is therefore inter-connected with the responsibility of their other Allies, and the crime committed against Greece took place in full mutual collaboration in the execution of their design of conquest. In view of this fact, the individual responsibility of each one of those who directed German policy cannot be examined separately but constitutes one single whole, as an organ of the collective political and military activity of the Reich and even more generally of the Axis. In its aggressive policy, however, it is known that it was Germany that directed its rapacious effort, and consequently it is Germany that bears the greater part of the responsibility.

3. Germany's aggression against Greece, which was thus involved in the wider plan of action of the Axis, followed various phases according to the development of events. Thus a) it supported the aggressive designs of Greece's neighbours against her, b) it tried to subjugate her economic--ally so as to overcome all tendencies of political resistance, c) it endeavoured to terrorise Greece into stopping her from taking the necessary defensive measures against the impending Italian threat, d) when the Italian attack was launched, it aimed at and succeeded in keeping a substantial part of the Greek army tied up on Greece's North-Eastern frontiers, e) it forced Greece to decline all assistance from her Allies, and isolated her diplomatically so that she could succomb more easily to Germany's will.

4. Until 1939 Germany worked for the gradual subjugation of the European states by means of her well-known economic and political plan of advancing her positions towards the South-East. During this period Greece is not immediately within the sphere of Germany's aggressive activities. The threat against her is manifested mainly from Italy and Bulgaria, each of which for special reasons looks to the seizure of Greek territories. Germany nevertheless supports and exploits these efforts which serve the immediate interests of her collaborators and at the same time her own. This is not the appropriate place to relate Italy's

H15O3D-0058

aggressive efforts against Greece from the beginning of the present century and particularly since the establishment of the Fascist regime. These things are in any case known to all. Without taking a definite attitude against Greece, Germany supported the Italian aims, thus helping and preparing the final attack in 1940. In October 1932 Hitler said in an interview with the Italian newspaper "TEVERE": "Italy and Germany have the same enemies and their mission consists in working together in the task of civilisation". In 1937, on the morrow of the events in Vienna, Hitler himself said at the Party Rally on the 7th September at Nuremberg: ".....Germany is now no longer isolated but united in close friendship with powerful nations. The natural community of interests between National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy has been shown in recent months to be a factor seeking to safeguard Europe from the threat of a chaotic lunacy". The whole German press, directed in the well-known manner by the supreme Government circles, encouraged Italy in her designs of conquest. When Italy seized Albania in March 1939, thus establishing a bridgehead for further aggressive action against Greece, Hitler said inter alia in his speech on the 28th April before the Reichstag:

> "The German Government with full understanding appreciates the justification for the action taken in Albania by its Italian friend, and therefore greets it with pleasure. Yes, it is not only the right, but the duty of Fascism to ensure within the living space indisputably recognised to Italy by nature and history, the maintenance of a state of things on which alone a truly prospering human civilisation seems to be able to depend and make itself firm".

In the recently published extracts from Ciano's diaries, it is mentioned in this connection that after the occupation of Albania, all the roads "were planned to lead to the Greek frontiers. This was ordered by the Duce, who thinks more and more of attacking Greece on the first opportunity." At another point in these diaries, the following is said about Germany: "Ribbentrop has sent a message that Berlin looks with sympathy on our action in Tirana as victory for Italy means strengthening of the power of the Axis".

5. Not content with the moral support of Italy, Germany tried to prevent Greece from taking elementary measures for the defense of her threatened independence. When the occupation of Albania rendered the threat to Greece more imminent, Germany hastened to denounce the guarantees of Greek Independence given by France and Gt. Britain as being directed against the Axis, and made every effort to bully or cajole Greece into declining these guarantees. From that moment the opposition to the British and French guarantee was destined to constitute the main weapon of attack against Greece in order to weaken her resistance. Greece had to be forced at all costs to deprive herself of any friendly assistance so that she could more easily suffer the fate prepared for her by the Axis. All available diplomatic means were mobilised: "friendly recommendations" among diplomats, public statements by political personalities, a press and radio campaign. Similar efforts were simultaneously made in the direction of Greece's friends in the Balkans in order that the Balkan pact and the alliance with Turkey should be weakened or torpedoed at any sacrifice. On the 27th August 1940 Ribbentrop went even further, and asking the Greek Minister in Berlin to call on him, told him clearly that Germany regarded Greece as a country that had placed itself by the side of Gt. Britain "because the Greeks accepted the British guarantee" and for various other reasons; that "in coming centuries Europe would be controlled by the Axis powers and the attitude of the Axis towards the European states would be regulated by the attitude of those states towards Britain during Germany's and Italy's life and death struggle". Ribbentrop concluded by saying: "(he) could only urgently advise the Greek Minister, both on account of the immediate and more distant future, to remedy the Italian grievances as quickly as possible and comply with the eventual wishes of the Italians." On the 30th January 1940 Hitler had

H1503D-0059

declared: "There also (in the Balkans) I do not see many hopes (for Gt. Britain) because one thing is true, that wherever Britain appears we shall attack her, and we are strong enough to do it."

6. In the meantime Germany continued to apply towards Greece the programme of economic domination of the Balkans which had been put into action as soon as the Hitlerite regime came into power. By securing an absolute control over Greece's economic life she thus hoped to subjugate the country politically and to paralyse all power to resist.

More specifically, Germany's economic effort from 1933 assumed towards Greece the following essential characteristics:

a). Efforts to supplant the other purchasing countries, particularly Anglo-American, in the Greek market and especially the tobacco market. This was achieved mainly by the offer of substantially higher prices, which was made possible by the fact that Germany did not pay in free exchange but simply made a credit entry in the Greco-German clearing.

b). Offers of high prices by Germany to the Greek tobacco growers. This created the impression among Greek growers that Germany was really interested in Greek economy and that the other countries merely sought the exploitation of the tobacco growers.

c). Thus an increase of exports to Germany was achieved, which increased the credit balance in favour of Greece in the clearing which could not be used except for imports from Germany, which tended to Greece's economic dependance on Germany.

d). The apparant advantage of the offer of high prices to the Greek growers was false, as when the time came to use the balance available in the clearing to buy German goods, the prices demanded by Germany were sufficiently high to offset completely the high prices given to the Greek growers.

e). This effort on the part of Germany is illustrated by the following figures:

In 1933 Greece's exports to Germany amounted to 31 million marks and her imports to 19 million; in 1938 Greece's exports rose to 97 million and her imports to 100 million.

f). According to official statements by the competent German authorities, it was sought by this policy to create a large economic unit within a wide area under the hegemony of Germany, inside which the other nations would be dependent on, and would be obliged to adjust their economy to, the needs of German economy and not the international market.

7. When in October 1940 the one member of the Axis, Italy, launched her actual attack on Greece, Germany's blackmailing activities assumed a more immediate and substantial character. It was no longer simply a case of terrorising Greece into submitting to Italy's political pressure, but a question of an immediate effort to break the morale of the Greek people defending itself and of weakening her political [illegible] at all costs.

German propaganda employed the most diabolical methods to this end. It did not directly demand of Greece that she should surrender to force, because it knew that the only effect would be to invigorate the resistance of the Greek people even more. Holding over her head the threat of German intervention, it tried to force Greece to repel any

H1503D-0060

assistance from her Allies or at least to restrict it to a minimum in the hope that she would thus avert a German attack. In this way, without any cost to Germany, Greece would be exhausted without any help from outside, and the Italian armies would finally be able to bring to a conclusion the Axis operation South-East of the Balkans. On the 28th November 1940 the representative of the German Foreign Office declared on the radio: "Germany's attitude towards the Greco-Italian conflict is the attitude of a very interested spectator, and it is stated that she will not intervene in this conflict unless Britain's help becomes very much greater". Throughout November and December the German inform--ation centres all over Europe circulated reports about impending German action to clear up the situation in the Balkans either through Bulgaria or through Yugoslavia. From early January 1941, responsible German circles in Sofia began to say that despite Germany's original intention not to disturb the situation in the Balkans, events now compelled the clearing up of the festering source of resistance to the policy of the Axis. In Belgrade and Bucharest during the same period officials of the press bureau of the German Embassy were circulating similar reports. The Reichs economic representative in the Balkans, Neubacher, who visited Sofia in the beginning of February, was saying there that the purpose of the concentration of German troops in Roumania was to strike towards the Aegean. On the 25th February 1941 the whole German press - as well as the Italian press - announced in big headlines the impending commence-ment of decisive operations. During the same period the German Military Attaché in Sofia was saying to a colleague that though he had no reason to expect any extension of the war to the Balkans, he did not completely preclude this owing to the attitude of certain circles in Athens who wanted to invite British troops to come in. The German military attaché in Ankara, speaking on the same lines, even went so far as to specify the 2nd March as the date of the Germans' entry into Bulgaria! Similar things were being said to members of the Greek Legation in Berlin and in Athens through the German Commercial Counsellor. Thus the essence of all the above narrowed down to this threat: Greece had nothing to fear from Germany, but on one condition: she should not permit any British troops to come to her aid, thus remaining isolated!

8. It was only natural that all this artfully-applied effort by the inspired German press should produce grave anxiety in Greece, where the army fighting in Albania had its flanks continuously exposed to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia because of geographical reasons. The Greek General Staff was obliged to keep constant vigil in this direction, and this at a time when the unequal struggle made imperative the concentration of every effort against Italy. At the same time although its war material was insufficient and was speedily being expended as operations proceeded, and the need for allied help was becoming more and more imperative, the Greek Government hesitated to accept all the help offered by Britain for fear that this would provoke the German flood. Thus the plan to terrorise Greece on the part of Germany was giving substantial results to the benefit of the aggressor Italy.

The presence of the German-Bulgarian threat from the North-East compelled the Greek General Staff to make provision in the mobilisation plan for the concentration on the Bulgarian frontier of the following forces: 6 infantry divisions and one infantry brigade (out of a total of 17 divisions and 3 brigades). But the encouraging attitude shown by Turkey and Yugoslavia from the very first days of the war permitted the Staff to withdraw part of the forces concentrated against Bulgaria, which were thus reduced to 4 divisions and one brigade and later (February 1941) to 3 divisions and one brigade. But when later on the German-Bulgarian threat began to be clearer, the Staff transferred another two infantry divisions to the sector Kaimaktsalan (N.W. Edessa)-Vermion-Aliakmon, so that the total forces of which the Albanian front was deprived amounted to 5 divisions and one brigade. These forces would have obviously been sufficient to tip the balance in favour of the Greek army in the winter of

H1503D-0061

1940 had they been used in Albania.

On the other hand the constantly proclaimed threat that the acceptance of substantial British help would lead to Germany's intervention in aid of Italy compelled the Greek Government to decline any effective help on the part of the British forces. With the exception of the forces which took over Crete and a small air force of which use was made on the Albanian front, no other more substantial assistance was accepted by Greece. For the same reason, as soon as the first British air reinforcements arrived, General Metaxas requested that all their operations should be directed towards Albania and refused to give his approval to the establishment of British air forces at the Larissa aerodrome which could, in view of its situation, be used for other operations also.

Later, on the 13th January 1941, General Wavell went to Athens and proposed to the Greek Government the dispatch of an expeditionary force to Salonika to organise a military base to meet the German threat from Roumania and Bulgaria. Still not wishing to give any grounds for a German attack, General Metaxas rejected this proposal, emphasizing that this would be of benefit to Greece only if the expeditionary force could number 10 divisions at once, which was not possible under the conditions then prevailing. Thus the diabolical way in which German blackmail was being applied produced the desired results!

9. When it was proved that all these blackmailing efforts were of no avail in bending the resistance of Greece, Germany decided to take a more active part in her destruction, putting into motion at the same time the wider strategic plan in the direction of the South-East and the East. "From this moment the Germany army will play its part in this struggle" (Italy's struggle), said Hitler in his speech of 16th March. His armies were concentrated in Bulgaria and Roumania, making preparations for their advance to the Aegean. In order to facilitate this operation within the time limit provided by the military command, however, it was necessary to secure: (a) the co-operation of Bulgaria (b) neutralisation of Yugoslavia, and (c) the immobilisation of Greece's ally, Turkey. German diplomacy was therefore set into motion to facilitate the German army's task.

With regard to Bulgaria, we have already seen from the published diary of the then Prime Minister of Bulgaria the full record of Germany's activities.

On the 1st January 1941 the Bulgarian Premier is summoned before Hitler and Ribbentrop at Salzburg, where participation to the Tripartite Pact is proposed as a prelude to Bulgaria's further co-operation. To ensure her acceptance, she is offered Greek territories and specifically "Aegean Thrace" as a reward. On the 7th January the Bulgarian King accepts this proposal in principle, and in consultation with his Prime Minister it is decided to ask Germany for further clarification with regard to the annexation of "Aegean Thrace" from Greece as regards the Bulgarian army's co-operation. It is decided to hold Staff talks to this end, and the German Minister in Sofia, Herr von Richtofen, announces on the 16th January that the German Government proposes that the talks should commence in Roumania with Field Marshal List. On the 18th January the Bulgarian Minister to Berlin, Draganof, arrives at Sofia and reports that Herr Weizäcker informed him on behalf of Ribbentrop that the Germans agreed to cede Greek Thrace from the Maritza to the Nestos to Bulgaria in exchange for her collaboration. On the 23rd January the Bulgarian representative at Field-Marshal List's Headquarters announces that the Germans agree to guarantee Bulgaria from attack from Turkey and that they will concentrate the greater part of their army on the Turkish frontier on condition that the Bulgarians agree

that during the first four days of the attack, they will hold the Turks with at least four divisions. By the 29th January all the details of the military co-operation have been worked out, and at a Cabinet Meeting held in Sofia the protocol agreed upon by the German and Bulgarian Military representatives is finally approved, together with the announcement to be made in Berlin by the Bulgarian representative in connection with Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. On the same day the military protocol was approved by the German General Staff also. On the 1st March Bulgaria's adherence to the Tripartite Pact takes place in Vienna. "Ribbentrop and Ciano", relates Filov in his diary, "handed me the documents by virtue of which, at the moment of the settlement of the Balkan frontiers, we would receive an outlet to the Aegean between the rivers Strymon and Maritsa. This fact was to be kept a close secret, and was to be announced only with the consent of the two Governments". Thus in order to facilitate the use of Bulgaria against their victim Greece, the responsible Germans distributed Greece's lands to their partners in crime. As is revealed by the above, the original promise of the Nestos-Maritsa area was extended during the negotiations as far as the Strymon, including, that is, Greek Eastern Macedonia.

The Bulgarians naturally were not slow to make use of this payment for their treachery, and invaded Greek territory in the wake of the German armies. On the 15th May, in the Bulgarian Parliament, the Prime Minister Filov expressed his gratitude towards his great Allies. "The Bulgarian people", he said, "will always feel the deepest gratitude and the most profound obligation towards the Axis Powers and their great leaders, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, who have made the union of Bulgaria a reality". And Hitler, magnanimous even before the event, said in his speech of the 4th May: "I was able to make this decision at the present moment with greater calm as I knew I was acting in agreement with Bulgaria, whose sentiments and whose stand by the side of the German Reich have remained unbroken....."

10. But even this was not sufficient to complete Germany's black-mailing efforts against Greece. Yugoslavia also had to be utterly neutralised so as to avoid complications from that direction and so that Greece, isolated from that side, could be morally cowed and crushed without giving any fight. To this end, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was persistantly sought through all the usual methods of German policy. In his speech of the 4th May 1941, Hitler stated unequivocally: "It was our sincere desire, by following a path of closer co-operation with Yugoslavia, to succeed perhaps in averting a clash with Greece, satisfying in a suitable manner Italy's just demands".

Thus on the 25th March, after insistent pressure from Germany, Yugoslavia's adherence to the Tripartite Pact was signed in Vienna. And as in the case of Bulgaria, so in Yugoslavia's case also, Greek territories were offered to her as bait to facilitate her adherence. "Furthermore", said Hitler in the same speech on the 4th May, "Yugoslavia received the assurance, at the specific demand of her Government, that if territorial changes took place in the Balkans, she would be ceded an outlet to the Aegean under Yugoslav sovereignty specifically including Salonika".

11. A little earlier, on the 17th February 1941, German diplomacy, also managed by simultaneous pressure in Sofia and Ankara to achieve the neutralisation of Turkey through the signature of a Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria. At that time Turkey was negotiating with Bulgaria a friendly statement which sought to oblige Bulgaria to try to defend her independence in the event of a German invasion. For this reason, in the Turkish draft of the statement, specific reference was made to the Menemenjoglou-Kiosseivanof negotiations of January 1940 which were precisely aimed to this end. At this stage Germany intervened and demanded that this provision should be expunged. "At 6 o'clock on the 27th January 1941", writes Filov in his memoirs, "von Richtofen

H1503D-0062

H1503D-0063

came to tell me that he had received a telegram from Ribbentrop approving the signature of the proposed statement on the non-aggression agreement with Turkey, but that we should expunge the section in which it was stated that its signature was in the spirit of the Kiosseivanof-Menemenjoglou meeting of the previous year. He recommended that the agreement should be signed in secret, so that its signature could be expedited. I gladly agreed to this suggestion." Simultaneous pressure on Turkey thus made it possible to alter completely the meaning of that statement which, by simply asserting the avoidance of any aggression - without any further provision - could only mean that Turkey would not move against Bulgaria and that Greece was now absolutely isolated and at Germany's mercy. And this is exactly the impression its signature made throughout Europe. "Britain and her Greek appendage", wrote the well-known Fascist writer Gayda on the 20th February, "now appears to be isolated, indeed expelled, from the Balkans".

13. While all these things were being perpetrated at the expense of Greece, German diplomacy was persistently trying by means of all kinds of false assurances to lull the responsible Greek Government by distracting its attention from the threatening danger. The German Legation in Athens and most of the German representatives abroad did not tire of proclaiming that they fully disapproved of the Italian attack against Greece and that Germany was animated by the best intentions towards her. As late as the 1st March 1941, the day of Bulgaria's adherence to the Axis, the spokesman of the German Foreign Office stated to American correspondents that "Germany's relations with Greece have undergone no change and continue to be friendly!!" On the 3rd March the same German spokesman stated that relations with Greece remained unchanged. And assisting from its own angle this work of misleading, Rome Radio was asserting as late as the 3rd April that well-informed circles looked with less pessimism than hitherto on the Yugoslav situation and noted as good symptoms of the easing of the tension in Belgrade the lack of contact between the Greek and the new Yugoslav government and the agreement being reached for the participation in the government of the Croat leader Matchek.

H1503D-0064

PART II. W A R.

The invasion of Greece started on the 6th April 1941. By the 28th of that month the Germans had entered Athens and had overrun the mainland of Greece. By the end of May, Crete having been captured, the whole of Greece was under German occupation.

In those few weeks of war, besides many cases of individual savagery on the part of members of the German army towards the population, the German armed forces committed the following acts against Laws of War in applying the German principle "Kriegsraison geht voz Kriegsmanier."

1. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.

The German Air Force bombed and very heavily damaged the following twenty-three undefended Greek towns: Jannina, Preveza, Arta, Corfu, Kozani, Servia, Elasson, Larissa, Tukkala, Volos, Lamia, Chalkis, Thebes, Piraeus, Corinth, Patras, Nauplia, Argos, Sparta, Kalamata, Canea, Rethymno and Heraklion. Of these the towns of Jannina, Arta, Preveza, Trikkala, Larissa, and Canea were almost completely destroyed.

In most cases the inhabitants, mainly old men, women and children, were deliberately mowed down by machine-gun fire. The victims of bombing and machine-gunning amounted to over 3,000.

2. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.

In Jannina Red Cross Hospitals, though conspicuously marked, were deliberately bombed in daylight and completely destroyed. 600 wounded, together with 50 nurses and a number of doctors, were buried under the ruins.

3. Destruction of Hospital Ships.

The five Greek hospital ships, "HESPEROS", "POLICOS","ATTIKI", "HELLENIS" and "SOCRATES", attached to the Greek forces, though bearing clear Red Cross markings by day and fully illuminated by night, were deliberately sunk by German aircraft, flying at a low altitude; the survivors were machine-gunned as they strove to keep afloat.

4. Pillage.

As the German armies advanced southwards in the wake of their armoured divisions, they plundered and pillaged everything in their path. Cattle, crops of every kind, clothing and movables were stolen from the inhabitants. Shops were stripped of goods and all stocks commandeered.

5. Destruction of Ships without warning. Murder of survivors.

After the occupation of Greece, the Greek Mercantile Marine continued the struggle, till the defeat of Germany. Over 200 Greek cargo vessels were destroyed without warning and many Greek sailors fell victims of the German policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. There are many instances where entire crews disappeared. One instance is recorded where three members of a crew miraculously survived to tell the story. On the 13th March 1944, the Greek s.s. "PELEUS" was torpedoed and sunk without warning. After the "PELEUS" sank, U. 852surfaced and attempted to kill all survivors. The rafts and wreckage were rammed, and the men on them were machine-gunned, and hand grenades thrown among the rafts. Thirty-four seamen out of thirty-seven were killed.

H1503D-0065

PART III. OCCUPATION.

From the very start of the occupation, the Germans decided on a policy of territorial dismemberment and divided the country among themselves, the Italians and the Bulgarians.

Germany occupied Central and Western Macedonia, Crete, the Aegean Islands and a zone in the Evros district of Thrace.

Epirus, the Ionian Islands and the Cyclades were placed under Italian occupation and completely isolated from the rest of Greece.

Two of the most fertile Greek provinces, Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace, were ceded to Bulgaria, who unofficially "annexed" them, so that they ceased to form a part of Greek territory. Later, following on the Italian surrender, Central and Western Macedonia were also handed over by the Germans to the Bulgarians.

The rest of Greece was left under Greek civil administration but with Germans and Italians, and more particularly the former, retaining control over all the more important economic and strategic factors.

As in other occupied countries, the German occupation policy in Greece was governed by two determining factors; the exploitation of the country to the maximum of its resources for the benefit of Germany's war economy, and the subjugation of the population by means of methodical terrorism and indiscriminate oppression.

The Germans pursued their two-fold policy in a spirit of plunder and revenge, in complete defiance of the universally recognised rules of occupation.

A. EXPLOITATION.

In order to understand the special policy of mass exploitation enforced by Germany in Greece and how the acute conditions of starvation and want came about throughout Greece during the years 1941-1944, it would be necessary to explain in some detail: (1) the economic situation of the country at the time of the beginning of the occupation, and (2) the method of pillage employed i.e. the predatory financial and economic measures enforced by the Germans during the occupation.

1. When the Germans entered Greece they found themselves in an already exhausted country. Even under the best conditions Greece possesses very slender resources in relation to the size of its population. Over half its area is mountainous and arid, and of the remainder only 20% is suitable for cultivation. Natural conditions are unfavourable to the growth of food crops and stockraising. In addition, the country lacks fuel and many raw materials. Thus, Greece is almost entirely dependent on imports for its requirements in foodstuffs, fuel and many essential raw materials.

The outbreak of the war in 1939 had an adverse effect - even when Greece was still neutral - on the Greek economy, which by reason of its structure had always been extremely sensitive to world economic conditions. Total imports, which exceeded 2,700,000 tons during the pre-war period, fell to 1,450,000 tons in 1940. The situation deteriorated still further after Italy's attack in October 1940, and Germany's attack in April 1941, when the country had to face a hard and unequal struggle against first one and later two, mighty powers. The country had to devote its resources to the prosecution of the war, and to make every sacrifice in meeting the needs of the fighting forces. The general mobilisation, the need of maintaining large forces on inadequate local supplies, the

H1503D-0066

requisitioning of practically all means of transport for military purposes, meant a drastic curtailment of civilian consumption. At the same time, agriculture suffered considerably from the mobilisation of the peasant population, the requisitioning of draught animals and the slaughtering of livestock for the needs of the army. As a result, severe restriction of consumption and strict rationing had been introduced at an early date, and the civilian population placed on a minimum diet.

In short, at the moment when the German occupation began it was evident that the losses in productive capacity suffered during the war as well as the considerable reduction in the stocks of imported goods had by themselves sufficed to cause acute distress in the country.

Nevertheless, so far from recognising that they were occupying a country from which no material contribution could possibly be exacted without imperilling the very existence of the population, the Germans pursued a policy of pillage which was bound to bring about, which did in fact bring about, famine, chaos and disintegration.

The treatment of Greece was more rigorous than that meted out to other occupied countries. The explanation is that Germany's policy in every case was closely related to the economic structure of each particular country. In other occupied countries the Germans organised production for the maximum benefit of their war effort. In these countries it was in their interest to maintain the worker's productive capacity; they did not condemn the whole population. In the case of Greece, however, as the country lacked self-contained industries and manufactures, transport systems and electric power, they considered it more advantageous to drain it of everything it could provide, in complete disregard of the most elementary needs of the population, and to enforce general terroristic measures, thereby threatening a whole people with extinction.

2. In pursuance of their policy, the Germans enforced the following administrative, financial and economic measures, which served the economic needs of the German nation and not the needs of an army of occupation, as provided by the rules concerning occupation. In violation of Articles 46,47,48,51 and 52 of the Hague Regulations the Germans maintained in Greece much larger forces than were necessary for the purposes of a mere occupation:

they carried out extensive fortification works compulsorily financed by the country;
they levied immense sums as "costs of occupation" far in excess of the needs of an army of occupation;
they confiscated and requisitioned the existing stocks/out of all proportion to the resources of the country; and supplies
they extorted a vast contribution in a disguised form by means of inflation and of forced borrowing by clearing.

(a) Maintenance of Large Forces.

Owing to her geographical position, Greece was used by the Germans as a base of operations for the war in North Africa. They also used Greece as a place of rest for thousands of their troops from the North African and Eastern fronts. Thus, they concentrated in Greece much larger forces than were actually required for purposes of occupation. Large amounts of local supplies of fruit, vegetables, potatoes, olive oil, meat and dairy products were taken for the needs of these forces. As current production was not sufficient for these needs, requisitioning of live-stock was extensively resorted to, with the result that the country's live-stock was seriously depleted in numbers.

H1503D-0067

(b) Execution of extensive fortifications.

In order to prepare against attack from the south, as Greece formed the southern sector of the so-called "Fortress of Europe", the Germans exhausted her already greatly diminished resources in the construction of vast works of fortification and defence. Neither the materials nor the food supplies for the labour employed were imported. The cost of the works was borne by Greece and amounted to 2½ million gold pounds.

(c) Costs of Occupation.

Enormous sums were exacted as costs of occupation. Between August 1941 and December 1941 the Germans were paid the sum of drs. 26,206,085,000 i.e. 60% above the estimated national income during the same period. In fact, according to the estimates of two Axis experts, Dr. Barberine (German) and Dr. Bertoni (Italian), the national income of that year amounted to only 23,000 million drs. In the following year, as the national income decreased, they extracted sums at the expense of the national capital.

(d) Confiscations and Requisitions.

One of the enemy's first measures on occupying Greece was to lay hands on all the stocks existing in the country by requisition or direct confiscation. Among other things, they requisitioned from the wholesale and retail trade 71,000 tons of currants and 10,000 tons of olice oil: they confiscated 1,435 tons of coffee, 1,143 tons of sugar, 2,520 tons of rice, and a whole shipload of wheat at the Piraeus of a value of £ 530,000 etc.

In the case of local supplies, since requisition was not always easy to carry out in the rural districts, one of the most effective ways for devices laying hands on them was the placing of an embargo on local products in the centres of production.

As already stated, the country had been divided between three occupants. This dismemberment did not merely serve administrative expediency. It also, among other things, served the German economic policy by enabling the "blocking" of local produce. All economic relations between the three zones of occupation were prohibited. Moreover, within the several zones, prohibitions and restrictions were such as to isolate whole regions and to deprive them of contact with the rest of the country. Thus, owing to these artificial boundaries, the inhabitants of one region were unable to buy the products of another, and while there might be a famine in one area, local supplies were available in the next. Even inside each region the transport and sale of commodities was made subject to special licence from the occupying authorities. This policy had the further advantage of enabling these authorities to obtain local produce at stable and unreasonably low prices which took no account of the large-scale inflation.

As a complement to the "blocking" of supplies and disregarding the fact that transport facilities had always been inadequate in Greece, and that heavy losses had already been sustained during the period of military operations, the occupying forces took over practically all the means of transport left in the country and used them almost exclusively for their own needs. The result was that even when supplies available in one region were desperately needed in another region, their dispatch could not be effected owing to lack of means of transport. The Relief Commission of the International Red Cross itself was faced with great difficulties in transporting the limited quantities of relief supplies (200,000 tons per annum) which it distributed to the population.

No small country could have survived the splitting up of its territory into so large a number of closed economic areas. In the case of Greece,

H1503D-0068

the Germans deliberately disregarded the greatly deversified forms of agricultural production prevailing in different parts of the country, and the fact that the various regions were complementary to each other. The effects of the extensive requisitioning of local produce during the first years of occupation were so disastrous for the Greek population that the enemy himself had to admit that he had gone too far. At the end of 1942 an undertaking was given to the International Red Cross Commission in Greece that local foodstuffs consumed by the occupying authorities or exported would be replaced by imported foodstuffs providing the same amount of calories. Even this undertaking was not kept in actual fact.

(e) Inflation.

In Greece more than in any other occupied country the issue of unlimited quantities of currency was deliberately used by the Germans as a means of obtaining command over local resources. Faced with an already exhausted economy, with the refusal of the population to submit to any form of compulsory labour, and, in addition, with the fact that not every article could be confiscated or requisitioned, the Germans adopted a policy of large-scale inflation as the easiest means of exploiting the country.

From the very start, they put into circulation 10,000,000,000 occupation Marks, a sum equal to half the money in circulation at that date. By April 1944, the monetary circulation had reached 14,000,000 million drs. i.e. had increased 700 times since the date of occupation.

The extent of the inflation is shown by the following figures : In April 1941 the price of a gold sovereign was 1,000 drs. In October 1944 it had reached 200,000,000,000,000, drms. Taking January 1941 as basis (100) the cost of living index stood at 3,268 in April of the same year, while towards the end of the occupation it had soared to 1,536,000,000,000, a 2,252,000,000-fold increase. Thanks to the inflation, when the Germans paid for goods they enriched themselves by the difference between the real prices and the artificial prices established through it. Thus not only foodstuffs, but every article of value, jewels, gold objects, furniture, etc., even all the coins in circulation(nickel and nickel alloys) found their way to Germany at a very conveniently low price.

(f) Misuse of Clearing.

The clearing system which had been applied before the war by Germany as a means of economic penetration, was evolved by them during the war as the most efficient device for spoliation, equivalent in fact to mass-looting. The Germans exercised their controlling power in such a way that the most important and essential products of the country were excluded from trade inside the country and kept at the disposal of the occupying Power.

Commodities destined for export were first of all confiscated or placed under an embargo by the Military Authorities and were subsequently bought by the interested parties at arbitrarily fixed prices, usually at pre-war prices which took no account of the devaluation of the drachma and the tremendrous rise in prices in the open market. The value of the commodities, as fixed by this arbitrary reckoning, was then entered to the credit of Greece's account. Conversely, goods imported from Germany, in spite of the steady prices prevailing at the place of origin, were charged at 200-500 percent over their normal price. In addition, Greece's account was debited with the value of the goods imported from Germany for the use of the forces of occupation.

Some of the latter goods were: coal, of which 80% was used for the railway transport needs of the troops and for the provision of power for the factories working for the +Germans, and petroleum products of which

H1503D-0069

70% was taken by the Military Authorities. As often as not, the bulk of the goods thus imported were confiscated by the Occupation Authorities on arrival and it was not unusual for them to demand that the settlement for these goods, although destined exclusively for the use of the occupation authorities, should be effected through this same clearing account. In consequence, notwithstanding the fact that Greece exported the whole of her available resources to Germany, the clearing account showed a credit balance in favour of Germany of 264,157,574,03 marks when the Germans left, while the credit balance in favour of Greece, at the moment of their arrival stood at 4,353,428,82 marks.

H1503D-0070

B. TERRORISM

During the first few weeks of the occupation the Germans presented themselves in Greece as "liberators" seeking the friendly collaboration of the population.

While reviewing the Balkan campaign in a speech at the Kroll Opera House of Berlin on May 4th 1941 Hitler made an attempt to propitiate Greece and to justify his unprovoked attack. He said: "Even today I feel that I must, as I believe in the interest of historical accuracy, distinguish between the Greek people and that thin top layer of corrupt leaders who, inspired by a King who had no idea of the duties of true leadership, preferred instead to further the aims of British war-mongers. I must categorically stress that this action was not directed against Greece.....Nothing is impossible for the German soldiers. Historical accuracy, however, obliges me to say that, of the opponents who have taken arms against us, the Greek soldiers are those who have fought with the greatest courage and contempt for death."

However, this conciliatory manner did not last long. On the night of May 30 1941 patriots pulled down the swastika from the Acropolis, and the following day May 31, the German Commander in Athens issued an order threatening heavy penalties;
"(a) Because on the night of the 30th - 31st May the German war flag flying on the Acroplis was taken away by unknown persons, those guilty of this act as well as their accomplices will be punished by death.

(b) Because the Press and public opinion of all classes still express themselves with evident sympathy in favour of the English, now expelled from Continental Europe.

(c) Because events in Crete (he was referring to the lawful resistance of the inhabitants) and the ill-treatment of German prisoners not only were not condemned, but in wide circles were even commented on with satisfaction.

(d) Because, although this was specifically forbidden, repeated gestures of sympathy towards British prisoners were observed (Offers of gifts, flowers, fruit, cigarettes etc.,) and these demonstrations were tolerated by the Greek police who did not intervene with the means at their disposal.

(e) Because the behaviour of large numbers of the people of Athens towards the German armed forces has again become less friendly".

The German Command went on to point out that until then it had been doing all it could to show its goodwill towards the people of Greece; but now with deep regret it must take whatever steps it considered necessary to end the situation.

From that early date, and at those slight signs of moral opposition, the Germans started applying their terroristic policy. In violation of Article 50 of the Hague Regulations they systematically punished the innocent enforcing the expressly condemned principle of joint responsibility of the community for acts of individuals. They used starvation as an instrument of pressure and for weakening the spirit of resistance of the Greek population. They seldom respected the laws of justice. Very few people were tried by court martial, and, when held, such trials were something of a judicial mockery. They instituted a policy of reprisals consisting in taking hostages, in killing hostages, in mass-murders and in destruction and devastation of villages for acts committed in their vicinity by unknown individuals. Thus, the great majority of those executed were picked at random from prisons and camps, without

H1503D-0071

any possible relation to the act in reprisal for which they were executed. The life of every citizen depended on the arbitrary decision of the local commander.

1. STARVATION.

Starvation was not a necessary incident of the war; it was the logical consequence of the policy of exploitation adopted by the Germans in Greece. They provoked hunger and they used hunger as a means of cowing the Greek population. From the following extracts of speeches etc., of high Nazi Officials it would appear that starvation was deliberate and was part of a plan which included or intended starvation, or was reasonably calculated to result in starvation.

That Hitler felt no hesitation about reducing or exterminating inconvenient populations is evident from his words to Rauschning (who would presumably be in a position to confirm them).

"We are obliged to depopulate as part of our mission of preserving the German population. We shall have to develop a technique of depopulation. I mean the removal of entire racial units. And that is what I intend to carry out - that, roughly, is my task. Nature is cruel, therefore, we too may be cruel. If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin?"

Dr. Ley wrote in Goebbel's organ "Der Angriff" of January 31st 1940 that:

"A lower race needs less room, less clothing, less food, and less culture than a higher race....."

Goering who "in accordance with the orders of the Führer" was "directing the economy of newly-occupied Eastern countries" stated his principle bluntly, in a speech in October 1942, at the Sportpalast, by which time in Greece starvation had already claimed many thousand victims.

"I have formed an unshakable resolve, a rock-firm principle which will be inflexibly maintained. The German people come first and foremost as regards the satisfaction of hunger and in questions of nutrition. If, as a result of the enemy's measures, difficulties of food supply should arise, then I want everyone to know that if anybody goes hungary, it will not be Germany."

But while it may not be easy to establish how far starvation was deliberately premeditated, it is beyong any doubt that when famine broke out and people died in the streets as a result of the German policy of exploitation, not only the Government of the Reich did not send any help to ease the situation, but they continued to remove agricultural and other supplies for the use of the German forces in Greece, for exportation to the Africa Corps, and for consumption in Germany. Thus, they introduced a new method of "white massacre".

The results of such treatment were bound to be catastrophic. The Greek population was reduced during the occupation to a state of complete physical exhaustion. A few months after the beginning of the occupation the food situation became acute in the urban centres and other non food-producing regions. During the period from August 1941 to April 1942 famine was rampant in the capital as well as in the Aegean and Cyclades Islands. It is a fact that Greece was only saved thanks to the partial raising of the blockade which was decided upon in the spring of 1942, at which date relief shipments began to arrive in Greece from Allied and

neutral countries. These shipments enabled the International Red Cross Commission to provide the bread ration of part of the population and to supply a minimum of foodstuffs to the various canteens.

It is an incontestable fact that the great majority of the Greek population lived on the verge of starvation for nearly three years. Many thousands experienced real famine for several months before relief shipments could reach them.

As a result the death rate increased by 500% (600% in the capital and 800 to 1,000% in the Islands during the period August 1941 - April 1942). New-born children died at a rate of 25% and the health of the survivors was greatly undermined.

The following extracts from reports of Neutral Missions in Greece give an idea of the state to which the population was reduced at the very moment when its scanty resources were used for feeding the Germans:

"During the winter of 1941 - 1942 when famine reigned in the capital, conditions in the provinces were still tolerable. During the following winter, however, when relief from Canada for the larger towns had been exhausted by the free market, the situation was very different... During our first tours of inspection (March 1943) we made the acquaintance of a population literally screaming for bread. Many villages had only a substitute baked of flour, wild pears and acorns - ordinary pig's food, and in many districts the population had received no other bread since December. We were taken inside the houses and shown empty shelves and larders and we saw people cooking weeds without oil and salt in order to fill their stomachs. The inhabitants of the poorer villages were all extremely thin, and the children in particular were often in a pitiful condition, with skinny extremities and swollen stomachs without any natural vitality or cheerfulness. It was quite usual for half the children to be unable to go to school." (Report of the Swedish delegates to the Peloponnese January 1944).

"Tuberculosis is making havoc among an undernourished population, lacking almost completely animal protein foods. It is the greatest danger which is at present threatening the Greek people.....Skin infections, staphylococciasis and particularly scabies are widespread. Often the entire population of towns and villages is affected." (Report of Swiss Mission in Greece, 5th April 1944).

"The population of Salonika, which is daily increasing with the influx of refugees and victims of reprisals, suffers acutely from lack of foodstuffs which are unobtainable on the market at prohibitive prices. Diseases due to the exhaustion caused by undernourishment and by other privations endured since the beginning of the war are spreading. Thus, tuberculosis, malaria, and children's diseases (rickets, adenitis, enteritis etc.) have again increased the number already considerable of patients." (Report of the Swedish Delegates in Macedonia, January 31st 1944.)

II. Massacres, wanton devastation and destruction of villages.

As soon as the Germans occupied Crete, their High Command proclaimed that "places near which attacks took place against German soldiers will be burned to the ground and the population will be held responsible." Following this proclamation, the first act of reprisal was committed; a number of people were shot, most of them completely innocent, and the villages of Skini, Prassi and Kandanos burnt to the ground in retaliation

H1503D-0072

H1503D-0073

for the killing, during the attack on Crete, of some German parachutists by members of the Cretan Militia. On the sites of these villages they erected posters bearing the following inscription in German and Greek "Zur Vergeltung der bestialischen Ermordung eines Fall-schirmjägerzug es und eines Pioniernalbzuges durch bewaffnte Männer und Frauen aus dem Hinterhalte zerstört."

The policy of reprisals which at first was of an intermittent character, gradually became intensified, especially after the opposition put up early in 1943 by organised guerrillas all over the country.

The technique employed was a standard one. On the day following any acts of sabotage or guerilla activities near a village, German troops appeared in the village. The inhabitants were summoned into the main square or other suitable place, supposedly in order to listen to a proclamation, and they were then mowed down by machine-gun fire. The German then proceeded to burn down, or in some cases shell, the village, after having pillaged it. They shot people in the streets, in the houses, in the fields, regardless of sex or age. In some cases only males from the age of sixteen and upwards were executed. In other cases, the men having fled to the mountains, they executed the women, the children and old men who had remained behind in the village, in the belief that their sex or age was a protection. Typical examples were Arachova, Kalavryta, Distomon, Klisoura, Kommeno, Mesovouni. Some villages were destroyed for the sole reason that they happened to be situated within the mountainous guerilla area. Thus, 1,600 villages were totally or partially destroyed out of a total of 6,500 and over 1,200,000 people left destitute. The number of villagers killed amounts to some 30,000. The fate of the survivors is described in the following extract from a report of the Relief Commission (May 1944):

"Whenever the occupation troops burn a village in retaliation for attacks on German lives or property by partisans, the villagers very often have no time - or are not allowed - to save their personal belongings. Half-naked and shoeless they gather together in caves and rock shelters if they are not able to take refuge in neighbouring villages." Many of these destitute people died of starvation and want.

III. HOSTAGES - CONCENTRATION CAMPS.

Hostages were taken indiscriminately and from every class. Politicians, professors, scientists, lawyers, doctors, officers, civil servants, clergymen, workers, women, anybody was labelled as a "suspect" or a "communist" and thrown into the local prisons or concentration camps. Prisoners under interrogation were subjected to various ingenious forms of torture. Most notorious among the concentration camps were those at Haidari (nr. Athens), Larissa and Agia (Crete), faithfully modelled on the German prototype. In these systematic and deliberate cruelty was practised. The inmates were starved, beaten and tortured, living under the most inhuman conditions without medical help or sanitation, subjected to the refined sadism of the S.S. guards. Many were shot or hanged, others died from maltreatment or starvation, and only a few were released or survived up to the date of the liberation of the country. Hostages were also deported to concentration camps in Germany. Thus, Buchenwald, Belsen, Dachau, etc., had their contingent of Greeks, The number of hostages shot amounts to some 91,000.

IV. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION.

Many churches all over Greece were profaned and members of the clergy deported or shot.

The ancient privileges of the Monasteries of Mount Athos, which

H1503D-0074

enjoyed autonomy under the Greek constitution and an international treaty, were abolished by the Germans on the ground that the place was a centre of anti-German propaganda.

By their orders and regulations the Germans gradually introduced into Greece the Nuremburg laws relegating Jews to the state of pariahs. At first, both regulations and treatment were, by comparison with later events, mild. They introduced discrimination between Jews and Christians. In July 1942, all the male members of the Jewish community of Salonika from 16 to 45 years of age were compelled to do forced labour, such as road-building work on farms etc. Three months later they were released, after having been compelled to pay an exorbitant monetary contribution.

Later, in 1943, the Germans, following the example set by the Bulgarians in Macedonia and Thrace in 1942, started applying the policy announced by Dr. Ley in December 1942, of "waging this war until the Jews have been wiped off the face of the earth". They applied this policy in Greece with the utmost thoroughness. Jews were rounded up and subjected to mass deportation, their property being confiscated. Thus, out of a population of nearly 80,000 Jews in Greece in 1941, 60,000 had been deported to Poland by 1944. According to the evidence given by the few repatriated Jews, most of the above mentioned number perished under the most appalling conditions. It has been estimated that in the death camp of Birkenau alone, 45,000 Greek Jews were gassed. Only 9 - 10,000 Jews survived in Greece by joining the Guerilla bands in the mountains or by going into hiding in Athens under false names, thanks to the assistance of their Christian fellow-citizens.

V. RECRUITMENT OF LABOUR.

One of the many problems confronting the German administration was that of recruiting labour.

All males between sixteen and fifty years of age were liable to labour conscription. Strikes were declared illegal, and severe penalties enforced for resort thereto. Persons who organised and directed a strike were liable to the death penalty. Strikers were tried by military courts.

At first, the Germans by propaganda and various forms of indirect pressure, tried to recruit Greek labour to work within Germany. They promised high wages and better conditions of life. As this kind of "voluntary" recruitment failed to produce the expected results they abandoned it and confronted the workers with the dilemma either of being taken as hostages or else of being sent to Germany to work. Nevertheless, the number of workers deported to Germany did not exceed 16,659.

II. RAPE-PILLAGE.

Though this report is not concerned with criminal acts of individual brutality, it should be mentioned that crimes such as rape and pillage by members of the German forces were daily occurrences.

London, 13th October 1945.

By order and on behalf of
The Royal Hellenic Government.

(sgd) ?????

Ambassador to the
Court of St. James's.

Filed Feb. 22, 194[illegible]
[illegible]
Secy.

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503e

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №_____

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

379a

СССР №379a

A 083740

H1503E-0001

H1503E-0002

У Д О С Т О В Е Р Е Н И Е

Я, полковник вооруженных сил СССР, Дмитрий КАРЕВ, Помощник Главного Обвинителя от СССР и начальник документальной части Советского Обвинения на Нюрнбергском процессе, настоящим удостоверяю, что нижеследующие документы, пред"явленные Международному Военному Трибуналу, а именно:

СССР-89, СССР-I73, СССР-I74, СССР-I75, СССР-I76, СССР-I78, СССР-I79, СССР-I80, СССР-I83, СССР-I85, СССР-I96, СССР-266, СССР-267, СССР-268, СССР-270, СССР-367, СССР-379а, СССР-38Iа, СССР-382, СССР-383, СССР-386, СССР-42I, СССР-422, СССР-423, СССР-424, СССР-425, СССР-426, СССР-427, СССР-429, СССР-430, СССР-43I, СССР-432, СССР-433, СССР-434, СССР-444, СССР-469, -

являются документами, захваченными у немцев в период I94I-I945 г.г. частями Красной Армии.

ПОЛКОВНИК /Д.КАРЕВ/

2 августа I946 г.
г.Нюрнберг.

А 083741

USSR-379

Abschrift

Der Reichsarbeitsminister
V a 5550/333/42 g

Berlin SW 11, d. 19.1.1942
Saarlandstr. 96

An
die Herren Präsidenten der Landesarbeitsämter
die Herren Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit

Geheim

Betr.: Lenkung des Arbeitseinsatzes.

Hiermit übersende ich Abdruck eines Erlasses vom 10.1. 1942 - Vp.22086/41 G.Rs., mit dem der Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reichs, Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, seiner Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz die uneingeschränkte Vollmacht zur Lenkung des gesamten Arbeitseinsatzes und zur Verteilung der nach Erfüllung der Wehrersatzforderung verfügbaren Arbeitskräfte erteilt hat.

Für die Leiter der Arbeitsämter ist je ein Abdruck beigefügt.

Im Auftrag
gez. Dr. Beisiegel

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело N 1 л. 59-60

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 379a
Filed Feb 22, 1946

A 083742

H1503E-0003

H1503E-0004

USSR-379

60

Abschrift

Abschrift zu Va 5550/333/42 g

Berlin W 8, den 10. Januar 1942
Leipziger Strasse 3

Der Reichsmarschall
des Grossdeutschen Reiches
Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan
V.R. 22086/41 g.Rs.

Der Arbeitseinsatz wird in den kommenden Monaten eine noch gesteigerte Bedeutung erhalten. Auf der einen Seite verlangt die Einsatzlage der Wehrmacht die Freimachung aller Angehörigen der jüngeren Jahrgänge für ihre Aufgaben. Auf der anderen müssen der vordringlichen Rüstungsfertigung und der sonstigen Kriegswirtschaft sowieder Landwirtschaft die von ihnen dringend benötigten Kräfte zugeführt werden. Dabei spielt der Einsatz von Kriegsgefangenen, insbesondere aus Sowjetrussland, eine erhebliche Rolle.

Die Massnahmen, die auf diesem Gebiet künftig erforderlich werden, versprechen nur bei einheitlicher Steuerung den Erfolg, den herbeizuführen ich mit allen Mitteln bemüht sein werde.

Ich habe deshalb meiner Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz, die schon bisher die Arbeitseinsatzfragen im Vierjahresplan zusammenfassend zu bearbeiten hatte, nunmehr die uneingeschränkte Vollmacht zur Lenkung des gesamten Arbeitseinsatzes und zur Verteilung der nach Erfüllung der Wehrersatzforderungen verfügbaren Arbeitskräfte erteilt. Ministerialdirektor Dr. M a n s f e l d wird dabei in engster Verbindung mit dem Oberkommando der Wehrmacht und den drei wehrmachtteilen vorgehen. Für die Umsetzung von Arbeitskräften innerhalb der Rüstungsfertigung gelten die bisherigen Vorschriften mit der bekannten Massgabe weiter, dass die Umsetzung nicht losgelöst vom allgemeinen Arbeitseinsatz, sondern in seinem Gesamtrahmen zu behandeln ist. Massnahmen dieser Art sind jeweils zwischen dem Reichsminister für Bewaffnung und Munition und der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz abzustimmen.

Ich bitte Sie hiervon Kenntnis zu nehmen und Ihre und Ihrer Dienststellen Zusammenarbeit mit der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz und der Arbeitsverwaltung möglichst eng zu gestalten, damit ich auch in Einzelfällen von der Anwendung meines Weisungsrechts absehen kann.

gez. G ö r i n g

An a) die Obersten Reichsbehörden,
b) die Herren Generalbevollmächtigten, Bevollmächtigten, Geschäftsgruppen usw. des Vierjahresplans.

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело № 1 л. 59-60

A083743

Filed Feb. 22, 1946

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503f

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

381

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР № 381

A083750

H1503F-0001

СССР - 381

" И Н С Т Р У К Ц И Я

для хозяйственных организаций "Рабочий Отдел" по использованию рабочей силы на Востоке "

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 381
Filed Feb 22 1946

A 083751

H1503F-0002

H1503F-0003

H1503F-0004

О П И С Ь

документов - " Инструкция для хозяйственных организаций".

№ пп	Наименование документов	Количество листов	В каком деле хранится в Чрез.Гос.Ком.	ПРИМЕЧАНИЕ.
1.	Инструкция для хозяйственных организаций "рабочий отдел" по использованию рабочей силы на Востоке.	3 /фотостат/	Дело № 11 л.л.80, 97.	
2.	Т о ж е - перевод	2	Дело № 11, л.л. 80, 97	

A083752

Ni Stab Ost
Abteilung Arbeit

Ortsunterkunft, August 1941.

D i e n s t a n w e i s u n g

für die Wirtschaftsdienststellen "Abteilung Arbeit"

zum Aufbau des Arbeitseinsatzes im Osten.

H1503F-0005

A083753

H1503F-0006

A 083754

H1503F-0007

Abschrift

Wi Stab Ost
Chefgruppe Arbeit
Br.Nr. 98 510/42 g

Berlin, den 26.1.1942

G e h e i m !

An die Wi In Süd - Gruppe Arbeit, z.Hd.OKVR Dr.Stephan - P o l t a w a

die Wi In Mitte - Gruppe Arbeit, z.Hd.OKVR Gelberg - B o r r i s s o w

das Wi Kdo Pleskau - Gruppe Arbeit, z.Hd.KVR Dr.Schultz- P l e s k a u

Betrifft: Lenkung des Arbeitseinsatzes; hier: Einsatz von sowjet.Arbeitskräften im Reich.

Als Anlage wird Abschrift eines Erlasses vom 10.1.1942 - V.P. 22086/41 g.Rs. - mit dem der Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches, Beauftragter für den Vierjahresplan, seine Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz die uneingeschränkte Vollmacht zur Lenkung des gesamten Arbeitseinsatzes und zur Verteilung der nach Erfüllung der Wehrersatzforderungen verfügbaren Arbeitskräfte erteilt hat, zur Kenntnis übersandt.

Der Reichsmarschall hebt in seinem Erlass nochmals die besondere Bedeutung des Russeneinsatzes für das Reich hervor.

Es wurde bereits mit Verfügung vom 4.12.1941 - Br.Nr. 42006/41 g - angeordnet, dass - im Bewusstsein der Dringlichkeit - darauf die Hauptarbeit auszurichten ist. Die Erwartungen, die der Reichsmarschall in die Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung setzt, müssen unter allen Umständen erfüllt werden. Aufgabe der Wirtschaftsorganisation und Einsatzverwaltung im Osten ist es, die Lücken in der Wirtschaft, die durch die Freimachung aller Angehörigen der jüngeren Jahrgänge für die Wehrmacht entstehen, in den nächsten Monaten durch umfassende Anwerbung russischer Arbeitskräfte zu schliessen. Dies ist kriegsentscheidend und muss daher erreicht werden! Wenn die Zahl der Freiwilligen hinter den

A 083755

H1503F-0008

H1503F-0009

gehegten Erwartungen zurückbleibt, so müssen die Werbemassnahmen, wie bereits angeordnet, mit allen zu Gebote stehenden Mitteln verschärft werden.

Für beschleunigte Unterrichtung der nachgeordneten Wirtschaftskommandos und der Leiter der Arbeitsämter ist Sorge zu tragen.

gez. Dr. Rachner
KV-Chef

A 3756

H1503F-0010

Раевская

Из материалов Чрезвычайной Государственной Комиссии

Дело № 11 л. л. 80, 95

083756/1

H1503F-0011

Военная Инспекция Штаб Ост
Рабочий отдел

Расположение войск
на востоке, август 1941 г.

Инструкция

для хозяйственных организаций "Рабочий Отдел"
по использованию рабочей силы на востоке.

A 083757

Faksimile

H1503F-0012

Копия

Берлин, 26.I-1942 г.

Хозяйственная Инспекция Штаб Ост
Главная группа "Труда"

Секретно

№ 98510|42

Хозяйственной Инспекции Юг - группа труда
ц.Хд.ОКВР Др Стефан
Полтава

Хозяйственной Инспекции Центр-группа труда
ц.Хд.ОКВР Гельберг

Борисов
Хозяйственному Управлению Псков-группа труда
ц.Хд.ОКВР др.Шульц

Псков

Содержание: руководство для использования рабочей силы; в данном случае :использование советской рабочей силы в Германии.

В качестве приложения пересылается для ознакомления копия предписания от I0.I.1942 - В.П.22086|4I секретный государственный документ - посредством которого Рейхсмаршал Великой Германии, уполномоченный по четырехлетнему плану, передал своей служебной группе по использованию рабочей силы неограниченные полномочия для руководства всем использованием рабочей силы и распределения рабочих, имеющихся в распоряжении после комплектования вооруженных сил.

Рейхсмаршал в своем предписании еще раз подчеркивает особое значение для Германии использование русской рабочей силы.

Уже в распоряжении от 4.I2.194I - № 42006|4I секретно было приказано - сознавая неотложность- считать это основной работой. Надежды, которые рейхсмаршал возлагает на управление по использованию рабочей силы, должны во что бы то ни стало оправдаться. Задачей хозяйственных организаций и управлений по использованию рабочей силы на Востоке является заполнение в ближайшие месяцы бреши в хозяйстве, возникшей благодаря уходу в армию людей младшего призывного возраста, посредством поголовной вербовки русской рабочей силы. Это является решающим для войны и поэтому должно быть достигнуто! Если число добровольцев не оправдает ожидания, то согласно приказания во время вербовки следует применять стоящие в распоряжении самые строгие меры .Следует озаботиться о срочном уведомлении подведомственных хозяйственных управлений и начальников биржи труда.Подпись Др.Рахнер, начальник КУ

Переводчик Чрезвычайной
Государственной Комиссии
Е.Раевская

тк

Раевская

Из материалов Чрезвычайной Государственной Комиссии
Дело № 11, лл. 80, 92
А 083758

H1503G-0001

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503g

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

3811

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР № 3818

H1503G-0002

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ.

Я, Помощник Главного Обвинителя от СССР, полковник Красной Армии, КАРЕВ Д.С., действующий на основании полномочий, предоставленных мне письменным распоряжением Главного Обвинителя от СССР генерала РУДЕНКО Р.А. от 5 сентября 1946 года, настоящим удостоверяю, что фотокопия документа СССР № 381 является подлинной и точной копией с подлинника, хранящегося в Прокуратуре СССР, в городе Москве.

Замена подлинника документа его фотокопией произведена на основании разрешения Международного Военного Трибунала.

Полковник Карев /Д.Карев/

" 6 " сентября 1946г.

H1503G-0003

C E R T I F I C A T E .

I hereby certify that the annexed document - USSR No 381 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the Soviet Prosecution under this number.

J. R a y
Colonel, USA

General Secretary
International Military Tribunal.

Nuremberg, October 1946

1 USSR - 381 b
geändert.

Merkblatt

für die Behandlung der ausländischen Zivilarbeiter im Reich.

Stichtag: 1.1o.1942.

Für den Masseneinsatz von ausländischen Zivilarbeitern sind einheitliche Richtlinien für ihre staatspolizeiliche Behandlung ergangen, die je nach der Volkstumszugehörigkeit verschieden sind und im folgenden kurz aufgeführt sind.

I. Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen polnischen Volkstums.

Für alle Arbeiter und Arbeiterinnen polnischen Volkstums (P-Träger) gelten folgende besondere Bestimmungen:

1.) Das Verlassen des Wohnortes ist nur mit polizeilicher Genehmigung gestattet.

2.) Die Unterkunft darf nicht verlassen werden während der Sommerzeit vom 1.4. - 3o.9. in der Zeit von 21 - 5 Uhr, während der Winterzeit vom 1.1o. - 31.3. in der Zeit von 2o - 6 Uhr. Die Kreispolizeibehörden sind berechtigt, in Sonderfällen andere Zeiten für dieses Ausgehverbot festzusetzen, soweit es der Arbeitseinsatz erfordert.

3.) Benutzung der öffentlichen Verkehrsmittel ist nur mit Erlaubnis der Ortspolizeibehörde gestattet und darf zum Zwecke des Arbeitseinsatzes erfolgen.

4.) Die Abzeichen (P.) sind stets sichtbar auf der rechten Brustseite eines jeden Kleidungsstückes zu tragen. Das Abzeichen ist auf dem Kleidungsstück fest anzunähen.

5.) Jeder gesellige Verkehr mit der deutschen Bevölkerung, insbesondere der Besuch von Theatern, Kinos, Tanzvergnügen, Gaststätten und Kirchen gemeinsam mit der deutschen Bevölkerung ist verboten. Desgleichen auch der über das gewöhnliche Maß hinausgehende Verkehr zwischen Arbeitgeber und polnischen Arbeitskräften. Alkoholgenuß ist nur in den den polnischen Arbeitern besonders zugewiesenen Gaststätten gestattet.

6.) Wer mit einer deutschen Frau oder einem deutschen Mann geschlechtlich verkehrt, oder sich ihnen sonst unsittlich nähert, wird mit dem Tode bestraft. Der deutsche Partner kann auf Anordnung des Reichsführers-SS in ein Konzentrationslager eingewiesen werden.

II.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 381
Filed Feb 22, 1946

A 083745

H1503G-0004

USSR-3816

H1503G-0005

II. Ostarbeiter (Ostzeichenträger).

(Hochstehendes Rechteck mit blau-weißer Umrandung auf blauem Grund die Aufschrift Ost in weißer Farbe.)

Als Ostarbeiter gelten die Arbeitskräfte aus dem altsowjetischen Gebiet mit Ausnahme der Randstaaten Litauen, Lettland, Estland, dem Bezirk Bialystock und dem Distrikt Lemberg. Ein Unterschied zwischen Ukrainern, Kaukasiern, Georgiern, Armeniern usw. wird nicht gemacht.

1.) Die Ostarbeiter sind in geschlossenen Lagern zu halten, die sie nur zum Zwecke des Arbeitseinsatzes in Begleitung des Wachpersonals oder des Lagerführers verlassen dürfen.

In kleinen landwirtschaftlichen Betrieben und Haushalten, in denen der Einzeleinsatz erlaubt ist, kann von einer lagermässigen Unterbringung abgesehen und eine Einzelunterbringung in fest verschließbaren Unterkünften gestattet werden, wenn eine männliche deutsche Person vorhanden ist, die die Kontrolle übernimmt.

2.) Geschlechtsverkehr zwischen Deutschen und Ostarbeitern ist verboten und wird für Ostarbeiter mit Todesstrafe und für Deutsche mit Konzentrationslager bestraft.

3.) Kirchenbesuch ist Ostarbeitern verboten. Auch seelsorgerische Betreuung durch Deutsche ist nicht gestattet.

4.) Briefverkehr ist den Ostarbeitern und ihren Angehörigen gestattet. Jeder Ostarbeiter kann zweimal im Monat eine Postkarte und einen Brief schreiben. Das Porto (Inlandsporto) ist beim zuständigen Postamt in Bar zu entrichten. Die Postsendungen sind durch Deutsche bei den Postämtern abzuliefern. Die Benutzung von Feldpostnummern ist den Ostarbeitern verboten. Derartige Postsendungen sind der hiesigen Dienststelle zuzuleiten.

5.) Die Freizeit der einzeln eingesetzten Ostarbeiter auf dem Lande haben sie auf dem Grundstück des Arbeitgebers zu verbringen. Ausgang kann gewissermassen als Belohnung unter hinreichender deutscher Aufsicht gewährt werden. Ostarbeiter können einen Arzt nur in Begleitung eines Deutschen aufsuchen.

6.) Erscheint Bestrafung eines Ostarbeiters geboten, ist die Ortspolizeibehörde zu benachrichtigen.

III. Arbeitskräfte aus den Randstaaten Litauen, Lettland, Estland, sowie aus dem Bezirk Bialystock und dem Distrikt Lemberg.

Für diese Arbeitskräfte gelten folgende Richtlinien:

1.) Sie dürfen sich innerhalb des Land- oder Stadtkreises, in dem sie arbeiten, frei bewegen. Verlassen dieses Ge-

A083746

USSR-381b

Gebietes ist nur mit Erlaubnis der Ortspolizeibehörde gestattet.

2.) Arbeitsniederlegung, Aufhetzung anderer Arbeiter, eigenmächtiges Verlassen der Arbeitsstelle wird mit Erziehungsarbeit im Arbeitserziehungslager bestraft.

3.) Geschlechtsverkehr mit deutschen Frauen und Mädchen ist bei strengster Strafe verboten.

IV. Tschechen und Protektoratsangehörige.

Im allgemeinen Behandlung wie deutsche Arbeiter. Verboten ist grundsätzlich der Geschlechtsverkehr zwischen Protektoratsangehörigen und Deutschblütigen.

V. Arbeitskräfte aus den uns befreundeten Staaten: Italien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Kroatien, Rumänien, Bulgarien.

Die Arbeitskräfte aus diesen Staaten sind als Gastarbeiter im Großdeutschen Reich tätig und unterstehen damit den deutschen Gesetzen. Geschlechtsverkehr mit diesen Arbeitskräften ist unerwünscht.

VI. Arbeitskräfte aus den besetzten Gebieten.

Hierbei ist zu unterscheiden zwischen Arbeitnehmern germanischer Abstammung, wie Niederländer, Norweger, Dänen und den übrigen aus den besetzten Gebieten Frankreich, Belgien, Griechenland und Restjugoslawien stammenden Arbeitskräften.

a) Die Arbeitnehmer germanischen Volkstums, die dem deutschen Volk rassenmässig gleich sind, sind grundsätzlich wie Deutsche zu behandeln.

b) Fremdvölkische Arbeitnehmer aus den besetzten Gebieten Frankreich, Belgien, Griechenland, Restjugoslawien. Es ist darauf zu achten, daß ein Geschlechtsverkehr der fremdvölkischen Arbeitskräfte mit deutschen Volksgenossen nicht stattfindet. Im übrigen sind diese Arbeitskräfte in Bezug auf ihren Arbeitseinsatz wie Deutsche zu behandeln. Bei festgestelltem Geschlechtsverkehr zwischen fremdvölkischen Arbeitskräften und Deutschen ist sofort die zuständige Ortspolizeibehörde zu benachrichtigen.

VII.

A083747

H1503G-0006

USSR-381 b

VII. Kriegsgefangene.

Die Kriegsgefangenen unterstehen der Wehrmacht. Die Fälle des verbotswidrigen Verkehrs zwischen Deutschen, insbesondere Frauen und Kriegsgefangenen sind trotz der bisher geleisteten Aufklärungsarbeit weiterhin im Steigen begriffen. Dieser Tatsache ist besondere Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Durch entsprechende Beobachtung und rechtzeitiges Eingreifen werden sich in vielen Fällen bereits in der Entwicklung begriffene Beziehungen zu deutschen Frauen und Kriegsgefangenen unterbinden, bzw. durch erzieherische Maßnahmen rechtzeitig abstellen lassen.

Die Tätigkeit der von der Partei zur Verfügung gestellten Kräfte erstreckt sich lediglich auf die Beobachtung und Uberwachung der ausländischen Zivilarbeiter, eine Vollzugsgewalt steht ihnen nicht zu.

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия

А083748

H1503G-0007

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503-R

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

Главный обвинитель

от СССР

СССР № 382

H1503H-0001

H1503H-0002

УДОСТОВЕРЕНИЕ.

Я, Помощник Главного Обвинителя от СССР, полковник Красной Армии, КАРЕВ Д.С., действующий на основании полномочий, предоставленных мне письменным распоряжением Главного Обвинителя от СССР генерала РУДЕНКО Р.А. от 5 сентября 1946 года, настоящим удостоверяю, что фотокопия документа СССР № 382 является подлинной и точной копией с подлинника, хранящегося в Прокуратуре СССР, в городе Москве.

Замена подлинника документа его фотокопией произведена на основании разрешения Международного Военного Трибунала.

Полковник Карев /Д.Карев/

" 6 " сентября 1946г.

H1503H-0003

C E R T I F I C A T E .

I hereby certify that the annexed document - USSR No 382 is a photostat of an original document submitted in evidence by the Soviet Prosecution under this number.

J. R a y
Colonel, USA

General Secretary
International Military Tribunal.

N.Y. October 1946

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 382
Filed Feb 22, 1946

USSR-382

Wi Stab Ost
Chefgruppe Arbeit

Berlin, den 8-4.1942

Durch Luftkurier!

An
Wi In Nord, Chefgruppe Arbeit
Wi In Mitte, Chefgruppe Arbeit
Wi In Süd, Chefgruppe Arbeit.

Betrifft: Russeneinsatz.

Im Nachgang zu meinem Fernschreiben bzw. Fernspruch vom 2.4. und 5.4.42 übermittle ich anliegend Abschrift eines Schreibens des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz vom 31.3.42 nebst Anlagen zur Kenntnisnahme. Abschriften für die nachgeordneten Dienststellen sind in ausreichender Zahl beigefügt.

1. Auf die Ausführungen unter Ziffer 1 des Schreibens, in welchen die vollverantwortliche Mitarbeit der Ost-Dienststellen der Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung und die Verpflichtung zur kameradschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit mit den Anwerbekommissionen besonders herausgestellt wird, weise ich nachdrücklichst hin. Gleichzeitig richte ich an alle Mitarbeiter im Hinblick auf die ausserordentlich gespannte Lage des grossdeutschen Arbeitseinsatzes die dringende Bitte und Mahnung, sich unter Zurückstellung aller persönlichen Interessen für die im Schreiben des Generalbevollmächtigten aufgezeigten Ziele restlos einzusetzen.

2. Wegen der in Ziffer 2 des Schreibens angeregten Abfangung der bereits für den Süd-Ost-Treck in Marsch gesetzten Kräfte habe ich weitere Weisungen des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz eingeholt und bitte, diesbezügliche Massnahmen vorerst zurückstellen zu wollen. Für den Süd-Ost-Treck angeworbene, aber bisher noch nicht in Marsch gesetzte Arbeitskräfte sind, Eignung und Ausgleichsfähigkeit vorausgesetzt, jetzt schon auf dem raschesten Wege dem Arbeitseinsatz im Reiche zuzuführen.

3. Die in Aussicht genommene Verdreifachung der Anwerbung setzt eine intensive propagandistische Vorbereitung voraus. Ich empfehle, sich zu diesem Zwecke, wie dies bereits im Bereich der Wi In Mitte geschieht, der dort vorhandenen Propagandaeinrichtungen zu bedienen und diese in ähnlicher Weise wie bei Einführung der neuen Agrarordnung einzusetzen. Der

H1503H-0004

H1503H-0005

USSR 382

Der Herr Reichsmarschall wünscht persönlich und ausdrücklich, dass die Ostwerbung mit allen Mitteln betrieben wird. Von einer zwangsweisen Aushebung ist zunächst nur in Form von Auflagen an die einzelnen Bezirke Gebrauch zu machen.

DER CHEF DES WIRTSCHAFTSSTABES OST
I.A.

gez. Dr. Rachner

Beglaubigt:

gez. Arbogast
KVI

Abschrift!

Der Beauftragte für den Vierjahresplan
Der Generalbevollmächtigte
für den Arbeitseinsatz

Va 5780.28/742

Berlin SW 11, 31.März 42

Schnellbrief!

An
den Herrn Reichsminister für die
besetzten Ostgebiete,
z.Hd.von Herrn Reichsminister Rosenberg oViA
B e r l i n W 35

den Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Gruppe Arbeit,
z.Hd.von Herrn Kriegsverwaltungschef Dr. Rechner
im H a u s e (R.M)

Betrifft: Russeneinsatz.

Die der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz für die Durchführung des Russenauftrages von dem Herrn Reichsmarschall erteilten Vollmachten habe ich als Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz übernommen. Für die Erleichterung der Arbeitseinsatzlage im Reich kommt der Durchführung des Russenauftrages entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Ich bitte daher, alle Möglichkeiten restlos zu erschöpfen, um schnellmöglichst und in grösstmöglichstem Umfange zivile Arbeitskräfte aus den neu besetzten Ostgebieten dem Reiche zuzuführen.

-3-

A 083762

USSR 382

3

1. Für die Anwerbung werde ich mich, wie bisher von der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz geschehen, gleichfalls der vollverantwortlichen Mitarbeit der Dienststellen der Arbeitseinsatzverwaltung in den neu besetzten Ostgebieten bedienen. Ich bitte, diese auf ihre Verantwortung besonders hinzuweisen und sie anzuhalten, mit den Kommissionen der bisherigen Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz, die nunmehr in meinem Auftrage tätig und mir unterstellt sind, aufs engste zusammenzuarbeiten Meine Kommissionen haben die Aufgabe, dieTätigkeit Ihrer Dienststellen für die Anwerbung von Arbeitskräften nach dem Reich in jeder Hinsicht zu unterstützen. Ich lege Wert darauf, dass diese Gemeinschaftsarbeit in kameradschaftlicher Form ohne unnötige Aufwerfung von Zuständigkeitsfragen lediglich abgestellt auf den grösstmöglichsten Erfolg stattfindet.

2. Die Ergebnisse der Anwerbung müssen schnellstens auf das Dreifache gesteigert werden. Mit Rücksicht auf den dringenden Bedarf der deutschen Landwirtschaft für die Frühjahrsbestellung und den ebenso dringenden Bedarf der Rüstungswirtschaft müssen alle Wünsche für den Eigenbedarf weitgehendst zurückgestellt werden. Der Einsatz im Reich sollte zum mindesten für die nächsten 3 Monate allem anderen vorgehen, es sei denn, dass es sich um zwingenden kriegsentscheidenden Eigenbedarf handelt. Ich wäre dankbar, wenn insbesondere die Herren Reichskommissare und Generalkommissare sowie die La-Führer auch von Ihnen nochmals hierauf ganz besonders hingewiesen und aufgefordert würden, ihre Mitarbeit in vollem Umfange zur Verfügung zu stellen. In Verhandlungen der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz mit der Gruppe Landwirtschaft - Ministerialdirektor Rieke - ist bereits erreicht worden, dass die Bedarfsdeckung für das Reich dem Bedarf für den Südosttreck vorgeht. Bei dem dringenden Bedarf der deutschen Landwirtschaft halte ich es für erforderlich, dass auch bereits für den Südosttreck in Marsch gesetzte Kräfte abgefangen und meiner nächsten Kommission für den Einsatz im Reich geschlossen zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Ich bitte um dahingehende Anweisung an Ihre Dienststellen.

3. Um das Anwerbeergebnis zu steigern, werde ich die entsandten Kommissionen zunächst verdoppeln. Ich habe für den 7. April bereits 2oo Fachkräfte der Arbeitsvermittlung nach Berlin berufen lassen, die unverzüglich zur Verstärkung eingesetzt werden sollen.

4. Die Vorarbeiten für die Verdreifachung der Anwerbung müssen mit grösster Energie und ohne jeden Zeitverlust durchgeführt werden, da die Kräfte vor dem Inkraftsetzen eines

H1503H-0007

USSR 382

4

verstärkten Abtransportplanes auch bereitstehen müssen.

Um die Werbeergebnisse zu steigern, beabsichtige ich, eine Erleichterung der bisherigen Einsatzbedingungen in Bezug auf Lohnregelung, Lohntransfer, Art der Unterbringung, Bewachung, Betreuung, Höhe der Verpflegungssätze durchzuführen. Ich werde Ihnen das Ergebnis meiner Verhandlungen schnellstens mitteilen.

Abschliessend bitte ich nochmals, alle geeigneten Schritte zu ergreifen, um die schnellste Durchführung des Russenauftrages zu sichern.

Abschrift meiner Fernschreiben an die Anwerbekommissionen bzw. die Reichskommissare und Wirtschaftsinspektionen füge ich bei.

gez. S a u c k e l

Abschrift!

Abschrift!

Der Beauftragte für den Vierjahresplan

Der Generalbevollmächtigte
für den Arbeitseinsatz

Berlin, d.31.3.1942

Fernschreiben!

G.Z. V a 5780.28/739

Betrifft: Russeneinsatz; hier: Tätigkeit der Anwerbekommissionen.

Der Führer hat mich zum Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz ernannt. Damit ist auch der bisher der Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz erteilte Auftrag für den Russeneinsatz von mir übernommen worden. Die Kommissionen sind nunmehr mir unterstellt und führen bis auf weiteres die Bezeichnung:

"Anwerbekommissionen des Generalbevollmächtigten
für den Arbeitseinsatz".

Die Stellung der Kommissionen bleibt vorläufig im übrigen die gleiche wie bisher. Sie sind den Dienststellen des Ostministeriums bzw. des Wi-Stabs Ost zur Unterstützung beigegeben und alle Massnahmen, die zur Verstärkung des Russeneinsatzes bei-

USSR 382
5

H1503H-0008

beitragen, mit diesen gemeinsam durchzuführen und nachhaltig zu fördern. Ich erwarte, dass die Kommissionen aufs engste und kameradschaftlichste mit den Ostdienststellen, die mir in gleicher Weise für den Erfolg der Anwerbung verantwortlich sind, zusammenarbeiten. Ich habe die gleiche Bitte auf Zusammenarbeit auch an das Ostministerium und den Wi Stab Ost gerichtet.

Die Anwerbung ist sofort und unter allen Umständen so zu verstärken, dass in kürzester Frist, d.h. noch im April, eine Steigerung des Abtransportes um das Dreifache erfolgen kann. Zur Aufstellung des dafür erforderlichen Transportplans sind dem Reichsarbeitsministerium – Referat V a R – die Abgangsbahnhöfe und die Zahlen der voraussichtlich wöchentlich zu erwartenden Kräfte über die Reichskommissare bzw. Wi In bis zum 10. April zu melden. Die Verstärkung der Kommissionen bzw. die Entsendung neuer Kommissionen wird beschleunigt erfolgen.

Wünsche auf Bereitstellung weiter Kraftwagen und Zuteilung von Betriebsstoff sind über die Reichskommissare bzw. die Wi In unverzüglich fernschriftlich an das Reichsarbeitsministerium – Referat V a R – zu übermitteln.

gez. S a u c k e l

An die

Leiter der Kommissionen der bisherigen Geschäftsgruppe Arbeitseinsatz in den besetzten Ostgebieten.

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело № 1 л. 66-68

A083765

Filed Feb 22, 1946
[illegible]
Secy

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503 i

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ №

383

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР №383

A083766

H1503I-0001

H1503I-0002

У Д О С Т О В Е Р Е Н И Е

Я, полковник вооруженных сил СССР, Дмитрий КАРЕВ, Помощник Главного Обвинителя от СССР и начальник документальной части Советского Обвинения на Нюрнбергском процессе, настоящим удостоверяю, что нижеследующие документы, пред"явленные Международному Военному Трибуналу, а именно:

СССР-89, СССР-I73, СССР-I74, СССР-I75, СССР-I76, СССР-I78, СССР-I79, СССР-I80, СССР-I83, СССР-I85, СССР-I96, СССР-266, СССР-267, СССР-268, СССР-270, СССР-367, СССР-379а, СССР-38Iа, СССР-382, СССР-383, СССР-386, СССР-42I, СССР-422, СССР-423, СССР-424, СССР-425, СССР-426, СССР-427, СССР-429, СССР-430, СССР-43I, СССР-432, СССР-433, СССР-434, СССР-444, СССР-469, -

являются документами, захваченными у немцев в период I94I-I945 г.г. частями Красной Армии.

ПОЛКОВНИК /Д. КАРЕВ/

2 августа I946 г.
г.Нюрнберг.

А083767

H15031-0003

USSR-383

Abschrift!

Der Reichsarbeitsminister
V a 5780.28/3786

Berlin SW 11, den 8.9.42
Saarlandstr.96

Schnellbrief

An
a) den Herrn Reichsminister für die besetzten Ostgebiete, z.Hd.von Herrn Reichsminister Rosenberg,
b) den Wi Stab Ost , Chefgruppe Arbeit, z.Hd.von Herrn Kriegsverwaltungschef Dr.Rachner,

im Hause.

Betrifft: Ostarbeitereinsatz; hier: Einsatz von 400.000 hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen.

Hiermit übersende ich Ihnen Abschrift meiner an die Landesarbeitsämter ergangenen Weisung wegen des Einsatzes von 400000 hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen mit dem für die Durchführung der Aktion vorgesehenen Merkblatt. Ich bitte Sie, nunmehr beschleunigt die erforderlichen Weisungen an Ihre Dienststellen wegen der Durchführung der Anwerbung zu geben. Insbesondere wird durch Sie die Aufteilung des Gesamtkontingents auf den Bereich des Wi Stabs Ost und den Bereich des Ostmin. zu regeln sein und im Bereich des Ostmin. die Unterverteilung auf die beiden Reichskommissariate.

Ich lege besonderen Wert darauf, daß die Anwerbung ohne Benachteiligung der laufenden Werbung für die Rüstungs- und Ernährungswirtschaft zusätzlich erfolgt und daß der Abtransport ins Reich raschestens durchgeführt wird, so daß die Gesamtzahl der anzuwerbenden weiblichen Kräfte noch vor Eintritt des Winters, also bis Ende Oktober, in Marsch gesetzt ist.

Ich bitte, mir sofort die von Ihnen getroffenen Anweisungen zur Kenntnis zu bringen und auch meine Anwerbekommissionen in den neubesetzten Ostgebieten entsprechend zu unterrichten.

Ich beabsichtige, meine Anwerbekommissionen durch den Einsatz

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NUREMBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 383
Filed Feb 22,1946

A 083768

H1503I-0004

von 1 - 2 weiblichen hauswirtschaftlichen Fachvermittlerinnen zunächst in den Städten Kiew, Poltawa, Saporoshje, Nikolajew, Charkow und Dnjepropetrowsk zu verstärken. Sollten Sie auch in weiteren Städten den Einsatz derartiger weiblicher Fachkräfte für erforderlich eracht en, so bitte ich, mir dies gleichfalls unverzüglich mitzuteilen.

gez.Sauckel.

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело №3 л. 69

№083769

USSR-383 70

Der Beauftragte für den Vierjahresplan
Der Generalbevollmächtigte für den Arbeitseinsatz
Gesch.-Z.: Va 5780.28/2714

Berlin, den 8. September 1942

Sonderaktion des Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz zur Hereinholung von Ostarbeiterinnen zugunsten kinderreicher städtischer und ländlicher Haushaltungen

Zur Verstärkung des Arbeitseinsatzes in der Hauswirtschaft, insbesondere zur Entlastung der kinderreichen und Aufbaufamilien, sollen auch hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen ins Reich hereingeholt und, je nach Bedarfslage, etwa je zur Hälfte in städtischen und ländlichen Haushaltungen eingesetzt werden.

Der Einsatz hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen in Familienhaushaltungen in größerer Zahl kann sich in sicherheitspolizeilicher und volkstumspolitischer Hinsicht ungünstig auswirken und für die Entwicklung des Berufsstandes der deutschen Hausgehilfinnen von Nachteil werden, wenn er nicht besonders sorgfältig vorbereitet und beobachtet wird. Um solchen Gefahren nach Möglichkeit zu begegnen, bestimme ich im Einvernehmen mit dem Leiter der Parteikanzlei und dem Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei für die Durchführung folgendes:

Gesichtspunkte für die Auswahl der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen

Für den Einsatz in Haushaltungen kommen nur Ostarbeiterinnen zwischen 15 und 35 Jahren in Frage, die bereit sind, in Haushaltungen zu arbeiten. Es kommen nur Kräfte in Betracht, die bei entsprechender Anleitung und Gewöhnung für den Einsatz im städtischen oder ländlichen Haushalt geeignet erscheinen, von kräftiger körperlicher Konstitution sind und deren allgemeines Erscheinungsbild dem deutschen möglichst nahekommt.

Mädchen, deren Äußeres auf fremde bzw. jüdische Abstammung schließen läßt, sind auf jeden Fall abzulehnen. Die Anwerbung von Volksdeutschen für die Hauswirtschaft ist auch im Rahmen dieser Aktion verboten.

Hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen dürfen in Familienhaushaltungen nur eingesetzt werden, nachdem durch ärztliche Untersuchung festgestellt worden ist, daß gegen den Einsatz in einem deutschen Haushalt keine ärztlichen Bedenken bestehen. Schwangere kommen für den Einsatz im Haushalt nicht in Betracht.

Verfahren bei Auswahl der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen

Die Anwerbestellen in den besetzten Ostgebieten werden künftig weibliche Arbeitskräfte, die unter den genannten Gesichtspunkten bei der ersten Sichtung für den Einsatz im Haushalt geeignet erscheinen, in den Transportlisten entsprechend kennzeichnen („Vorgesehen für Haushalt").

Soweit möglich, werden diese Kräfte bereits in den Ostgebieten vor Einteilung der Transporte ins Reich ausgesondert und nach einer Sichtung durch eine Arbeitseinsatzfachkraft (Vermittlerin) und einen Beauftragten des Reichsführers SS sowie eingehender ärztlicher Untersuchung zu geschlossenen Sondertransporten zusammengestellt bzw. in besonderen Wagen der allgemeinen Transportzüge abbefördert. In den Transportlisten wird ausdrücklich vermerkt, daß diese Kräfte nach dem Ergebnis der Sichtung unbedenklich in deutschen Haushalten eingesetzt werden können („für Haushalt unbedenklich geeignet").

Bei jedem Auffanglager der Landesarbeitsämter wird außerdem die Möglichkeit einer entsprechenden Sichtung (ebenfalls durch eine Arbeitseinsatzfachkraft — Vermittlerin — und einen Beauftragten des Reichsführers SS) für die weiblichen Arbeitskräfte vorgesehen, die in den Listen der noch nicht ausgesuchten Transporte als „vorgesehen für Haushalt" gekennzeichnet sind. Diese Kräfte bedürfen vor dem Einsatz noch einer genauen ärztlichen Untersuchung zwecks Feststellung, daß gegen den Einsatz in einem deutschen Haushalt keine Bedenken bestehen.

In der Anlaufzeit des neuen Verfahrens, solange Transporte ohne Kennzeichnung der für Haushaltungen in Betracht kommenden Mädchen einlaufen, können außerdem im Auffanglager selbst vorausgewählte geeignet erscheinende Mädchen in der im vorigen Absatz angegebenen Form endgültig für den Einsatz gesichtet werden.

Soweit bisher bereits Ostarbeiterinnen in Einzelfällen in Haushaltungen eingesetzt worden sind, und soweit eine Umsetzung einzelner Kräfte aus der gewerblichen Wirtschaft in Haushalte in Betracht gezogen wird, muß auch für diese durch das zuständige Arbeitsamt eine entsprechende Überprüfung veranlaßt werden.

Gesichtspunkte für die Auswahl der Haushaltungen

Die hauswirtschaftliche Tätigkeit im Familienhaushalt ist eine qualifizierte Berufsarbeit für deutsche weibliche Arbeitskräfte. In deutschen Haushaltungen, besonders in kinderreichen und Aufbaufamilien, sollen ausländische Hilfskräfte nur eingesetzt werden, soweit deutsche Hausgehilfinnen nicht zur Verfügung stehen. Bei dem gegenwärtigen Mangel an deutschen Hausgehilfinnen ist es jedoch erforderlich geworden, weibliche Arbeitskräfte der besetzten Ostgebiete auch zur Hilfe und Entlastung deutscher kinderreicher Familien zum Einsatz zu bringen.

Aus volkspolitischen Gründen sollen die ausländischen Kräfte, besonders aus den besetzten Ostgebieten, bevorzugt an Stellen eingesetzt werden, in denen sie praktische hauswirtschaftliche Arbeit zu erledigen haben, ohne in näherer Berührung mit der Familie zu stehen und in die Betreuung und Erziehung der Kinder eingeschaltet zu werden.

Für den Einsatz kommen nur Haushaltungen in Betracht, deren Mitglieder politisch zuverlässig sind und Gewähr dafür bieten, daß sie die für den Einsatz der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen erlassenen Bestimmungen genau beachten. Haushaltungen mit Kindern sollen hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen nur zugeteilt werden, wenn die Erziehung der Kinder durch die Mutter oder ihre Stellver-

Wenden!

A083770

H1503I-0006

treterin gewährleistet ist und in der Regel nicht in der Hand der Ostarbeiterin liegt.

Kinderreichen und Aufbaufamilien sollen zwar in erster Linie deutsche Hausgehilfinnen zugeführt werden. Da das zur Zeit nicht immer möglich ist, diesen Familien aber auf jeden Fall Hilfe gesichert werden soll, muß bei der Verteilung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen ihr Bedarf bevorzugt berücksichtigt werden. Erst wenn diesen Familien, soweit sie zur Einstellung von Ostarbeiterinnen bereit und geeignet sind, die erforderlichen Hilfskräfte gestellt sind, darf anderen Haushaltungen eine Ostarbeiterin vermittelt bzw. die Beschäftigungsgenehmigung für eine solche erteilt werden.

Der Einsatz erfolgt nur in Familien, in denen die gesonderte Unterbringung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen innerhalb des Haushalts gewährleistet ist. Auf keinen Fall dürfen hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen mit Deutschen gemeinsam untergebracht werden.

Verfahren bei Auswahl der Haushaltungen

Das Arbeitsamt gibt nach der Dringlichkeit des Bedarfs überprüfte Anträge auf Zuweisung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin auf einem Vordruck nach anliegendem Muster (Anlage 1) zur Begutachtung an den zuständigen Hoheitsträger der NSDAP. (Kreisleiter). Erhebt der Kreisleiter Bedenken gegen den Einsatz, so sieht das Arbeitsamt von der Zuweisung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin bzw. der Erteilung der Beschäftigungsgenehmigung für eine solche ab und gibt dem Haushaltungsvorstand einen ablehnenden Bescheid. Eine Begründung ist hierbei nicht anzuführen. Die Entscheidung ist endgültig.

Soweit in einzelnen Fällen bereits hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen in Haushaltungen eingesetzt sind, ist die Überprüfung des Haushalts nachträglich zu veranlassen.

Auf das Erfordernis der vorherigen Begutachtung des Haushalts ist besonders auch bei der Umsetzung der Ostarbeiterinnen, die bereits im Reich beschäftigt werden, von einem Haushalt in einen anderen bzw. von einem Betrieb in einen Haushalt zu achten.

Ergibt sich nachträglich während der Beschäftigung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen, daß die für den Einsatz notwendigen Voraussetzungen bei dem Haushalt nicht vorliegen, so erwirkt das Arbeitsamt von Amts wegen oder auf Antrag des Hoheitsträgers der NSDAP. im Verhandlungswege die beschleunigte Entlassung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin. Führen die Verhandlungen nicht zum Erfolg, so kann die Angelegenheit der Staatspolizeileitstelle übergeben werden. Das Arbeitsamt sorgt gegebenenfalls für anderweitigen Einsatz.

Einsatzbedingungen

Für den Einsatz der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen gelten die allgemeinen Bedingungen für den Einsatz der Ostarbeiter — s. Erl. Va 5780.28/551 vom 20. März 1942 — und Rderl. ARG. 444/42, soweit nicht der Reichsführer SS und Chef der Deutschen Polizei abweichende Bestimmungen erläßt.

Die Beaufsichtigung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen durch den beschäftigenden Haushalt muß jederzeit gewährleistet sein. Die Haushaltungsvorstände sind verpflichtet, das Arbeitsamt zu unterrichten, falls wegen längerer Abwesenheit der Familie eine Beaufsichtigung nicht möglich ist, damit das Arbeitsamt erforderlichenfalls die Ostarbeiterin für diese Zeit vorübergehend anderweitig einsetzt.

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen erhalten grundsätzlich die gleichen Lebensmittelzuteilungen wie die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung.

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen sind, soweit sie in städtischen Haushaltungen eingesetzt sind, ausschließlich für eine Beschäftigung mit hauswirtschaftlichen Arbeiten vorgesehen und dürfen nicht anderweitig, etwa in dem Beruf des Haushaltungsvorstandes, z. B. als Sprechstundenhilfe, Verkäuferin, Kellnerin usw. beschäftigt werden. Hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen, die in ländlichen Haushaltungen eingesetzt sind, sollen für landwirtschaftliche Arbeiten nur in dem bei ländlichen Hausgehilfinnen üblichen Umfang herangezogen werden.

Sind deutsche Hilfskräfte im Haushalt, so sind diese so hervorzuheben und aufsichtführend einzusetzen, daß ein Solidaritätsgefühl zwischen ihnen und den hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen nicht entstehen kann.

Das arbeitsrechtliche Verhältnis regelt sich nach der Verordnung über die Einsatzbedingungen der Ostarbeiter vom 30. Juni 1942 — RGBl. I S. 419 ff. —. Hinsichtlich der Entlohnung habe ich die Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit angewiesen, für ihr Wirtschaftsgebiet einheitliche Lohnsätze für hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen in zwei Altersgruppen festzusetzen, die den Arbeitsämtern mitgeteilt werden. Jedem Haushaltungsvorstand, der eine hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterin beschäftigt, teilt der Leiter des Arbeitsamts als Beauftragter des Reichstreuhänders der Arbeit den entsprechenden Lohnsatz sowie die Höhe des auszuzahlenden Betrages und der von ihm zu zahlenden Ostarbeiterabgabe mit (vgl. Erl. GBA. IIIb 14531 vom 25. Juli 1942 — Rderl. ARG. 899/42). Für hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen ist nur die Hälfte der Ostarbeiterabgabe zu zahlen. Die Ostarbeiterabgabe entfällt, wenn eine Ostarbeiterin im Haushalt beschäftigt wird von einem Abgabepflichtigen mit mindestens drei minderjährigen Kindern oder anderen minderjährigen Angehörigen im Sinne des § 10 Nr. 3 bis 6 StAnpG, die das 14. Lebensjahr noch nicht vollendet haben, zum Haushalt des Abgabepflichtigen gehören und in seinem Haushalt leben.

Merkblätter nach anliegendem Muster (Anlage 2) gehen den Landesarbeitsämtern in Kürze in größerer Zahl zu.

Als Unterlage für die Verteilung der Kontingente teilen die Landesarbeitsämter unverzüglich ihren Bedarf an hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen, getrennt nach Bedarf für städtische und ländliche Haushalte, mit.

Über Schwierigkeiten, die sich bei dem Einsatz hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen ergeben, bitte ich alsbald, über die allgemeinen Beobachtungen und Erfahrungen bei diesem Einsatz bis zum 31. Oktober 1942 zu berichten und gleichzeitig die Zahl hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen, die in den Landesarbeitsbezirken zum Einsatz gekommen sind, getrennt nach städtischen und ländlichen Haushaltungen, mitzuteilen.

Vorgang: Rderl. Va 5780.28/551 vom 20. 3. 1942 und Rderl. ARG. 444/42.

Sauckel

A083771

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело №3 1.70

H1503I-0007

zu Va 5780.28/2714 vom 8. September 1942

Merkblatt

für Hausfrauen über die Beschäftigung hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen in städtischen und ländlichen Haushaltungen

(herausgegeben vom Generalbevollmächtigten für den Arbeitseinsatz im Einvernehmen mit dem Leiter der Parteikanzlei und den übrigen beteiligten Dienststellen)

Deutsche Hausgehilfinnen stehen heute den deutschen Haushaltungen nicht in ausreichender Zahl zur Verfügung. Die einheimischen Arbeitskräfte müssen deshalb durch ausländische Hilfskräfte ergänzt werden. Zur Entlastung der Hausfrauen werden jetzt auch hauswirtschaftliche Arbeitskräfte aus den altsowjetischen Gebieten (hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen) eingesetzt. Über die Zugehörigkeit einer Ausländerin zu diesem Personenkreis, auf den die untenstehenden Bestimmungen Anwendung finden, gibt das Arbeitsamt Auskunft.

Die Hausfrau übernimmt mit der Beschäftigung der Ostarbeiterin die Verantwortung, durch richtiges eigenes Verhalten und durch ordnungsgemäße Behandlung der Ostarbeiterin Schäden für die Familie und das deutsche Volk zu verhindern.

Jeder Deutsche hat mit dafür zu sorgen, daß eine Blutmischung mit den Ostarbeiterinnen vermieden wird.

A. Allgemeine Grundsätze für die Behandlung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen

1. Das Verhalten im Haushalt

Die Ostarbeiterinnen kommen aus einem Land, dessen Bewohner dem deutschen Volkstum, der deutschen Kultur, Art und Sitte fremd gegenüberstehen und jahrzehntelang im bolschewistischen Sinne erzogen worden sind. Es muß alles versucht werden, sie durch richtiges Verhalten und richtige Behandlung zur richtigen Einstellung zu bringen und den deutschen Familienhaushalt vor Schaden zu hüten.

Jeder Fremde beurteilt nach der persönlichen und politischen Haltung des einzelnen die Einstellung unseres gesamten Volkes. Die ausländischen Arbeitskräfte müssen in der Hausfrau und ihren Familienangehörigen würdige Vertreter des deutschen Volkes sehen können. Fragen unseres völkischen Lebens wie Unterhaltungen über kriegsbedingte Schwie-

A 083772

H1503I-0008

rigkeiten und Sorgen gehören nicht vor die Ohren dieser fremden Kräfte.

Die deutsche Familie muß in ihrer Haltung gegenüber der Ostarbeiterin den Kriegsverhältnissen Rechnung tragen und in natürlichem Selbstbewußtsein jede unangemessene Annäherung vermeiden.

Da die Ostarbeiterinnen wahrscheinlich sehr willig sind, aber noch keine Erfahrungen in Hausarbeiten, wie sie in deutschen Haushaltungen üblich sind, besitzen, hat die Hausfrau sie sorgfältig und mit Geduld in deutsche Ordnung und Haushaltführung einzuführen.

Die Ostarbeiterin muß korrekt und in jeder Hinsicht gerecht behandelt werden. Sie wird bei Willkür und unnötiger Schroffheit von Erwachsenen und Ungezogenheiten von Kindern ebenso schnell den schuldigen Respekt verlieren und in ihrer Arbeitsleistung nachlassen wie bei Nichtbeachtung des gebotenen Abstandes. Ordentliche Behandlung, Verpflegung, Unterbringung und Auszahlung des Lohnes sind selbstverständliche Pflicht.

2. Die Arbeitseinteilung im Haushalt

Der Aufgabenkreis der Ostarbeiterin ist möglichst weitgehend auf die technischen Arbeiten im Haushalt zu begrenzen. Die Haushaltführung und die Erziehung der Kinder ist Aufgabe der Hausfrau oder der deutschen Hausgehilfin.

3. Die Bewertung der hauswirtschaftlichen Arbeit

Das Ansehen der hauswirtschaftlichen Leistung darf durch die Beschäftigung von Ostarbeiterinnen nicht sinken. Die Erfüllung der hauswirtschaftlichen Aufgaben in der Familie ist höchster Dienst am Volk. Die verantwortliche Haushaltsführung bleibt deshalb den deutschen Frauen vorbehalten. Es ist Pflicht der Hausfrau, durch das eigene Vorbild, die Erziehung der Kinder und die richtige Behandlung der deutschen Hausgehilfin dazu beizutragen, einen berufsstolzen deutschen hauswirtschaftlichen Nachwuchs heranzubilden.

Werden ausnahmsweise in demselben Haushalt deutsche Hausgehilfinnen und Ostarbeiterinnen beschäftigt, so ist die deutsche Hausgehilfin vorwiegend mit Aufgaben der Familienbetreuung zu beauftragen und aufsichtführend gegenüber der Ostarbeiterin einzusetzen. Deutsche Hausgenossen haben immer den Vorrang.

B. Einsatzbedingungen

1. Einstellung, Entlassung

Hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen dürfen als Ausländerinnen nur mit Genehmigung des für den Haushalt zuständigen Arbeitsamtes beschäftigt werden. Auch Haushaltungen mit Kindern unter 14 Jahren müssen also vor Einstellung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin stets die Beschäftigungsgenehmigung des Arbeitsamtes einholen. Das ist auch bei Einstellung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin, die bereits in einem anderen Arbeitsverhältnis gestanden hat, besonders zu beachten.

Vor Entlassung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin ist das Arbeitsamt zu unterrichten.

K083773

H1503I-0009

2. Polizeiliche Anmeldung, Kennzeichnung, Beaufsichtigung

Der Haushaltungsvorstand ist verpflichtet, die Ostarbeiterin sofort nach Aufnahme in seinem Haushalt polizeilich anzumelden.

Die Ostarbeiterin ist verpflichtet, auf der rechten Brustseite jeder Oberkleidung das „Ost"-Kennzeichen zu tragen. Die Bestellung der Kennzeichen kann bei der polizeilichen Anmeldung erfolgen.

Ist eine Beaufsichtigung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin im Haushalt wegen längerer Abwesenheit der Familie nicht möglich, so ist das Arbeitsamt unverzüglich zu unterrichten, das erforderlichenfalls die hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterin für diese Zeit vorübergehend anderweitig einsetzt.

3. Beschäftigung

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen sind ausschließlich für eine Beschäftigung mit hauswirtschaftlichen Arbeiten vorgesehen und dürfen nicht anderweitig, etwa in dem Beruf des Haushaltungsvorstandes, z. B. als Sprechstundenhilfe, Verkäuferin, Kellnerin, tätig sein. Hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen, die in ländlichen Haushaltungen eingesetzt sind, sollen zu landwirtschaftlichen Arbeiten nur in dem bei ländlichen Hausgehilfinnen üblichen Umfang herangezogen werden.

4. Arbeitsverhältnis

Die im Reich eingesetzten hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen stehen in einem Beschäftigungsverhältnis eigener Art. Die deutschen arbeitsrechtlichen und arbeitsschutzrechtlichen Vorschriften finden auf sie nur insoweit Anwendung, als dies besonders bestimmt wird.

5. Entlohnung

Die Höhe des Entgelts der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen richtet sich nach den von dem Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit herausgegebenen Sätzen, die dem Haushaltungsvorstand bei Vermittlung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin vom Arbeitsamt bekanntgegeben werden.

6. Ostarbeiterabgabe

Haushaltungsvorstände, die hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen beschäftigen, haben grundsätzlich eine Abgabe nach Maßgabe der von dem Reichstreuhänder der Arbeit herausgegebenen Tabelle zu entrichten, deren Höhe bei der Vermittlung von dem Arbeitsamt bekanntgegeben wird.

7. Steuerfreiheit

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen haben während der Beschäftigung innerhalb des Deutschen Reiches keine Lohnsteuer zu zahlen.

8. Versorgung der Angehörigen

Die Angehörigen der in das Reich vermittelten hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin erhalten — soweit erforderlich — für die Beschäftigungsdauer eine

4083774

Hier durchschneiden!

H1503I-0010

Unterstützung bis zu 130 Rubel je Monat. Bei Entlassung in die Heimat, unerlaubter Aufgabe der Arbeit, schwerwiegenden Verstößen gegen die Disziplin und Todesfall ist das zuständige Arbeitsamt unverzüglich zu benachrichtigen, damit die Zahlung der Unterstützung eingestellt wird.

9. Freizeit

Ein Anspruch auf Freizeit besteht nicht.

Hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen dürfen sich grundsätzlich außerhalb der Haushalte nur bewegen, um Angelegenheiten der Haushaltungen zu erledigen. Jedoch kann ihnen bei Bewährung einmal wöchentlich als Belohnung die Gelegenheit gegeben werden, sich 3 Stunden ohne Beschäftigung außerhalb des Haushalts aufzuhalten. Dieser Ausgang muß bei Einbruch der Dunkelheit, spätestens aber um 20 Uhr, beendet sein. Der Besuch von Gaststätten, Lichtspiel- oder sonstigen Theatern und ähnlichen für Deutsche oder ausländische Arbeiter vorgesehenen Einrichtungen ist verboten. Desgleichen ist der Kirchenbesuch untersagt. Besondere Veranstaltungen werden unter Umständen für hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen in städtischen Haushaltungen durch die Deutsche Arbeitsfront, für hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterinnen in ländlichen Haushaltungen durch den Reichsnährstand gemeinsam mit dem Deutschen Frauenwerk durchgeführt werden.

Die hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterin muß außerhalb des Haushalts stets ihre Arbeitskarte als Personalausweis mit sich führen.

10. Urlaub, Rückkehr nach der Heimat

Urlaub wird zunächst nicht gewährt.

Die Anwerbung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen erfolgt auf unbestimmte Zeit.

11. Sparen

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen können ihr Entgelt ganz oder zum Teil verzinslich sparen. Der ersparte Betrag wird in die Heimat überwiesen und steht dort dem Sparer oder dessen Angehörigen zur Verfügung. Merkblätter hierüber werden durch die Arbeitsämter ausgegeben. Sie sind auch bei dem Büro der Landeswirtschaftsbank Ukraine, Berlin C 2, Grünstr. 3/4, erhältlich.

12. Unterkunft

Die Unterbringung erfolgt in dem beschäftigenden Haushalt. Die Unterkunft soll einfach, sauber und hygienisch einwandfrei und mit allem Notwendigen ausgestattet sein. Es ist Gelegenheit zur gründlichen Körperreinigung zu geben.

Deutsche dürfen das Zimmer mit der Ostarbeiterin nicht teilen.

13. Ernährung

Die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen erhalten grundsätzlich die gleichen Lebensmittelzuteilungen wie die deutsche Zivilbevölkerung.

A083775

H1503I-0011

14. Bekleidung

Bekleidung kann grundsätzlich nicht gewährt werden. In dringenden Ausnahmefällen, in denen es zur Erhaltung der Arbeitsfähigkeit der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin notwendig ist, können Bezugscheine bei den Wirtschaftsämtern beantragt werden. Die Zuweisungen erfolgen dann in der Regel aus vorhandenen Beständen getragener Kleidungsstücke. Im übrigen ist auf die Erhaltung und Pflege der von den Ostarbeiterinnen mitgebrachten Kleider besonders zu achten.

15. Gesundheitsfürsorge

Für die Tage, an denen die hauswirtschaftliche Ostarbeiterin wegen Krankheit oder Unfall nicht arbeiten kann, ist, soweit nicht Krankenhauspflege gegeben wird, vom Haushaltungsvorstand lediglich Unterkunft und freie Verpflegung zu gewähren. Die Krankenversorgung erfolgt durch die zuständige Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse, an die der Haushaltungsvorstand einen Beitrag in Höhe von 4,— *RM* aus eigenen Mitteln zu zahlen hat. Sofern für den beschäftigenden Betrieb eine Landkrankenkasse zuständig ist, hat diese die Krankenversorgung der hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin für einen vom Haushaltungsvorstand aus eigenen Mitteln zu zahlenden Beitragssatz in Höhe von täglich 0,13 *RM* zu übernehmen.

Besondere Aufmerksamkeit ist dem Auftreten von Ungeziefer (Läusen) zuzuwenden, obwohl die hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterinnen vor der Zuweisung einer Entlausung und einer ärztlichen Untersuchung unterzogen worden sind.

Ist wegen Krankheit oder sonstiger Arbeitsunfähigkeit die Rückbeförderung einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin nach dem Osten erforderlich, so ist sie dem zuständigen Arbeitsamt zur Rückführung zu melden. Schwangere sind dem Arbeitsamt sofort nach Bekanntwerden der Schwangerschaft zur Rückführung zu melden.

Die Kranke bzw. Schwangere verbleibt, sofern vom Arzt nichts anderes angeordnet ist, bis zum Abtransport in dem Haushalt.

16. Postverkehr

a) Im Bereich der Reichskommissariate Ostland (einschließlich Weißruthenien) und Ukraine ist die Dienstpost eingeführt. Es sind Postkarten sowie gewöhnliche und eingeschriebene Briefe bis zu 250 Gramm zugelassen. Der Absender muß genau angegeben sein. Die Postgebühren werden am Schalter bar entrichtet. Die Zustellung findet nur in Orten mit Dienstpostämtern und Poststellen statt. Bei Sendungen nach Orten ohne Dienstpostamt muß die Ortsbezeichnung mit dem Zusatz „über das Dienstpostamt in ..." angegeben werden.

b) Im rückwärtigen Heeresgebiet besteht ein allgemeiner Postverkehr noch nicht. Für die Ostarbeiter ist folgende Sonderregelung getroffen worden:

Jede Ostarbeiterin kann zweimal im Monat eine Postkarte mit Rückantwort (Inlandgebühren) schreiben. Die Anschrift muß deutlich in lateinischen Buchstaben geschrieben sein und folgende Angaben enthalten:

AN83776

H1503I-0012

An

Vor- und Zuname: .....

Ort: .....

Rayon: .....

(wenn bekannt, Name des anwerbenden Arbeitsamts).

Z. B.:

An

Frau Maria Witrischenka

Warkowa

Rayon Orscha

Arbeitsamt Borissow.

Die Anschriftseite der Antwortkarte hat die Ostarbeiterin mit genauer Anschrift auszufüllen. Die Karten sind vom Haushaltungsvorstand der Auslandsbriefprüfstelle, Berlin W 62, Budapester Str. 20, zuzuleiten.

Die für Deutschland bestimmte Post (Antwortkarte mit vorgeschriebener Anschrift) kann von den Angehörigen beim zuständigen Arbeitsamt im besetzten Gebiet gelegentlich des Empfangs der Unterstützung abgegeben werden. Das Arbeitsamt sammelt die Post und sendet sie auf dem Feldpostwege über die Auslandsbriefprüfstelle Berlin zur Weiterbeförderung an die Ostarbeiterinnen.

Zu a) und b): Paketverkehr ist zur Zeit noch nicht zugelassen.

17. Verstöße gegen die Arbeitsdisziplin

Bei groben Verstößen müssen sich die Haushaltungsvorstände an die Staatspolizei(leit)stellen wenden.

18. Beratung und Auskunft

a) Die Hausfrau wird vom Deutschen Frauenwerk über das volkspolitisch notwendige Verhalten und die unter diesem Gesichtspunkt richtige Arbeitseinteilung aufgeklärt. Es werden zu diesem Zweck Hausfrauentreffen durchgeführt.

Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront berät die städtische Hausfrau, der Reichsnährstand die ländliche Hausfrau in arbeitsrechtlichen und sozialpolitischen Fragen.

b) Die Ostarbeiterin wird, soweit sie im städtischen Haushalt eingesetzt ist, von der Deutschen Arbeitsfront bei arbeitsrechtlichen Fragen aufgeklärt, die Deutsche Arbeitsfront führt die Schlichtung von Streitfällen durch und stellt, soweit erforderlich, Sprachhilfe zur Verfügung. Die in ländlichen Haushaltungen eingesetzten Ostarbeiterinnen werden entsprechend durch den Reichsnährstand betreut.

Im übrigen erteilt das Arbeitsamt Auskunft.

Der Haushaltungsvorstand und die Hausfrau sind für die Beachtung der vorstehenden Bestimmungen verantwortlich.

A083777

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Дело № 3 л. 71

H1503I-0013

H1503I-0014

Anlage 1
zu Nr. Va 5780.28/2714 vom 8. September 1942

Arbeitsamt .....
Va 5780.28/.....

An
die NSDAP

.....

Betrifft: Einsatz hauswirtschaftlicher Ostarbeiterinnen.

Name des Haushaltungsvorstandes: .....
Beruf des Haushaltungsvorstandes: .....
Wohnung: .....
Privat — Arzt — Geschäftshaushalt (Geschäftszweig .....)

Der vorstehend genannte Haushalt hat die Vermittlung — Beschäftigungsgenehmigung für — eine(r) hauswirtschaftliche(n) Ostarbeiterin beantragt.

Ich bitte um Stellungnahme, ob Bedenken gegen den Einsatz einer solchen in diesem Haushalt bestehen.

....
(Ort und Datum) (Unterschrift)

Urschriftlich zurück
an
das Arbeitsamt
in .....

Gegen den Einsatz einer hauswirtschaftlichen Ostarbeiterin in dem obengenannten Haushalt bestehen — keine — Bedenken.

....
(Ort und Datum) (Unterschrift)

A083778

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия
Акт N3 л. 72.

Filed Feb. 18, 1946
[illegible]
Clerk

Международный военный трибунал

H-1503 j

ДОКУМЕНТЫ ОБВИНЕНИЯ

ПО ДЕЛУ № 1

Главный обвинитель
от СССР

СССР № 385

A 083779

H1503J-0001

A 083780

H1503J-0002

(35) Настоящим подтверждаю, что
приложенное фото точно воспроиз-
ведено с подлинника.

Фото аутентично подлиннику,
который хранится в делах
Чрезвычайной Государственной Комиссии
в гор. Москве.

Уполномоченный Чрезвычайной
Государственной Комиссии.

15/I 46 г. [illegible]

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NURNBERG, GERMANY
USSR Exhibit 385
Filed Feb 18, 1946

A 083781

H1503J-0004

A o 83182

16 Настоящим подтверждаю, что прилагаемое фото точно воспроизведено с подлинного.

Фото аутентично подлиннику, который хранится в делах Чрезвычайной Государственной Комиссии в гор. Москве.

Уполномоченный Чрезвычайной Государственной Комиссии

15/I 46 г. Е. [illegible]

Чрезвычайная Государственная Комиссия

А083783.

H1503J-0005